The sense of mineness in personal memory: problems for the endorsement model

What does it take for a subject to experience a personal memory as being her own? According to Fernández’ (2019) model of endorsement, this particular phenomenal quality of our memories, their “sense of mineness”, can be explained in terms of the experience of the mnemonic content as veridical. In this article, I criticize this model for two reasons: (a) the evidence that is used by Fernández to ground his theoretical proposal is dubious; and more importantly, (b) the endorsement model does not accommodate many non-pathological everyday memories that preserve their sense of mineness, but whose veridicality is explicitly denied, suspected, not automatically endorsed, or neither denied nor endorsed. Finally, I sketch two alternative explanations: one also problematic, the other one more promising, and present some normative advantages of the latter. This also displays the undesirability of the endorsement model from a normative perspective.

The Phenomenology of “Pure” Consciousness as Reported by an Experienced Meditator of the Tibetan Buddhist Karma Kagyu Tradition. Analysis of Interview Content Concerning Different Meditative States

A philosopher and a cognitive neuroscientist conversed with Buddhist lama Tilmann Lhündrup Borghardt (TLB) about the unresolved phenomenological concerns and logical questions surrounding “pure” consciousness or minimal phenomenal experience (MPE), a quasi-contentless, non-dual state whose phenomenology of “emptiness” is often described in terms of the phenomenal quality of luminosity that experienced meditators have reported occurs in deep meditative states. Here, we present the excerpts of the conversation that relate to the question of how it is possible to first have and later retrieve such non-dual states of selflessness and timelessness that are unrelated to sensory input. According to TLB, a “pure” experience of consciousness contains the phenomenal quality of luminous clarity, which is experienced solely in the transitional phase from the non-dual state of absolute emptiness to the state of minimal emptiness, when the person gradually returns to duality. However, this quality of luminous clarity can also be experienced in non-minimal states as in the experiential mode of being awakened. TLB describes this transition as a kind of ephemeral afterglow in the form of a maximally abstract phenomenal quality, i.e., luminosity, which justifies the conclusion of having been in a state of “pure” consciousness.

A multidimensional phenomenal space for pain: structure, primitiveness, and utility

Pain is often used as the paradigmatic example of a phenomenal kind with a phenomenal quality common and unique to its instantiations. Philosophers have intensely discussed the relation between the subjective feeling, which unites pains and distinguishes them from other experiences, and the phenomenal properties of sensory, affective, and evaluative character along which pains typically vary. At the center of this discussion is the question whether the phenomenal properties prove necessary and/or sufficient for pain. In the empirical literature, sensory, affective, and evaluative properties have played a decisive role in the investigation of psychophysical correspondence and clinical diagnostics. This paper addresses the outlined philosophical and empirical issues from a new perspective by constructing a multidimensional phenomenal space for pain. First, the paper will construe the phenomenal properties of pains in terms of a property space whose structure reflects phenomenal similarities and dissimilarities by means of spatial distance. Second, philosophical debates on necessary and sufficient properties are reconsidered in terms of whether there is a phenomenal space formed of dimensions along which all and only pains vary. It is concluded that there is no space of this kind and, thus, that pain constitutes a primitive phenomenal kind that cannot be analyzed entirely in terms of its varying phenomenal properties. Third, the paper addresses the utility of continued reference to pain and its phenomenal properties in philosophical and scientific discourses. It is argued that numerous insights into the phenomenal structure of pain can be gained that have thus far received insufficient attention.

The badness of pain

Why is pain bad? The most straightforward theory of pain's badness, dolorism, appeals to the phenomenal quality of displeasure. In spite of its explanatory appeal, the view is too straightforward to capture two central puzzles, namely pain that is enjoyed and pain that is not painful (e.g. pain asymbolia). These cases can be captured by conditionalism, which makes the badness of displeasure conditional on an agent's attitude. But conditionalism fails where dolorism succeeds with explanatory appeal. A new approach is proposed, reverse conditionalism, which maintains the explanatory appeal of dolorism, but gives attitudes a value-defeating role. It is argued that this view does best in fulfilling the desiderata and capturing the cases.

