Utopias of One

Author(s):  
Joshua Kotin

This book is a new account of utopian writing. It examines how eight writers—Henry David Thoreau, W. E. B. Du Bois, Osip and Nadezhda Mandel'shtam, Anna Akhmatova, Wallace Stevens, Ezra Pound, and J. H. Prynne—construct utopias of one within and against modernity's two large-scale attempts to harmonize individual and collective interests: liberalism and communism. The book begins in the United States between the buildup to the Civil War and the end of Jim Crow; continues in the Soviet Union between Stalinism and the late Soviet period; and concludes in England and the United States between World War I and the end of the Cold War. In this way it captures how writers from disparate geopolitical contexts resist state and normative power to construct perfect worlds—for themselves alone. The book contributes to debates about literature and politics, presenting innovative arguments about aesthetic difficulty, personal autonomy, and complicity and dissent. It models a new approach to transnational and comparative scholarship, combining original research in English and Russian to illuminate more than a century and a half of literary and political history.

2020 ◽  
pp. 233-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexei D. Voskressenski

Russia’s relations with China (and vice versa) have evolved steadily during the post-Soviet period. Leaders on both sides have proclaimed, for a number of years now, that their bilateral relations are at their best point in history. How did the China-Russia relationship reach such a stage, especially given their long (and largely discordant) history? This chapter traces the evolution of China-Russia relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It identifies the commonalities and common purposes Moscow and Beijing have in world affairs, as well as their bilateral economic, cultural, and military relations. The China-Russia relationship has important implications for the United States, as well as American allies in the world.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (02) ◽  
pp. 32-49
Author(s):  
Li Yan

The rumors that Lenin was a “German spy” first appeared in Petrograd after the February revolution in Russia. During the Soviet period, the “Sisson documents” (papers) were fabricated in the United States and other Western countries, and other evidence was sought that Lenin was allegedly an “agent” of the German government. However, all the evidence presented were convincingly refuted. V. I. Lenin’s “German spy” case was discussed again during the collapse of the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Russia. In some Russian media, political and academic circles, this “case” was reproduced in various forms, but new materials and new evidences were not found.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard L. Weinberg

At the end of World War II, vast quantities of German documents had fallen into the hands of the Allies either during hostilities or in the immediately following weeks. Something will be said near the end of this report about the archives captured or seized by the Soviet Union; the emphasis here will be on those that came into the possession of the Western Allies. The United States and Great Britain made agreements for joint control and exploitation, of which the most important was the Bissell-Sinclair agreement named for the intelligence chiefs who signed it. The German naval, foreign office, and chancellery archives were to be physically located in England, while the military, Nazi Party, and related files were to come to the United States. Each of the two countries was to be represented at the site of the other's holdings, have access to the files, and play a role in decisions about their fate. The bulk of those German records that came to the United States were deposited in a section of a World War I torpedo factory in Alexandria, Virginia, which had been made into the temporary holding center for the World War II records of the American army and American theater commands. In accordance with the admonition to turn swords into plowshares, the building is now an artists' boutique.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Jan Železný

The United States' approach to China since the Communist regime in Beijing began the period of reform and opening in the 1980s was based on a promise that trade and engagement with China would result in a peaceful, democratic state. Forty years later the hope of producing a benign People's Republic of China utterly failed. The Communist Party of China deceived the West into believing that the its system and the Party-ruled People's Liberation Army were peaceful and posed no threat. In fact, these misguided policies produced the emergence of a 21st Century Evil Empire even more dangerous than a Cold War version in the Soviet Union. Successive American presidential administrations were fooled by ill-advised pro-China policymakers, intelligence analysts and business leaders who facilitated the rise not of a peaceful China but a threatening and expansionist nuclear-armed communist dictatorship not focused on a single overriding strategic objective: Weakening and destroying the United States of America. Defeating the United States is the first step for China's current rulers in achieving global supremacy under a new world order based an ideology of Communism with Chinese characteristics. The process included technology theft of American companies that took place on a massive scale through cyber theft and unfair trade practices. The losses directly supported in the largest and most significant buildup of the Chinese military that now directly threatens American and allied interests around the world. The military threat is only half the danger as China aggressively pursues regional and international control using a variety of non-military forces, including economic, cyber and space warfare and large-scale influence operations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 29-50
Author(s):  
Alina Shymanska

The Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine was adopted in 1990 and declared Ukraine a non-nuclear state. However, Kyiv was not eager to surrender the nuclear arsenal that it had inherited from the Soviet Union. It is possible to divide Ukraine’s denuclearisation process into two different phases. The first phase consisted of bilateral discussions between Russia and Ukraine, which ended due to Russia’s inability to understand Ukraine’s security concerns. In 1993, the United States joined the discussion, and the trilateral phase began. The involvement of the United States helped to reach a consensus and promote nuclear non-proliferation in Ukraine by providing security assurance and some economic benefits. The case of Ukraine’s nuclear non-proliferation was supposed to be one of the most exemplary cases of denuclearisation in the last two decades. But in light of the Ukrainian crisis which started in 2014, the world recognizes that the security assurances provided in the Budapest Memorandum ultimately failed to deter Russian aggression towards Ukraine. Scott Sagan believes that the international norms and an image of ‘a good international citizen’ that can integrate into the Western economic and security system while maintaining good relations with Russia mattered the most in view of Ukraine's decision to give up nuclear weapons. This article suggests that the Ukrainian denuclearisation is the fusion of both the norms and domestic factors that Ukraine faced in 1990s. The article will review Ukraine’s decision to return the nuclear weapons, despite the ongoing Russian threat. It will also clarify Ukraine’s decision to not pursue nuclear proliferation, despite recent trends within Ukraine’s political circle that would be in support of this decision.


Author(s):  
Anand Toprani

During the first half of the twentieth century, a lack of oil constrained Britain and Germany from exerting their economic and military power independently. Having fought World War I with oil imported from the United States, Britain was determined to avoid relying upon another great power for its energy needs ever again. Even before the war had ended, Whitehall began implementing a strategy of developing alternative sources of oil under British control. Britain’s key supplier would be the Middle East—already a region of vital importance to the British Empire, but one whose oil potential was still unproven. There turned out to be plenty of oil in the Middle East, but Italian hostility after 1935 threatened British transit through the Mediterranean. As war loomed in 1939, Britain’s quest for independence from the United States was a failure. Germany was in an even worse position than Britain. The Third Reich went to war dependent on petroleum synthesized from coal, meager domestic crude oil production, and overland imports—primarily from Romania. German leaders were confident, however, that they had sufficient oil to fight a series of short, localized campaigns that would deliver to them the mastery of Europe. Their plan derailed following Germany’s swift victory over France, when Britain refused to make peace. This left Germany responsible for satisfying Europe’s oil requirements while cut off from world markets. A looming energy crisis in Axis Europe, an absence of strategic alternatives, and ideological imperatives all compelled Germany to invade the Soviet Union in 1941—a decision that ultimately sealed its fate.


Author(s):  
Karim Elkady

Since the 1830s, Egyptian regimes have sought US governmental support to assist Egypt in gaining its independence and enable it to act freely in the region. Because historically the United States had no territorial interests in Egypt, Egyptian leaders solicited this strategic connection as potentially a leverage first against the Ottoman Empire, France, and England from the 1830s to World War I, then later against the British military occupation until 1954, and finally against Israel’s occupation of Sinai from 1967 to 1973. Egypt also courted US assistance to support its regional ambitions, to assume leadership of the Arab World, and to stabilize the Middle East. Later, the economic and financial challenges that Egypt has faced in its recent history have led it to request and rely on US military and economic aid. US interests in Egypt have shifted during their relationship. Initially the United States was interested in trade and protection of private US citizens, especially its Protestant missionaries. But after World War II and the rise of the United States to a position of global leadership, US motives changed. Due to US interests in Persian Gulf oil, its commitment to defend Israel, and its interest in protecting Egypt against the control of hostile powers, the United States became more invested in securing Egypt’s strategic location and utilizing its regional political weight. The United States became involved in securing Egypt from Axis invasions during World War II and in containing Soviet attempts to lock Egypt into an alliance with Moscow. After a period of tense relations from the 1950s to the early 1970s, Egypt and the United States reached a rapprochement in 1974. From that time on, the Egyptian–US strategic partnership emerged, especially after the Camp David Accords, to protect the region from the Soviet Union, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and then to contain the rise of terrorism.


