Zombies at Large? Corporate Debt Overhang and the Macroeconomy

What are the macroeconomic consequences of business credit booms? Are they as dangerous as household credit booms? If not, why not? We answer these questions by collecting data on nonfinancial business liabilities (primarily bank loans and corporate bonds) for 17 advanced economies over the past 150 years. Unlike household credit, business credit booms are rarely followed by macroeconomic hangovers. Data on debt renegotiation costs—instrumented by a country’s legal tradition—show that frictions to debt resolution make recessions deeper and longer—an important factor in explaining the differences with household credit booms.

Collateral Booms and Information Depletion

We develop a new theory of information production during credit booms. Entrepreneurs need credit to undertake investment projects, some of which enable them to divert resources. Lenders can protect themselves from such diversion in two ways: collateralization and costly screening, which generates durable information about projects. In equilibrium, the collateralization-screening mix depends on the value of aggregate collateral. High collateral values make it possible to reallocate resources towards productive projects, but they also crowd out screening. This has important dynamic implications. During credit booms driven by high collateral values (e.g. real estate booms), economic activity expands but the economy’s stock of information on existing projects gets depleted. As a result, collateral-driven booms end in deep crises and slow recoveries: when booms end, investment is constrained both by the lack of collateral and by the lack of information on existing projects, which takes time to rebuild. We provide empirical support for the mechanism using US firm-level data.

What Do the Two Global Crises Tell us: History as a Mirror

<p>History typically does repeat with similar processes. Routes to both The Great Depression in 1929 and the Subprime Crisis (the Great Recession) in 2007 are similar: central banks implemented lax monetary policy and governments adopt populist policies to expand credit, economic growth drives public and private debt to increase sharply and asset illiquidity is caused due to the financial system's borrowing short-term funding to lend long-term loans for high profits. The key factors involved in both crises will be analysed from the following dimensions prior to the two crises: interest rates, credit booms, leverage and liquidity in the banking system. Human nature is one main reason to explain these crises. The primary cause of this phenomenon is that animal spirits such as confidence cannot be entirely eliminated, with significant subsequent effects upon the economy.</p>

Zombies at Large? Corporate Debt Overhang and the Macroeconomy

With business leverage at record levels, the effects of corporate debt overhang on growth and investment have become a prominent concern. In this paper, we study the effects of corporate debt overhang based on long-run cross-country data covering the near universe modern business cycles. We show that business credit booms typically do not leave a lasting imprint on the macroeconomy. Quantile local projections indicate that business credit booms do not affect the economy’s tail risks either. Yet in line with theory, we find that the economic costs of corporate debt booms rise when inefficient debt restructuring and liquidation impede the resolution of corporate financial distress and make it more likely that corporate zombies creep along.

Capital Flows and Leverage

This article surveys the literature on capital flows and leverage. We summarize results from the existing papers and document new facts. The empirical literature takes both a macro and a micro approach. The macro approach focuses on aggregate data both over time and in the cross-section of countries, and it documents a positive correlation between total capital flows, build-ups in terms of external and domestic debt to GDP ratio, and financial crises. The micro approach uses granular data and focuses on leverage at the firm and bank level and associates this leverage with country-level capital flows and related exchange rate movements. We document new facts from a hybrid approach that focuses on the relationship between sector-level capital flows and sectoral leverage. We highlight the interconnections between different approaches and argue that harmonization of the macro and micro approaches can yield a more complete understanding of the effect of capital flows on country-, sector-, and firm- and bank-level leverage associated with credit booms and busts.