What Gary Couldn’t Imagine

In this paper, I propose and defend an antiphysicalist argument, namely, the imagination argument, which draws inspiration from Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, or rather its misinterpretation by Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland. They interpret the knowledge argument to be about the ability to imagine a novel experience, which Jackson explicitly denies. The imagination argument is the following. Let Q be a visual phenomenal quality that is imaginable based on one’s phenomenal experience. (1) It is not possible to imagine Q solely based on complete physical knowledge. (2) If it is not possible to imagine Q solely based on complete physical knowledge, then physicalism is false. (3) Therefore, physicalism is false. Even though objections have been raised to this argument in the literature, there is, as far as I know, no explicit defense of it. I argue that the imagination argument is more plausible than the knowledge argument in some respects and less plausible in others. All things considered, it is at least as interesting and serious a challenge to physicalism as the knowledge argument is.

Success of manufacturing industries – Role of Six Sigma

Six Sigma is a phenomenal quality management concepts which has helped many organizations to overcome quality crisis in the recent past. Six Sigma is observed as a very promising quality management tool for any organization to make its presence felt in the corporate world as it emphasizes on obtaining a fruitful solution to improve accuracy, reduce defect thereby reduce the cost and improve profits. The main objective of this investigation is to unearth the extent to which the companies have been benefitted due to Six Sigma implementation. This article presents the results based on the analysis of collective opinion of employees of various Indian manufacturing industries that have implemented Six Sigma. This research also examines interrelationship among various parameters defined in the research. The research revealed that industries are benefitted irrespective of their nature in terms of their growth, financial benefits, productivity and satisfaction of the customer. However, peoples’ equity that deals with the benefits that employees obtain after Six Sigma implementation is not certain. The research also revealed the existence of strong interrelationship among various parameters used to measure the success of Six Sigma.

“Do you see the story?” Consciousness, Cognition and Cricis of Narration in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness

The aim of this article is to examine the ways Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness dramatizes an existential crisis that is psychologically as well as politically underpinned. It explores how the novel is reflective of the ideological complexities of its day while also corresponding to current ideas in cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind which examine the entanglements of embodied feelings, subjective sentience and the ability to narrativize experientiality in shared language. In investigating how the crisis of narration in Heart of Darkness is reflective of the psychological and existential alienation experienced by the protagonist in the novel, the article draws on debates on the role of the literary narrative as a vehicle to communicate the phenomenal quality of consciousness.

Aesthetics as analysis of mind experience

The paper presents an at tempt to shed light on causes and circum stances which brought about foundation of aesthetics in 18th century as discipline which analyzes mind experience. Author recognizes key importance of 17th century epistemology for constitution of modern aesthetics, principally idea of subjectivity, subject-object relation problem and new method - philosophical introspection. Special place in modern aesthetics, according to author, deserves aesthetic theory of Francis Hutcheson who defines beauty as phenomenal quality of subjective experience of human mind.

Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure

Some philosophers have claimed that pleasures and pains are characterized by their particular ‘feel’ or ‘hedonic tone’. Most contemporary writers reject this view: they hold that hedonic states have nothing in common except being liked or disliked (alternatively: pursued or avoided) for their own sake. In this article, I argue that the hedonic tone view has been dismissed too quickly: there is no clear introspective or scientific evidence that pleasures do not share a phenomenal quality. I also argue that analysing hedonic states in terms of liking or wanting is implausible. If it is correct that pleasures and pains are not united by any particular hedonic tone, we should instead simply conclude that there are several different hedonic tones. This pluralistic understanding of the hedonic tone view has generally been overlooked in the literature, but appears to be fairly plausible as a philosophical account of pleasure and pain.

Mutual Subject-Discovery in Syrian Encounters

For anthropologists who engage in encounter-based fieldwork, contact zones have a peculiar phenomenal quality that is often neglected by scholars from other disciplines who have taken up the fieldwork paradigm initially developed by ethnographers. In this paper, I want to elaborate how, in my most recent fieldwork in Syria, I experienced such zones, and I want to reflect on this experience and its relation to concepts and writing as it becomes knowledge. I define fieldwork as “the registering of sensory impressions in a (temporal) process of mutual subject-discovery and critique,” and anthropology as a “mode of engagement in generating knowledge and social and political action that enables ongoing relationships” (Borneman/Hammoudi 2009: 19). This picture of fieldwork and ethnography, in its stress on the author being in “a zone of contact with the world he is depicting” (Bakhtin 1981: 30), is at odds with understandings that focus on anthropology as a “cultural critique” of the West (Marcus/Fischer 1986), “creative and usable mappings” (Gupta/Ferguson 1997: 56), “comparison of embedded concepts” between societies (Asad 2003: 17), or interpretation of another culture (Geertz 1973).