scholarly journals Conventional and constitutional regulations of lawful detention of a person without a court decision: criminal procedure aspect

Author(s):  
Аndrew Medvid

The article compares the requirements for the lawful application of detention without a court decision as a criminal procedure established in Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the second sentence of Article 29 part 3 of the Constitution of Ukraine. In particular, the content of the concept of "detention" of a person is studied, the list of subjects who have the right to detain a person without a court decision and the legal content and list of legitimate grounds for detention of a person without a court decision as a criminal procedure are studied and compared. Conventional, constitutional and criminal-procedural norms are also studied, as well as the necessity of mandatory further judicial review of the legality of the detention of a person, including the terms of such review. Based on a detailed analysis of these provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Constitution of Ukraine, relevant decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, it is established that the grounds for the detention of a person by a general entity, defined by paragraph 2 of Article 207 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, and a special entity, defined by subparagraphs 1 and 2 (except subparagraph 3) of paragraph 1 of Article 208 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, in general, correspond to the grounds for lawful detention of a person enshrined in Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Therefore, it cannot be qualified as unlawful interference with the human right to liberty and security of person. At the same time, proposals are formulated to make changes and additions to subparagraph 3 of paragraph 1 of Article 208 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. It is also proved that the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 12 and Articles 209 and 211 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine are critical provisions of the current legislation of Ukraine regarding the lawful application of detention of a person without a court decision. These provisions actually eliminate some shortcomings and establish the necessary legal and procedural grounds for the clarified application of the provision of the second sentence of part 3 of Article 29 of the Constitution of Ukraine, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as well as the practice of their application developed by the European Court of Human Rights.

Author(s):  
Miodrag Simović ◽  
Marina Simović

The well-known sentence in English Justice delayed is justice denied confirms historical awareness of the value of a speedy court decision. The right to a fair trial within a reasonable time applies to both civil and criminal proceedings. In a criminal trial, the issue of adjournment may also be regulated under Article 5 paragraph 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms when a person is detained. The rationale for the principle, in criminal proceedings, is “based on the need to allow the accused not to remain for too long in a state of uncertainty as to the outcome of criminal charges against him” (Kart v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, 2009). Furthermore, the variability of criminal proceedings that take too long - generally damages the reputation of the alleged offender. The European Court of Human Rights explained that “the reason for the verdict in so many lenghty proceedings is that certain contracting parties have not complied with the ‘reasonable time’ requirement under Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention and have not prescribed a domestic remedy for this type of appeal” (Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2006-V).


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-467
Author(s):  
Hamdija Šarkinović

The paper deals with property, which is guaranteed by Article 58 of the Constitution of Montenegro and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The constitutional-law concept of the right to property in Montenegro is broader than the traditional civil law concept, as it includes all real rights, as the European Court under the notion of property, in addition to the usual, includes all acquired rights of a person. The autonomous concept of property and possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was separately covered, consisting of three rules: principle of peaceful enjoyment of possessions, deprivation of possessions, and control of the use of property. The application of the text of justification of interference with property in the case law of the European Court is explained, which includes the text of legality, the text of a legitimate aim in the general or public interest and the text of proportionality. However, the case law of the ordinary courts in the field of guarantees of property rights, constitutional and convention’s is not harmonized with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and represents one of the main tasks of the Constitutional Court in the coming period. The Constitutional Court of Montenegro follows the concept of property enshrined in the Constitution and gives the property meaning as the constitutional and convention human right guaranteed by the Constitution, and its inviolability as one of the fundamental values of the constitutional order, although the case law of the Constitutional Court has not fully and always been coherent with the aforementioned principles.


Law and World ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-162

The present article – “The Analysis of the Recent Standards of Applying Compulsory Measures according to the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights (The Analysis of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia and its Compliance with the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights)” – discusses the recent case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 5 of the European Convention together with the compliance of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia in terms of applying compulsory measures.


Author(s):  
S.E. Fedik

The modern concept of reforming procedural legislation in Ukraine has set before law enforcement and law enforcement agencies a number of tasks for a smooth transition from the normative-act to the precedent method of law enforcement. Moreover, such a position is directly enshrined in the procedural legislation of Ukraine, in particular in Part 4 of Art. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, which states: - "The Court applies in cases the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 and its protocols, approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of law." [1]. It is this article of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine that the legislator indirectly obliges the judicial authorities of Ukraine to use both norms of international law (represented by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 and its protocols) and court decisions of the European Court. on human rights, which are expressed in the practice of this court in the consideration of cases by this international judicial institution. The very provision of the above-mentioned article of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine declares the actual transition from the rules of normative-legal procedure of law application to the principles of precedent legal system, where the source of law is not only normative-legal act but also court decision. An important condition for the correct application of a rule of law or a court decision is the correct interpretation of a legal norm, or a whole normative legal act, as well as judicial precedent. Interpretation of legal norms involves a combination of objective and subjective, and depending on the purposes of interpretation in this process, respectively, its two stages are correlated - clarification and explanation. And if the process of interpretation is aimed only at the interpreter's understanding of the content of the legal norm, then clarification is an independent process of cognition. When the goal is to bring the content of the legal norm to third parties, the clarification and explanation are stages (stages) of a single, inseparable process. This process is inherent in all types of legal activity - lawmaking, law enforcement, law enforcement, systematization and legal education, and in a legal society the interpretation of legal norms is a stabilizing factor in the process of regulating social relations, enhances legal norms, strengthens legality, protects human and civil rights [2, P. 5-6].


