Conventions of Audit Quality: The Perspective of Public and Private Company Audit Partners

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Brivot ◽  
Mélanie Roussy ◽  
Maryse Mayer
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Professional Judgment ◽  
Private Company ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Financial Situation ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Depth Analysis

SUMMARY This research is based on an in-depth analysis of 34 interviews with partners in Big 4, medium-sized, and small audit firms that specialize in private and/or public company audits, to explore how they understand the concept of audit quality. Two contrasting conventions—i.e., shared judgment norms—of audit quality emerge from the analysis. Public company audit partners in Big 4 firms espouse what we call the “model” audit quality convention, which considers that audit quality results from a technically flawless audit, where professional judgment is highly formalized, and quality is attested by a perfectly documented audit file that passes Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) and PCAOB inspections. In contrast, partners working primarily on private company audits, regardless of their firm's size, endorse what we call the “value-added” audit quality convention, which considers that audit quality results from tailoring the audit to meet the client's unique needs, where professional judgment is unconstrained, and where quality is attested by the client's perception that the audit has given a better understanding of their financial situation and the associated risks and opportunities. Our analysis also reveals significant tensions within each of these two conventions, and a fear that the current regulatory framework for quality control might end up severely hurting audit quality.

How Small Audit Firm Membership in Associations, Networks, and Alliances Can Impact Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. P29-P35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Lauren M. Cunningham
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Association Network ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditor Selection

SUMMARY This article summarizes “Small Audit Firm Membership in Associations, Networks, and Alliances: Implications for Audit Quality and Audit Fees” (Bills, Cunningham, Myers 2015), which examines the association between small audit firm membership in an association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as an “association”), audit quality, and audit fees. We find that small audit firm association members provide higher-quality audits and charge higher fees than small audit firms that are not members of an association. When compared to similarly sized clients audited by the Big 4, we find that member firms provide audit quality similar to the Big 4 firms, but member firms charge lower fees than their Big 4 counterparts. We caution that these results may not be generalizable to the largest Big 4 clients for which there is not a similarly sized client audited by our sample of small audit firms. We infer audit quality from Public Company Accounting Oversight Board inspections, restatement announcements, and discretionary accruals. Our findings should be of interest to audit committees in charge of auditor selection and to small audit firms interested in the benefits of association membership.

The Impact of Partners' Economic Incentives on Audit Quality in Big 4 Partnerships

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Dekeyser ◽  
Ann Gaeremynck ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Marleen Willekens
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Client Characteristics ◽  
Financial Situation ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
The Impact

Economic incentives are fundamental for understanding auditor behavior. In this paper, we investigate the association between the extent of partners' fee-based compensation, partners' observable net wealth, and audit quality. Using a sample of Belgian Big 4 audit firms and their predominantly private clients, our results suggest a negative association between audit quality and partner fee-based compensation, and a positive association between audit quality and partner observable net wealth. Moreover, our results show that the latter association is most significant when a partner is carrying a lot of debt, which indicates that a partner's financial situation may affect audit quality. The extent of fee-based incentives also varies among partners of the same audit firm. Furthermore, partner and client characteristics differ based on the extent of fee-based compensation. Our findings should be of interest to regulators and audit firms as they suggest that audit partner's economic incentives significantly affect audit quality.

Audit Firms as Networks of Offices

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott E. Seavey ◽  
Michael J Imhof ◽  
Tiffany J. Westfall
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Management ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Network Connectedness ◽  
Partner Knowledge ◽  
Office Level

SUMMARY Prior audit research suggests that most, if not all, audit quality can be explained at the office level. However, the question remains of whether office-level audit quality is contingent on how individual offices relate to the firm as a whole. Motivated by theories of knowledge management, organizational learning, and networks, we posit that individual offices are connected to their audit network through partner knowledge sharing and oversight, which impact office-level audit quality. We interview Big 4 audit partners and learn that knowledge sharing between partners in different offices is common and intended to aid in the provision of audit services. Using network connectedness to proxy for knowledge sharing and oversight between offices of the same firm, we document that more connected offices are associated with fewer client restatements and lower discretionary accruals. We additionally find that network effects are magnified when accounting treatments are more complex and require greater auditor judgement.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Financial Reporting Fraud: Public and Private Companies

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. A27-A41 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Scott Fleming ◽  
Dana R. Hermanson ◽  
Mary-Jo Kranacher ◽  
Richard A. Riley
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Primary Objective ◽  
Private Company ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Multivariate Tests ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Public Versus Private ◽  
Financial Reporting Fraud

ABSTRACT This study uses survey data gathered by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) and provided to the Institute for Fraud Prevention (IFP) to examine differences in the profile of financial reporting fraud (FRF) between private companies and public companies. Although private companies represent a significant portion of the economy, largely due to lack of data on these companies, most research on FRF examines only public companies. The primary objective of this study is to determine how private company FRF is different from FRF in public companies. Our multivariate tests reveal that public companies have stronger anti-fraud environments, are more likely to have frauds that involve timing differences, tend to experience larger frauds, have frauds that involve a larger number of perpetrators, and are less likely to have frauds that are discovered by accident. Overall, it appears that the stronger anti-fraud environment in public companies leads public company FRF perpetrators to use less obvious fraud methods (i.e., timing differences) and to involve larger fraud teams to circumvent the controls. These public company frauds are larger than in private companies, and their larger size may make them more likely to be detected through formal means, rather than by accident. Based on the results, we encourage auditors and others to be particularly attuned to the unique risks of the public versus private setting.

