Is There an Ellsberg-Fellner Paradox? A Note on its Resolution

1989 ◽  
Vol 64 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1087-1090 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Brady ◽  
Howard B. Lee

The Ellsberg-Fellner Paradox can be shown to be nonparadoxical if Keynes' concept of weight-of-evidence is incorporated in decision making under risk and/or uncertainty. Keynes' concept is a more advanced version of C. S. Peirce's “second number” approach and is identical to R. Carnap's reliability-unreliability index. The Ellsberg-Fellner Paradox is paradoxical only to decision theorists who accept the Von Neumann-Morgenstern-Savage axioms. Decision theorists who accept the logical approach to probability can bypass this problem.

2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 25-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaja Damnjanovic ◽  
Ivana Jankovic

The approaches to the decision making process are typically either normative or descriptive. We sketch a historical development of the decision theory, starting with concept of utility that was first introduced by Daniel Bernoulli and then explaining the basic concepts of von Neumann and Morgenstern?s normative expected utility theory (including the basic axioms of rationality). Then we present the descriptively oriented prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky as a critique of the expected utility theory. We compare these theories and conclude that their historical sequence captures the sequence of the developmental stages of the decision-making process itself. However, normative and descriptive theories are not mutually exclusive.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamar Kugler ◽  
Lisa D. Ordonez ◽  
Terry Connolly

Neuroscience ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 440 ◽  
pp. 30-38
Author(s):  
Xue-rui Peng ◽  
Xu Lei ◽  
Peng Xu ◽  
Jing Yu

2012 ◽  
Vol 263 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillaume Fond ◽  
Sophie Bayard ◽  
Delphine Capdevielle ◽  
Jonathan Del-Monte ◽  
Nawale Mimoun ◽  
...  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document