Official Financial Flows, Capital Mobility, and Global Imbalances

CFA Digest ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Tan
2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (199) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamim Bayoumi ◽  
Joseph Gagnon ◽  
Christian Saborowski ◽  
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...  

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamim Bayoumi ◽  
Joseph Gagnon ◽  
Christian Saborowski

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamim Bayoumi ◽  
Joseph Gagnon ◽  
Christian Saborowski

2015 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 146-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamim Bayoumi ◽  
Joseph Gagnon ◽  
Christian Saborowski

Author(s):  
Michael J. Lee

Since the 1970s, financial crises have been a consistent feature of the international economy, warranting study by economists and political scientists alike. Economists have made great strides in their understanding of the dynamics of crises, with two potentially overlapping stories rising to the fore. Global crises appear to occur highly amid global imbalances—when some countries run large current account deficits and others, large surpluses. A second story emphasizes credit booms—financial institutions greatly extend access to credit, potentially leading to bubbles and subsequent crashes. Global imbalances are, in part, the product of politically contested processes. Imbalances would be impossible if states did not choose to liberalize (or not to liberalize) their capital accounts. Global political structures—whether international institutions seeking to govern financial flows, or hierarchies reflecting an economic power structure among states—also influence the ability of the global system to resolve global imbalances. Indeed, economists themselves are increasingly finding evidence that the international economy is not a flat system, but a network where some states play larger roles than others. Credit booms, too, and the regulatory structures that produce them, result from active choices by states. The expansion of the financial sector since the 1970s, however, took place amid a crucible of fire. Financial deregulation was the product of interest group knife-fights, states’ vying for position or adapting to technological change, and policy entrepreneurs’ seeking to enact their ideas. The IPE (international political economy) literature, too, must pay attention to post-2008 developments in economic thought. As financial integration pushes countries to adopt the monetary policies of the money center, the much-discussed monetary trilemma increasingly resembles a dilemma. Whereas economists once thought of expanded access to credit as “financial development,” they increasingly lament the preponderance of “financialized” economies. While the experimentalist turn in political science heralded a great search for cute natural experiments, economists are increasingly turning to the distant past to understand phenomena that have not been seen for some time. Political scientists might benefit from returning to the same grand theory questions, this time armed with more rigorous empirical techniques, and extensive data collected by economic historians.


1998 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Roberts Clark ◽  
Usha Nair Reichert ◽  
Sandra Lynn Lomas ◽  
Kevin L. Parker

The effect of increased capital mobility on the national control of macroeconomic policy continues to be a topic of debate. Empirical contributions to this debate share the assumption that domestic macroeconomic policy is driven by either partisan or countercyclical motivations, and that the effects of international financial flows have roughly similar effects in all countries. This article reevaluates the integration hypothesis in a framework in which manipulations of the macroeconomy derive from opportunistic motivations. The article emphasizes the ways in which prior institutional choices effect the way these motivations are translated into actions. Evidence from individual country and pooled time-series tests suggests that opportunistic cycles are less likely to occur when (1) a government maintains a fixed exchange rate in the presence of highly mobile capital or (2) when the central bank enjoys above-average independence.


2021 ◽  
pp. 149-162
Author(s):  
Jack Copley

This chapter reiterates the key arguments and findings of the book. The British state pursued financial liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s in an attempt to reconcile the demands of domestic civil society with the suffocating, impersonal pressures of the global economic crisis on Britain’s balances with the rest of the world. Financialization was an accidental result, not an intended outcome. In addition, this chapter explores how the four liberalizations examined here impacted upon the trajectory of financialization in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Britain’s liberalization of its financial sector boosted global capital mobility, and thus created powerful pressures on other states to follow suit, contributing to a dynamic of competitive deregulation that spread around the world. Further, the arm’s-length, depoliticized design of the 1986 FSA generated an institutional path dependency, whereby future British systems of financial governance would take a similarly light-touch form. This meant that London would incubate a series of banking scandals in the 1990s, as well as being home to some of the riskiest financial practices exposed by the 2008 crisis. Finally, the growing financial flows unleashed by the liberalizations of the 1970s and 1980s were increasingly channelled into the housing market, resulting in Britain’s particular dynamic of housing-centric financialization.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Sebastian Alvarez

The shortcomings and potential dangers of international financial flows for the health and stability of domestic banking systems in developing countries have been copiously discussed over the last decades. While the importance of capital controls and regulation as determining factors has been widely emphasised, the extent to which these policies work in episodes of financial crisis is still a matter of debate. This article examines the relationship between supervisory frameworks and banking fragility in Mexico and Brazil in the wake of the international debt crisis of 1982. It shows that the model of international banking intermediation that evolved out of the stringent capital mobility system in Brazil was considerably less vulnerable to crisis than in Mexico, which had a more lightly regulated regime. These findings provide insights into historical debates about the implications of prudential regulation and capital controls for the development and expansion of foreign finance, and whether the risks underlying international banking are necessarily inherent in the process of financial globalisation.


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