Audit quality following the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s operation

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 927-946
Author(s):  
She-Chih Chiu ◽  
Chin-Chen Chien ◽  
Hsuan-Chu Lin
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Univariate Analysis ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Big Four

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the transition from self-regulation to heteronomy has changed the gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four auditors. Design/methodology/approach This study analyzes publicly held companies in the USA between 1999 and 2012 using univariate analysis, multivariate analysis and quantile regression analysis. Audit quality is measured with discretionary accruals. Findings This study shows an insignificant difference in audit quality between the clients of Big Four and non-Big Four auditors after Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter, PCAOB) began its operations. In the analysis of the effects of PCAOB inspections on the audit quality of audit firms that are inspected annually and triennially, the findings show that the inspections have more positive effects when carried out annually. This suggests that the frequency of inspection is positively associated with audit quality. Overall, these results provide evidence that recent improvements in audit quality have been caused by changes in regulatory standards. Originality/value The paper provides three major original contributions. First, the authors add to the literature on audit quality by further demonstrating a reduced gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms due to heteronomy. Secondly, this study contributes to the debate as to whether independent inspections on audit firms are beneficial or not and suggests that the PCAOB inspections help increase audit quality. Finally, the results of this work contribute to the growing literature examining discretionary accruals.

The role of audit quality in firm valuation

2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (5) ◽  
pp. 575-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mishari M. Alfraih
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Book Value ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Team

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of audit quality on the value relevance of earnings and book value. Because joint audit is mandated for all Kuwait Stock Exchange-listed firms, it is hypothesized that the higher the quality of the audit team (as measured by the number of Big 4 audit firms in the joint audit team), the higher the value relevance of earnings and book values for equity valuation. Design/methodology/approach Consistent with prior research, the value relevance of earnings and book value is measured by the adjusted R2 derived from the Ohlson’s 1995 regression model. The number of Big 4 audit firms represented on the firm’s audit team is used as a proxy for audit quality. Three tiers of audit quality exist, namely, two non-Big 4 audit firms, one Big 4 and one non-Big 4 audit firms or two Big 4 audit firms. To address this paper’s objective, the association between audit quality and the value relevance of earnings and book value were examined using four approaches. The final sample consists of 1,836 firm-year observations and covers fiscal years from a 12-year period (2002-2013). Findings Taken together, the four approaches used collectively provide empirical evidence that audit quality positively and significantly affects the value relevance of accounting measures to market participants. Importantly, the results reveal significant variations in the value relevance of earnings and book value jointly across the three possible auditor combinations. Research limitations/implications Although using auditor size as a proxy for audit quality is well established in the auditing literature, a limitation of that proxy is that it measures audit quality dichotomously, which implicitly assumes a homogeneous level of audit quality within each group. Practical implications The findings show the importance of high-quality and rigorous external audits in improving the value relevance of accounting information. Originality/value This study contributes to the extent literature on audit quality by exploring the role of audit quality in a unique institutional setting that imposes mandatory joint audits. Although prior studies have investigated the effect of joint audit pair choice on earnings management and audit fee premium, this study is the first to investigate the effect of joint audit pair choice on the value relevance of accounting information.

scholarly journals Should the 4 big replace the big 4? An examination of audit quality using internal audit

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Harjinder Singh ◽  
Rick Newby ◽  
Inderpal Singh
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Important Research ◽  
Dummy Variable ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Dichotomous Variable ◽  
Audit Fee

Prior research has linked audit quality with large audit firms. Consequently, a dichotomous variable, Big N/non-Big N has traditionally proxied for audit quality. Applying a different measure of audit quality than audit fee, this study investigates whether a single dummy variable for Big N is an appropriate proxy for audit quality in explaining differences in the existence of clients’ internal audit (IA) function. Results indicate that the existence of clients’ IA function is not consistent among Big 4 firms. This has important research implications for the universal use of a Big N dummy variable as a measure for audit quality.

scholarly journals FAR Research Project: The loss of talent: a threat for audit quality?

2017 ◽  
Vol 91 (9/10) ◽  
pp. 268-273
Author(s):  
Isabella Grabner ◽  
Judith Künneke ◽  
Frank Moers
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Recent Survey ◽  
New Professionals ◽  
Research Project ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Labor Inputs

The main priority of the audit industry is to maintain and improve audit quality. While audit quality has been an important topic in both accounting academia and practice, there is still a lack of understanding of what drives audit quality. Given that people are the most valuable asset an audit firm has, we focus on examining the labor inputs as a driver of audit quality. Specifically, we argue that a key threat for audit quality that so far has been largely neglected is the loss of talent across the hierarchy. A well-known problem for audit firms is that they invest enormous resources in new professionals only to have many with talent leave (Patten, 1995; Vera-Muñoz, Ho & Chow, 2006; ACCA & ACRA, 2012). A recent survey by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants finds that only about 38% are satisfied with their career and only 35% plan to stay beyond three years, with no significant differences across Big 4 and midtier firms (ACCA and ACRA, 2012).

Small Audit Firm Membership in Associations, Networks, and Alliances: Implications for Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 767-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Lauren M. Cunningham ◽  
Linda A. Myers
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Matched Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Association Member ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Control Samples

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as “an association”). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company size-matched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality.

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