Close auditor-client relationships: adverse effects and the potential mitigating role of partner rotation

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate whether close auditor-client relationships affect audit quality over the tenure of the audit partner and the potential role of partner rotation in mitigating this effect. Design/methodology/approachUsing the Chinese mandatory audit partner rotation setting, the authors identify the existence of a close auditor-client relationship if the audit partner tenure with a client is larger than the audit firm tenure with that client. The sample period (1998–2009) is divided into voluntary and mandatory rotation periods when examining the effects of audit partner tenure on audit quality for the normal and close auditor-client relationship subsamples, respectively. The authors also conduct a propensity score matching analysis to address a selection issue. FindingsThe paper finds that under the voluntary partner rotation regime, audit quality decreases with audit partner tenure for the subsample with close auditor-client relationships, whereas this effect is not shown in the normal relationship subsample. However, audit quality no longer declines with audit partner tenure under the mandatory partner rotation regime. Originality/valueThis is the first study that directly examines the effect of audit partner tenure on audit quality associated with close auditor-client relationships under the voluntary and mandatory partner rotation regimes.

Relative Influences of Review and Engagement Auditor Rotation on Audit Quality: Evidence from China

Manuscript type: Research paper Research aims: This study focuses on the effects of audit partner rotation on audit quality (AQ) in China. In particular, we examine the effects of review auditors (RAs) and engagement auditors (EAs) on AQ when they voluntarily and mandatorily rotate. Design/Methodology/Approach: The data in this study are retrieved from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. We develop an OLS regression model and logit model respectively to test the hypotheses developed. Finally, we have 13,856 firm-year observations collected for the first regression model, and 16,893 firm-year observations gathered for the second logit model from 2003 to 2015. Research findings: Findings show that RAs are more likely to behave opportunistically to retain clients by weighing up the benefits and costs of compromising audit quality in the first year after a rotation. The results imply that RAs may have an incentive to acquiesce the clients’ accounting irregularities in their first year of audit engagement when they are mandatorily rotated. However, we do not find this trend in terms of EAs’ rotation, suggesting that EAs are less affected by the auditor-client relationship compared to RAs. In addition, we find that RAs are less likely to issue modified audit opinions (MOPI) as the magnitude of negative discretionary accruals (DA) increases when they are voluntarily rotated. Theoretical contribution/Originality: Previous studies have investigated the relationship between mandatory audit partner rotation and audit quality. The results are mixed and inconclusive. Our study contributes to the extant literature by considering RAs’ opportunistic behaviour after mandatory rotation, which has not been explored in previous studies. In China, only a few studies have examined the relationship between mandatory audit partner rotation and audit quality. Our study is one of the first study focusing on the RA’s influence on AQ. Practitioner/Policy implication: The findings of our study can help Chinese authorities, listed firms and academics gain more understanding on whether mandatory audit partner rotation improves audit quality in practice. Since RAs have greater incentive to retain the existing client, we propose that RAs should bear more responsibility for the audit work, instead of the equally shared responsibility with EAs. Research limitation/Implications: Our study is subject to some limitations. First, our study adopts the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality. However, there can be a measurement error in estimating discretionary accruals. Second, we focus on the auditor rotation and exclude the case of audit firm rotation. Since the AQ can be affected by various factors, audit firm rotation can also affect AQ. Third, although we test the relative effects of RAs and EAs in audit work, we do not examine the effect of RAs’ characteristics such as their professional experience, educational background, and years of service. AQ can be affected by RAs’ characteristics.

Does Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation Influence Auditor Selection Strategies?

Under mandatory rotation, the switching cost may be the most influential factor to be considered for experienced mandatory audit rotations. This study attempts to explore the impacts of the mandatory rotation mechanism on company information disclosure and signaling strategies by examining the audit partner and audit firm switching activities of the mandatory rotation company. Are companies that experience mandatory audit rotation more likely to engage industry specialist auditors with better industry-specific knowledge and reputations to minimize the costs of mandatory rotations? Furthermore, in the case of being required to rotate audit partners, do companies rotate only audit partners, rather than changing both audit partners and audit firms at the same time, to minimize switching costs? To explore these problems, this study examined auditor rotations of listed companies in Taiwan from 2004 to 2016; and expected that, to minimize switching costs, mandatory rotation companies are more likely to select industry specialist auditors to be their successor auditors, and are less likely to rotate audit partners and audit firms at the same time. For the audit partner rotations, we find that, compared to voluntarily rotated companies, a higher percentage of companies choose industry specialist auditors to be their successor audit partners under mandatory rotation. Furthermore, the empirical results support our expectations that companies that experience mandatory audit partner rotation are significantly more likely to engage industry specialists to be their successor audit partners and are more likely to rotate only audit partners rather than rotating both audit partners and audit firms around mandatory audit rotation periods.

