The Impact of Partners' Economic Incentives on Audit Quality in Big 4 Partnerships

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Dekeyser ◽  
Ann Gaeremynck ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Marleen Willekens

Economic incentives are fundamental for understanding auditor behavior. In this paper, we investigate the association between the extent of partners' fee-based compensation, partners' observable net wealth, and audit quality. Using a sample of Belgian Big 4 audit firms and their predominantly private clients, our results suggest a negative association between audit quality and partner fee-based compensation, and a positive association between audit quality and partner observable net wealth. Moreover, our results show that the latter association is most significant when a partner is carrying a lot of debt, which indicates that a partner's financial situation may affect audit quality. The extent of fee-based incentives also varies among partners of the same audit firm. Furthermore, partner and client characteristics differ based on the extent of fee-based compensation. Our findings should be of interest to regulators and audit firms as they suggest that audit partner's economic incentives significantly affect audit quality.

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-99
Author(s):  
Carl W. Hollingsworth ◽  
Terry L. Neal ◽  
Colin D. Reid

SUMMARY While prior research has examined audit firm and audit partner rotation, we have little evidence on the impact of within-firm engagement team disruptions on the audit. To examine these disruptions, we identify a unique sample of companies where the audit firm issuing office changed but the audit firm did not change and investigate the effect of these changes on the audit. Our results indicate that companies that have a change in their audit firm's issuing office exhibit a decrease in audit quality and an increase in audit fees. In additional analysis, we partition office changes into two groups—client driven changes and audit firm driven changes. This analysis reveals that client driven changes are more likely to result in a higher audit fee while audit quality is unchanged. Conversely, audit firm driven changes do not result in a higher audit fee but do experience a decrease in audit quality.


Author(s):  
Rebecca Mattocks ◽  
Ting-Chiao Huang ◽  
Robyn Moroney ◽  
Ashna Lata Prasad

This paper examines the association between the length of the cooling-off period and audit quality: (1) when partners rotate back and (2) during the cooling-off period, ahead of an extension to the minimum cooling-off period requirement in Australia. Using multiple measures of audit quality, we find some evidence of a positive association between the cooling-off period length and audit quality when partners rotate back, yet evidence of a negative association between the two, during the cooling-off period. We also find that auditor and client characteristics-such as partner busyness, client knowledge, geographic proximity, and client importance-play important roles in determining the cooling-off period length and whether a partner rotates back onto a client. Overall, we provide timely evidence that extending the cooling-off period only marginally enhances audit quality when a partner rotates back onto a client, and evidence of an unintended consequence of this policy during the cooling-off period.


2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph H. Schroeder ◽  
Chris E. Hogan

SUMMARY We examine the impact of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) and the economic recession on risk characteristics and degree of auditor/client misalignment in the publicly traded client portfolios of Big 4 firms. AS5 and the economic recession both likely resulted in an increase in audit firm personnel capacity as well as a decline in current and future revenue prospects, leading to concerns that the Big 4 firms may pursue clients that present greater risk to the portfolio. We find that the overall portfolio in 2009 presents greater financial risk, attributable to the impact of the recession on continuing clients. A net decrease in audit and auditor business risks is also attributable to continuing clients over this period, as increases for new clients are offset by reductions due to departing clients. Overall, the results, which should be of interest to regulators, indicate that Big 4 firms continued to balance their portfolio with risk in mind. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the paper.


2017 ◽  
Vol 91 (9/10) ◽  
pp. 268-273
Author(s):  
Isabella Grabner ◽  
Judith Künneke ◽  
Frank Moers

The main priority of the audit industry is to maintain and improve audit quality. While audit quality has been an important topic in both accounting academia and practice, there is still a lack of understanding of what drives audit quality. Given that people are the most valuable asset an audit firm has, we focus on examining the labor inputs as a driver of audit quality. Specifically, we argue that a key threat for audit quality that so far has been largely neglected is the loss of talent across the hierarchy. A well-known problem for audit firms is that they invest enormous resources in new professionals only to have many with talent leave (Patten, 1995; Vera-Muñoz, Ho & Chow, 2006; ACCA & ACRA, 2012). A recent survey by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants finds that only about 38% are satisfied with their career and only 35% plan to stay beyond three years, with no significant differences across Big 4 and midtier firms (ACCA and ACRA, 2012).


2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 767-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Lauren M. Cunningham ◽  
Linda A. Myers

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as “an association”). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company size-matched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality.


2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Brivot ◽  
Mélanie Roussy ◽  
Maryse Mayer

SUMMARY This research is based on an in-depth analysis of 34 interviews with partners in Big 4, medium-sized, and small audit firms that specialize in private and/or public company audits, to explore how they understand the concept of audit quality. Two contrasting conventions—i.e., shared judgment norms—of audit quality emerge from the analysis. Public company audit partners in Big 4 firms espouse what we call the “model” audit quality convention, which considers that audit quality results from a technically flawless audit, where professional judgment is highly formalized, and quality is attested by a perfectly documented audit file that passes Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) and PCAOB inspections. In contrast, partners working primarily on private company audits, regardless of their firm's size, endorse what we call the “value-added” audit quality convention, which considers that audit quality results from tailoring the audit to meet the client's unique needs, where professional judgment is unconstrained, and where quality is attested by the client's perception that the audit has given a better understanding of their financial situation and the associated risks and opportunities. Our analysis also reveals significant tensions within each of these two conventions, and a fear that the current regulatory framework for quality control might end up severely hurting audit quality.