2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 418-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nezahat Altuntaş

Abstract Nationalism is an ideology that has taken different forms in different times, locations, and situations. In the 19th century, classical liberal nationalism depended on the ties between the nation state and its citizenship. That form of nationalism was accompanied by “the state- and nation-building” processes in Europe. In the 20th century, nationalism transformed into ethnic nationalism, depending on ideas of common origin; it arose especially after World War I and II and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, at the beginning of 21st century, nationalism began to integrate with religion as a result of global political changes. The terrorist attack on the United States, and then the effects that the United States and its allies have created in the widespread Muslim geography, have added new and different dimensions to nationalism. The main aim of this study is to investigate the intersection points between religion and nationalism, especially in the case of political Islam.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-51
Author(s):  
M. Yu. Myagkov

The article offers an overview of modern historical data on the origins, causes of World War II, the decisive role of the USSR in its victorious end, and also records the main results and lessons of World War II.Hitler's Germany was the main cause of World War II. Nazism, racial theory, mixed with far-reaching geopolitical designs, became the combustible mixture that ignited the fire of glob­al conflict. The war with the Soviet Union was planned to be waged with particular cruelty.The preconditions for the outbreak of World War II were the humiliating provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty for the German people, as well as the attitude of the "Western de­mocracies" to Russia after 1917 and the Soviet Union as an outcast of world development. Great Britain, France, the United States chose for themselves a policy of ignoring Moscow's interests, they were more likely to cooperate with Hitler's Germany than with Soviet Russia. It was the "Munich Agreement" that became the point of no return to the beginning of the Second World War. Under these conditions, for the USSR, its own security and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany began to come to the fore, defining the "spheres of interests" of the parties in order to limit the advance of German troops towards the Soviet borders in the event of German aggression against Poland. The non-aggression pact gave the USSR just under two years to rebuild the army and consolidate its defensive potential and pushed the Soviet borders hundreds of kilometers westward. The signing of the Pact was preceded by the failure in August 1939 of the negotiations between the military mis­sions of Britain, France and the USSR, although Moscow took the Anglo-French-Soviet nego­tiations with all seriousness.The huge losses of the USSR in the summer of 1941 are explained by the following circum­stances: before the war, a large-scale modernization of the Red Army was launched, a gradu­ate of a military school did not have sufficient experience in managing an entrusted unit by June 22, 1941; the Red Army was going to bleed the enemy in border battles, stop it with short counterattacks by covering units, carry out defensive operations, and then strike a de­cisive blow into the depths of the enemy's territory, so the importance of a multi-echeloned long-term defense in 1941 was underestimated by the command of the Red Army and it was not ready for it; significant groupings of the Western Special Military District were drawn into potential salients, which was used by the Germans at the initial stage of the war; Stalin's fear of provoking Hitler to start a war led to slowness in making the most urgent and necessary decisions to bring troops to combat readiness.The Allies delayed the opening of the second front for an unreasonably long time. They, of course, achieved outstanding success in the landing operation in France, however, the en­emy's losses in only one Soviet strategic operation in the summer of 1944 ("Bagration") are not inferior, and even exceed, the enemy’s losses on the second front. One of the goals of "Bagration" was to help the Allies.Soviet soldiers liberated Europe at the cost of their lives. At the same time, Moscow could not afford to re-establish a cordon sanitaire around its borders after the war, so that anti- Soviet forces would come to power in the border states. The United States and Great Britain took all measures available to them to quickly remove from the governments of Italy, France and other Western states all the left-wing forces that in 1944-1945 had a serious impact on the politics of their countries.


1971 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Usha Mahajani

In his short administration, President Kennedy was called upon to deal with several Southeast Asian developments but none that had reached such a high watermark of an international crisis as the question of Laos. As in Berlin, he inherited in Laos a situation aggravated by near-direct armed confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Kennedy's response to that situation was a complex set of policy moves and measures that alternately raised a spectre of large-scale, direct American military intervention and prospects of East-West agreement on Laotian neutrality, only to end eventually on the same note of anti-communist crusade as in the preceding Eisenhower administration.


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