scholarly journals PREGUNTAS DESVIADAS EN EL CUARTO DE MARY

2013 ◽  
pp. 77-91
Author(s):  
Maria Ayelen Sanchez
Keyword(s):  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Knowledge Argument ◽  
Frank Jackson ◽  
Daniel Dennett

En 1982, Frank Jackson propuso un experimento mental con el objetivo de refutar al fisicalismo y a su teoría de la identidad entre estados mentales y cerebrales. Este experimento, conocido como “el argumento del conocimiento” (Knowledge argument), tuvo una enorme repercusión en el ámbito de la filosofía de la mente, a tal punto que actualmente sigue generando debates en torno a su aceptación. En el presente trabajo expondremos la objeción realizada al mismo por Daniel Dennett, la cual pretende desacreditar la conclusión de Jackson. Finalmente, utilizaremos elconcepto de “pregunta desviada”, tal como lo emplea Hilary Putnam en su análisis del problema mente-cuerpo, para dejar planteada una crítica a la objeción presentada por Dennett.

Knowledge argument

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torin Alter
Keyword(s):  
Biological Sciences ◽  
Colour Vision ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Knowledge Argument ◽  
Frank Jackson ◽  
Black And White ◽  
Television Monitor ◽  
Physical Chemical ◽  
The World

The knowledge argument is an argument against physicalism, the view that the world is wholly physical. It was developed by Frank Jackson (1943–) and is based on the following thought experiment. Everything that can be known through the physical, chemical, and biological sciences – the complete physical truth – has been discovered. Mary is a brilliant scientist who is raised in a black-and-white room. She has never had colour experiences. But she learns the complete physical truth, which includes the completed science of colour vision, by reading books and watching lectures on a black-and-white television monitor. Then she leaves the room and sees colours. Jackson’s argument runs roughly as follows. When Mary leaves the room, she learns something new. She learns what it is like to see in colour. Evidently, the complete physical truth is not the complete truth about the world. Ergo, physicalism is false. Some react by denying that Mary learns anything when she leaves the room. Others react by accepting that she learns something but denying that this refutes physicalism. Still others accept the argument as sound. The ensuing discussion has led to a variety of insights about consciousness and its place in the natural world.

New thoughts about old facts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
María de Ponte ◽  
Kepa Korta
Keyword(s):  
Root Canal ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Knowledge Argument ◽  
Frank Jackson ◽  
Famous Paper ◽  
Linguistic Level ◽  
Nature Of Time

In a famous paper by Prior, ontological, epistemic, and semantic considerations are entangled in a way that creates the illusion of an ontological argument about the nature of time. This chapter defends the thesis that Prior’s argument is best interpreted as a “knowledge argument,” similar to that raised by Frank Jackson against physicalism. At a linguistic level, the authors argue that an utterance like “Thank goodness that is over [now]” expresses the same proposition as “Thank goodness the date of the conclusion of the root canal is Friday, June 15, 1954,” when uttered on the same date. At the epistemic level, it is argued that the two are associated with different motivating thoughts. At the ontological level, the authors reject the assumption that the proposition related to the utterance “Thank goodness that is over [now]” and its associated thought require the existence of A-properties.

What Gary Couldn’t Imagine

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 293-311
Author(s):  
Tufan Kiymaz ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Argument ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Quality ◽  
Daniel Dennett ◽  
Physical Knowledge ◽  
Paul Churchland

In this paper, I propose and defend an antiphysicalist argument, namely, the imagination argument, which draws inspiration from Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, or rather its misinterpretation by Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland. They interpret the knowledge argument to be about the ability to imagine a novel experience, which Jackson explicitly denies. The imagination argument is the following. Let Q be a visual phenomenal quality that is imaginable based on one’s phenomenal experience. (1) It is not possible to imagine Q solely based on complete physical knowledge. (2) If it is not possible to imagine Q solely based on complete physical knowledge, then physicalism is false. (3) Therefore, physicalism is false. Even though objections have been raised to this argument in the literature, there is, as far as I know, no explicit defense of it. I argue that the imagination argument is more plausible than the knowledge argument in some respects and less plausible in others. All things considered, it is at least as interesting and serious a challenge to physicalism as the knowledge argument is.

Narrow Content

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri ◽  
John Hawthorne
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Central Topic ◽  
Tyler Burge ◽  
Narrow Content

Narrow mental content, if there is such a thing, is content that is entirely determined by the goings-on inside the head of the thinker. A central topic in the philosophy of mind since the mid-1970s has been whether there is a kind of mental content that is narrow in this sense. It is widely conceded, thanks to famous thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, that there is a kind of mental content that is not narrow. But it is often maintained that there is also a kind of mental content that is narrow, and that such content can play various key explanatory roles relating, inter alia, to epistemology and the explanation of action. This book argues that this is a forlorn hope. It carefully distinguishes a variety of conceptions of narrow content and a variety of explanatory roles that might be assigned to narrow content. It then argues that, once we pay sufficient attention to the details, there is no promising theory of narrow content in the offing.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri ◽  
John Hawthorne
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Tyler Burge ◽  
Narrow Content ◽  
History Of ◽  
To Come

The Introduction outlines the history of the narrow content debate. It introduces the famous thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, discusses why the debate only came to prominence in the 1970s, and outlines what is to come.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Kirchin
Keyword(s):  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
General Methodology ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
History Of ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
The Difference

This chapter introduces the distinction between thin and thick concepts and then performs a number of functions. First, two major accounts of thick concepts—separationism and nonseparationism—are introduced and, in doing so, a novel account of evaluation is indicated. Second, each chapter is outlined as is the general methodology, followed, third, by a brief history of the discussion of thick concepts, referencing Philippa Foot, Hilary Putnam, Gilbert Ryle, and Bernard Williams among others. Fourth, a number of relevant contrasts are introduced, such as the fact–value distinction and the difference between concepts, properties, and terms. Lastly, some interesting and relevant questions are raised that, unfortunately, have to be left aside.

Philosophy of Logic. Hilary Putnam

1973 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-133
Author(s):  
John Corcoran
Keyword(s):  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Philosophy Of Logic
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