Mandatory partner rotation, audit timeliness and audit pricing

Purpose The purpose of this study is to provide further evidence on the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of mandatory audit partner rotation (MPR). Specifically, this study examines how MPR simultaneously affects audit reporting lag (ARL) and audit fees (AFs). Design/methodology/approach A simultaneous approach was adopted to further shed light on the findings currently documented by this line of research. Findings Using Australian data, it was found that MPRs increase AFs but do not affect ARL simultaneously in the year of MPRs. It was also found that the departing audit partners do not charge higher fees or delay the completion of the audits in the final year before their departure and that neither AFs nor ARL changes significantly for the second round of MPRs. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no prior study on MPR has examined the issue using a simultaneous approach although failure to consider the simultaneous effect of interrelated variables may lead to estimation biases and problems of parameter identification. The results herein provide further evidence that the clients do not bear both costs of paying higher AFs and having the delayed audits and that the costs associated with MPRs do not occur earlier and the costs associated with MPRs may dissipate over time.

The Effect of Board Links, Audit Partner Tenure, and Related Party Transactions on Misstatements: Evidence from Chile

Companies restate when material misstatements are identified in previously issued financial statements. Misstatement research in Latin America is sparse, even though they are an important context to study this phenomenon. Chile’s corporate governance regulations are considered exemplars for Latin American countries but its auditing profession is not well developed. Thus, Chile provides an interesting context to study the complementary roles of audit and board governance affecting misstatements. Using a sample of 104 Chilean listed firms over seven years, our study finds that the board links and audit partner tenure negatively affect misstatements. Specifically, given the prevalence of related party transactions (RPTs) in conglomerates, the finding suggests that cross directors monitor high-value RPTs, but that this is not a substitute for auditor expertise. The findings raise questions about the advisability of mandating audit partner rotation to strengthen auditor independence because the results indicate that a short audit partner tenure leads to the auditor not developing client-specific knowledge. The study makes contributions to the corporate governance literature by highlighting that board monitoring is not a good substitute for auditor monitoring of financial reporting integrity, and suggesting the need for having licensing requirements to become an auditor.

On the Economics of Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation and Tenure: Evidence from PCAOB Data

We analyze the effects of partner tenure and mandatory rotation on audit quality, pricing, and production for a large cross-section of U.S. public firms over the 2008 to 2014 period. On average, we find no evidence that audit quality declines over the tenure cycle and little support for "fresh-look" benefits provided by the new audit partner. Audit fees decline and audit hours increase after mandatory rotation, but then reverse over the tenure cycle. We also find evidence that audit firms use "shadowing" in preparation for a lead partner turnover. These effects differ by competitiveness of the local audit market, client size, and partner experience. When multiple members of the audit team commence at a new client, the transition appears to be more disruptive and more likely to exhibit audit quality effects. Our findings point to costly efforts by the audit firms to minimize disruptions and audit failures around mandatory rotations.

Audit Partner Rotation Meningkatkan Audit Fee ?

Abstrak : Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh audit partner rotation, mandatory partner rotation, dan voluntary partner rotation terhadap peningkatan audit fee. Dalam melakukan pengujian terhadap tujuan penelitian tersebut, peneliti menggunakan analisis regresi linier berganda dengan menggunakan sampel penelitian 81 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia untuk rentang pengamatan 2008 – 2014 atau 567 pengamatan (firm year). Berdasarkan hasil pengujian yang dilakukan, hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa audit partner rotation memberikan pengaruh terhadap audit fee, baik pada tahun terjadinya rotasi maupun pada tahun pertama dan tahun kedua setelah terjadinya rotasi. Disamping itu, peningkatan audit fee juga dipengaruhi oleh mandatory partner rotation, baik pada tahun terjadinya rotasi maupun pada tahun pertama dan tahun kedua setelah terjadinya rotasi. Hasil lain yang diperoleh dari penelitian ini adalah voluntary partner rotation hanya mempengaruhi peningkatan audit fee di tahun terjadinya rotasi, sedangkan pada tahun pertama dan tahun kedua setelah terjadinya rotasi tidak mempengaruhi peningkatan audit fee. Penelitian ini memberikan implikasi kepada regulator dalam mempertimbangkan lamanya rotasi wajib bagi partner, sedangkan untuk kepentingan perusahaan, dapat digunakan sebagai dasar pertimbangan dalam menentukan apakah akan melakukan pergantian kantor akuntan ataukah melakukan pergantian partner. Kata Kunci: Audit Fee, Audit Partner Rotation, Mandatory Partner Rotation, Voluntary Partner Rotation