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 1439-1444
Author(s):  
Miodrag N. Simović ◽  
Marina M. Simović ◽  
Vladimir M. Simović

The paper is dedicated to ne bis in idem principle, which is a fundamental human right safeguarded by Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This principle is sometimes also referred to as double jeopardy.The principle implies that no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which s/he has already been finally convicted or acquitted (internal ne bis in idem principle), and that in some other State or before the International Court (ne bis in idem principle in respect of the relations between the states or the State and the International Court) the procedure may not be conducted if the person has already been sentenced or acquitted. The identity of the indictable act (idem), the other component of this principle, is more complex and more difficult to be determined than the first one (ne bis).The objective of this principle is to secure the legal certainty of citizens who must be liberated of uncertainty or fear that they would be tried again for the same criminal offence that has already been decided by a final and binding decision. This principle is specific for the accusative and modern system of criminal procedure but not for the investigative criminal procedure, where the possibility for the bindingly finalised criminal procedure to be repeated on the basis of same evidence and regarding the same criminal issue existed. In its legal nature, a circumstance that the proceedings are pending on the same criminal offence against the same accused, represents a negative procedural presumption and, therefore, an obstacle for the further course of proceedings, i.e. it represents the procedural obstacle which prevents an initiation of new criminal procedure for the same criminal case in which the final and binding condemning or acquitting judgement has been passed (exceptio rei iudicatae).The right not to be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which s/he has already been finally convicted or acquitted is provided for, primarily, by the International Documents (Article 14, paragraph 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). The International framework has also been given to ne bis in idem principle through three Conventions adopted by the Council of Europe and those are the European Convention on Extradition and Additional Protocols thereto, the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, and the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments.Ne bis in idem principle is traditionally associated with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Likewise, no derogation from Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention at the time of war or other state of emergency which is threatening the survival of the nation (Article 4, paragraph 3 of Protocol No. 7). Thereby it is categorised as the irrevocable conventional right together with the right to life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery, and the legality principle. Similarly, ne bis in idem principle does not apply in the case of the renewed trials by the International criminal courts where the first trial was conducted in some State, while the principle is applicable in the reversed situation. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia could have conducted a trial even if a person had already been adjudicated in some State, in the cases provided for by its Statute and in the interest of justice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-385
Author(s):  
Yana Litins’ka ◽  
Oleksandra Karpenko

Abstract COVID-19 became a stress-test for many legal systems because it required that a balance be found between rapid action to prevent the spread of the disease, and continued respect for human rights. Many states in Europe, including Ukraine, chose to enforce an obligation to self-isolate. In this article we review what the obligation to self-isolate entails in the case of Ukraine. We also analyse whether such an obligation should be viewed as a deprivation or a mere restriction of liberty, and if it is permissible under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.


2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Thym

AbstractApplying the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to immigration cases has always been a balancing exercise between the effective protection of human rights and the Contracting States' autonomy to regulate migration flows. In its recent case law, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR) has considerably extended the protective scope of Article 8 ECHR by granting autonomous human rights protection to the long-term resident status independent of the existence of family bonds under the heading of ‘private life’. This has important repercussions for the status of legal and illegal immigrants across Europe, since the new case law widens the reach of human rights law to the legal conditions for leave to remain, effectively granting several applicants a human right to regularize their illegal stay. The contribution analyses the new case law and develops general criteria guiding the application of the ECHR to national immigration laws and the new EU harmonization measures adopted in recent years.


2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurence A. Groen

This note analyzes the functioning of the Russian judiciary on the basis of the European Court of Human Rights’ judgments in the cases of OAO Neftianaia Kompaniia Iukos and three of the company’s former leading executives, Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovskii, Platon Leonidovich Lebedev and the late Vasilii Aleksanian. The analysis turns to the breaches by the Russian state of Articles 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 (right to a fair trial) and 18 (permissible restrictions to the rights guaranteed) of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as established by the Court in the aforementioned cases, and the role of the Russian judiciary therein. In light of the fundamental flaws and structural nature characterizing the violations found, the conclusion is reached that the Russian judiciary (still) appears not to be entirely free from undue influence by the other branches of government.


2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Gilles Cuniberti

In Sabeh el Leil v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (‘‘ECtHR’’ or ‘‘the Court’’) ruled for the second time that a contracting state had violated the right to a fair trial afforded by Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘‘Convention’’) by denying access to its courts to an embassy employee suing for wrongful dismissal on the grounds that the employer enjoyed sovereign immunity. The ECtHR had first ruled so a year earlier in Cudak v. Lithuania, where the plaintiff was also an embassy employee.


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