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanyaolu Wasiu Abiodun ◽  
Animasau Rasheed Olatunji

The paper examined the influence of boards attributes and audit firm choice of Nigerian listed non-financial firms. In an attempt to achieve the objective of this study, data of 21 sampled manufacturing companies were obtained from 2012 to 2017 using purposive sampling technique. Data for the sampled companies were analysed using logit regression analysis.  The result of the study provides evidence for significant influence of board independence, gender diversity and board meetings on audit firm choice while it board size was found to exert positive but no significant effect on audit firm choice. Arising from this, the study recommends that the non-executive directors should be dominated by directors with adequate level of financial directors that will propel them towards appreciating audit quality while choosing audit firm so as to improve quality of audit work. Also, firm should also seek to know whether audit quality of big 4 audit firms always supersedes that of their non-big 4 counterparts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (6) ◽  
pp. 722-748
Author(s):  
Murat Ocak ◽  
Gökberk Can

Purpose Recent studies regarding auditor experience generally focus on auditor overall experience in accounting, auditing, finance and related fields (Hardies et al., 2014), auditor sector and domain experience (Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Hammersley, 2006), auditor experience as CPA (Ye et al., 2014; Sonu et al., 2016) or big N experience (Chi and Huang, 2005; Gul et al., 2013; Zimmerman, 2016) or auditors’ international working experience (Chen et al., 2017). But there is little attention paid to where auditors obtained their experience from? And how do auditors with government experience affect audit quality (AQ)? This paper aims to present the effect of auditors with government experience on AQ. Design/methodology/approach The authors used Turkish publicly traded firms in Borsa Istanbul between the year 2008 and 2015 to test the hypothesis. The sample comprises 1,067 observations and eight years. Two main proxies of government experience are used in this paper. The first proxy is auditor’s government experience in the past. The second proxy is the continuous variable which is “the logarithmic value of the number of years of government experience”. Further, auditor overall experience in auditing, accounting, finance and other related fields are also used as a control variable. Audit reporting aggressiveness, audit reporting lag and discretionary accruals are used as proxies of AQ. Besides this, the authors adopted the model to estimate the probability of selecting a government-experienced auditor, and they presented the regression results with the addition of inverse Mills ratio. Findings The main findings are consistent with conjecture. Government-experienced auditors do not enhance AQ. They are aggressive, and they complete audit work slowly and they cannot detect discretionary accruals effectively. Spending more time in a government agency makes them more aggressive and slow, and they do not detect earnings management practices. The Heckman estimation results regarding the variable of interest are also consistent with the main estimation results. In addition, the authors found in predicting government-experienced auditor choice that family firms, domestic firms and firms that reported losses (larger firms, older firms) are more (less) likely to choose government-experienced auditors. Research limitations/implications This study has some limitations. The authors used a small sample to test the impact of government-experienced auditors on AQ because of data access problems. Much data used in this study were collected manually. Earnings quality was calculated using only discretionary accruals. Real activities manipulation was not used as the proxy of AQ in this paper. The findings from emerging markets might not generalize to the developed countries because the Turkish audit market is developing compared to Continental Europe or USA. Practical implications The findings are considered for independent audit firms. Audit firms may employ new graduates and train them to offer more qualified audit work for their clients. The results do not mean that government-experienced auditors should not work in an audit firm, or that they should not establish an audit firm. It is clear that government-experienced auditors provide low AQ in terms of audit reporting aggressiveness, audit report lag and discretionary accruals. But as they operate more in the independent audit sector, they will become successful and provide qualified audit work. One other thing we can say is that it is perhaps better for government-experienced auditors to work in the tax department of independent audit firms. Originality/value This paper tries to fill the gap in the literature regarding the effect of auditor experience on AQ and concentrates on a different type of experience: Auditors with government experience.


2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. P18-P24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Callaway Dee ◽  
Ayalew Lulseged ◽  
Tianming Zhang

SUMMARY: In our paper “Client Stock Market Reaction to PCAOB Sanctions against a Big 4 Auditor” (Dee et al. 2011), we examine stock price effects for clients of a Big 4 audit firm when news of sanctions imposed by the PCAOB against the audit firm was made public. These PCAOB penalties were the first against a Big 4 auditor, and they revealed information about quality-control problems at the audit firm that were not publicly known until the sanctions were announced. Our analysis of stock prices suggests that investors in clients of the penalized Big 4 firm reevaluated their perceptions of the quality of the firm's audit work after learning of the sanctions. The negative stock price effects for the firm's clients were consistent with investors inferring that the financial statements were of lower quality. In the paper, we conclude that investors find information about PCAOB sanctions against audit firms to be relevant in assessing audit quality and use that information in setting stock prices for audit firms' clients. This finding has relevance for the debate on the proposed legislation in Congress (H.R. 3503), which would allow the PCAOB to disclose proceedings against auditors before the investigations are concluded. Our results suggest that, although investors may find early disclosure of this information useful, public disclosure of Board disciplinary proceedings before they are completed could unfairly harm an audit firm's reputation if the firm is ultimately vindicated of wrongdoing.


2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alastair Lawrence ◽  
Miguel Minutti-Meza ◽  
Ping Zhang

ABSTRACT: This study examines whether differences in proxies for audit quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms could be a reflection of their respective clients’ characteristics. In our analyses, we use three audit-quality proxies—discretionary accruals, the ex ante cost-of-equity capital, and analyst forecast accuracy—and employ propensity-score and attribute-based matching models in attempt to control for differences in client characteristics between the two auditor groups while estimating the audit-quality effects. Using these matching models, we find that the effects of Big 4 auditors are insignificantly different from those of non-Big 4 auditors with respect to the three audit-quality proxies. Our results suggest that differences in these proxies between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors largely reflect client characteristics and, more specifically, client size. We caution the reader that this study has not resolved the question, although we hope that it encourages other researchers to explore alternative methodologies that separate client characteristics from audit-quality effects.


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