scholarly journals RELASI POLITIK UANG DAN PARTY-ID DI INDONESIA

CosmoGov ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 204
Author(s):  
Iradhad Taqwa Sihidi ◽  
Laeli Nur Khanifah ◽  
Achmad Apriyanto Romadhan
Keyword(s):  

Tulisan ini secara spesifik melihat implikasi serius dari rendahnya Party-ID terhadap masivnya praktek politik uang di Indonesia. Prosesi demokrasi elektoral di Indonesia bekerja dengan logika padat modal sehingga kekuatan finansial menjadi salah satu faktor determinan dalam kemenangan kandidat politik. Hal ini beririsan secara bersamaan dengan terjadinya proses deideologisasi yang berlangsung secara masif ditubuh partai politik dan pemilih sehingga tingkatan Party-ID menjadi lemah. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi literatur. Data utama yang digunakan berasal dari jurnal, buku, maupun internet. Penelitian ini menunjukan bahwa gagalnya fungsi representasi politik (artikulasi dan agregasi kepentingan) yang ditampilkan partai politik membuat ikatan kedekatan ideologis (Party-ID) dengan masyarakat menjadi begitu rapuh. Hilangnya kohesi ideologis tersebut turut andil menguatkan tipologi floating mass yang seringkali harus diikat kembali melalui pendekatan politik uang ketika momen elektoral hadir (Pemilu dan Pilkada). Memperkuat fungsi intermediasi Partai Politik melalui reformasi kelembagaan dan kerja-kerja politik ideologis adalah salah satu solusi strategis memutus mata rantai politik uang di Indonesia. 

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haryanto Haryanto

This article explains that the party identifi cation (party ID) has become the main factor of voting behaviorin local politics in Indonesia. Voters no longer dominant consider the proximity factor, both ethnic andregional proximity in determining vote choice, as a general conclusion that has been used to explain votingbehavioral in local politics in Indonesia. This article confi rms that voters tend to conform to the party thenmake a choice their voices to candidates that are off ered by the party.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Ripke ◽  
R. Winter ◽  
T. Dietz ◽  
J. Quittek ◽  
R. da Silva

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. p39
Author(s):  
John Tropman

Social good has been defined as “services or products that promote human well-being on a large scale.” While there seems to be agreement about the definitional “space” of social good, concepts of social action, social justice, and social impact require further attention.Producing social good does not require injustice: improvements can be made even when there is no injustice. Social good might be considered the first step in a triad containing social better (ment) and social best (good, better, best), with impactful results produced by social actors.There may be large cultural “umbrellas,” widely held value bundles, which define whole societies at points in time and over time. We discuss two: “the lonely crowd,” and “party ID.”We use a portfolio analysis to look at the elements of social good and social bad: social very good, social good, social neutrality, social bad, and social disaster, and then consider three examples of positive social impacts, and five examples of negative social impacts.We suggest a guide to social action to help us make better decisions aimed toward the A or B outcomes (Social Very Good and Social Good), using three steps: awareness of hidden bias, regular decision refurbishment, and using decision rules.The goal of this paper is to share ideas to help avoid social bad, and to help achieve social good. Ideally, social good considerations will become a regular part of the decision-making process. 


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelangelo Geovanny Landgrave

Value of statistical life (VSL) analysis is common place in policy circles to evaluate the effectiveness of policy. As I show using a novel survey experiment with United States' state legislators, actual use of VSL analysis faces several problems. Firstly, policy preferences are inelastic, unchanging, regardless of the cost. Secondly, policy preferences are determined in large by actors' party ID. This means that VSL analysis, in practice, will either encourage policies that are too risky to too risk adverse.


Author(s):  
Thokozani Felix Vallent ◽  
Hae-Jung Kim ◽  
Eun-Jun Yoon ◽  
Hyunsung Kim

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Jenkins ◽  
Michelangelo Geovanny Landgrave

Despite the public's purported distaste for candidates supported by political action committees (PACs), they remain prominent in American electoral politics, with their total spending exceeding $582 million in the 2020 cycle. Does this dislike of PACs provide an opportunity for candidates to increase their likelihood of (re)election? Using a candidate evaluation survey experiment fielded as part of the 2020 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), we investigate how the decision to accept or reject PAC contributions affects candidates' evaluation and voters' willingness to support their election efforts. We find that voters are more likely to vote for, donate to, and trust candidates that reject PAC contributions. Surprisingly we fail to find evidence of moderation by respondent's party ID. Republican and Democratic voters both penalize candidates that accept PAC money. This study is among the first to study how candidates' campaign financing choices influence their evaluation by voters.


2017 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz ◽  
Joshua J. Dyck
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Krehbiel ◽  
Adam Meirowitz ◽  
Thomas Romer

Political parties are active when citizens choose among candidates in elections and when winning candidates choose among policy alternatives in government. But the inextricably linked institutions, incentives, and behavior that determine these multistage choices are substantively complex and analytically unwieldy, particularly if modeled explicitly and considered in total, from citizen preferences through government outcomes. To strike a balance between complexity and tractability, we modify standard spatial models of electoral competition and governmental policy-making to study how components of partisanship—such as candidate platform separation in elections, party ID-based voting, national partisan tides, and party-disciplined behavior in the legislature—are related to policy outcomes. We define partisan bias as the distance between the following two points in a conventional choice space: the ideal point of the median voter in the median legislative district and the policy outcome selected by the elected legislature. The study reveals that none of the party-in-electorate conditions is capable of producing partisan bias independently. Specified combinations of conditions, however, can significantly increase the bias and/or the variance of policy outcomes, sometimes in subtle ways.


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