Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management

CFA Digest ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-78
Author(s):  
David B. Miyazaki
1999 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franklin R Edwards

The Fed-engineered rescue of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in September 1998 set off alarms throughout financial markets about the activities of hedge funds and the stability of financial markets in general. With only $4.8 billion in equity, LTCM managed to leverage itself to the hilt by borrowing more than $125 billion from banks and securities firms and entering into derivatives contracts totaling more than $1 trillion (notional). When LTCM's speculations went sour in the summer of 1998, the impending liquidation of LTCM's portfolio threatened to destabilize financial markets throughout the world. Public policy response to LTCM should focus on risks of systemic fragility and ways in which bank regulation can be improved.


2018 ◽  
pp. 49-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. E. Mamonov

Our analysis documents that the existence of hidden “holes” in the capital of not yet failed banks - while creating intertemporal pressure on the actual level of capital - leads to changing of maturity of loans supplied rather than to contracting of their volume. Long-term loans decrease, whereas short-term loans rise - and, what is most remarkably, by approximately the same amounts. Standardly, the higher the maturity of loans the higher the credit risk and, thus, the more loan loss reserves (LLP) banks are forced to create, increasing the pressure on capital. Banks that already hide “holes” in the capital, but have not yet faced with license withdrawal, must possess strong incentives to shorten the maturity of supplied loans. On the one hand, it raises the turnovers of LLP and facilitates the flexibility of capital management; on the other hand, it allows increasing the speed of shifting of attracted deposits to loans to related parties in domestic or foreign jurisdictions. This enlarges the potential size of ex post revealed “hole” in the capital and, therefore, allows us to assume that not every loan might be viewed as a good for the economy: excessive short-term and insufficient long-term loans can produce the source for future losses.


10.1002/aps.2 ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-294
Author(s):  
Leslie Shaw

Author(s):  
E. S. Biryukov

The paper considers two main original approaches to investing the assets of institutional investors (the total amount of their assets in the world is about 100 trillion dollars) – the one of Norway's sovereign wealth fund Global and approach of Yale's endowment fund. Fund Global with assets of $ 716 billion dollars is the largest institutional investor in the world, its strategy is based on the assumption that markets are efficient and their long-term growth lies in the balance of investment in stocks , bonds, and , since more recent time - in real estate. Financiers of Yale in the 1990s revolutionized the approach to investment, firstly, by reducing the proportion of stocks and bonds in favor of private equity and real estate, and secondly , by shift from investments in the domestic market to foreign markets. Not all institutional investors are ready to follow these strategies because of the risk of negative returns in times of crises, but in the medium- and long-term, these approaches allow to beat inflation. For example, Yale's endowment has grown since 1985 to 2012 from 1.6 to 19 billion dollars, and high yield allows to transmit 1 billion dollars (!) to the budget of the university annually. Endowment funds are one of the key sources of revenues of leading American universities. Analysis of the investment policy of endowment funds and sovereign wealth funds shows that fundamental changes in the concept of investing began to occur since the late 1980s - early 1990s . Institutional investors of both these types ceased to focus on conservative instruments - bonds and deposits , and use other options: Global - stocks , Yale – private equity , hedge funds, real estate investments , etc. With the expand of the spectrum of instruments in which the funds are invested the income volatility increases either, and therefore the institutional investors should be both transparent and explain to the public the motives of investment strategy changes.


Quipukamayoc ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (12) ◽  
pp. 13
Author(s):  
Pascual Chávez Ackermann

Desde los primeros días de junio, han ocurrido una serie de extraordinarios acontecimientos en los mercados financieros mundiales que, si se analizan cada uno de ellos por separado, no parecen tener mayor significado. Pero, si estos hechos se consideran como parte de un solo proceso global, entonces no podemos llegar sino a la conclusión de que ya ocurrió a principios de junio otro desastre financiero, parecido a la quiebra en setiembre de 1998 del fondo financiero de apuestas especulativas LTCM (Long Term Capital Management), y que se pusieron en marcha una serie de esfuerzos de alto nivel para ocultar la realidad o para administrar la crisis, todo ello para prevenir que cunda el pánico en los mercados financieros internacionales. En un discurso pronunciado ante la Casa Mansión en Londres el 10 de junio, el gobernador del Banco de Inglaterra, Eddie George, recalcó cuán cerca había llegado el mundo a la desintegración financiera en el otoño de 1998. "La última vez que estuvimos aquí para esta espléndida ocasión, yo sugerí que estábamos viviendo en un ambiente económico y financiero internacional peligroso. Estas fueron palabras fuertes para un banquero central -pero quizás no lo suficientemente fuerte-. Ese ambiente rápidamente empeoró en el transcurso del otoño, y para las fechas de la reunión anual del FMI (Fondo Monetario Internacional), en octubre, ya todo mundo hablaba de una desintegración financiera global y una próxima recesión mundial, lo que no era simplemente hipérbole periodística".


2019 ◽  
pp. 28-55
Author(s):  
Hyun Song Shin

An example of a hedge fund illustrates a long-short strategy that maximises expected returns subject to a Value-at-Risk strategy. Balance sheet capacity depends on the measured volatility of asset returns and the book equity of the long-short hedge fund. The principles are illustrated by the case of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM).


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