scholarly journals PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENCE ON ISRAEL-HEZBOLLAH ARMED CONFLICT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 686
Author(s):  
Wiwilliem Rizki Limboto ◽  
Teddy Nurcahyawan

The legalization of war has legitimized wars of “self-defence”. On January 18, 2015 on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, Israel launched an airstrike that killed six Hezbollah fighters and an Iranian brigadier general, Mohammed Ali Allahdadi. Israel claims that it acted preemptively in order to preserve its existential security by implementing a defensive policy commonly dubbed as the “War Between Wars” policy, to disrupt Iran’s supply of advanced weaponry for Hezbollah. On the other hand, Hezbollah in its continuous defiance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 claims that the aforementioned arms supply was meant to preserve Lebanon’s security against future Israeli aggression. The facts of the case presented certain legal issues, as to whether or not Israel’s airstrike towards Hezbollah constitute a legitimate self-defence and its permissibility under international law. This is a normative legal research, thus relies heavily on library research, the IRAC method was used in deciphering the issue. After careful considerations, by attributing the said airstrike with the preemptive strike theory, it has been found that Israel’s airstrike was not preemptive, but rather preventive in nature, and should have been illegal under international law. However, a just cause test was conducted on both sides, and it has been found that the odds are more in favor towards Israel than Hezbollah. Ultimately, the research concluded that although preventive warfare was deemed to be illegal under international law, Israel’s claim of self-defence was more likely to be permitted in the international arena than Hezbollah’s.


2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-134
Author(s):  
John Ip

AbstractThe Syrian civil war has highlighted the phenomenon of foreign fighting, in which individuals leave their home State to join an armed conflict overseas. The predominant paradigm for regulating foreign fighting, centred on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, is based on counterterrorism, which in essence treats foreign fighting as a form of terrorism. This paradigm is largely reflective of the domestic legislation of the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia. This article argues that this approach is problematic, and that an alternative paradigm based on the international law of neutrality and related domestic legislation provides a better means for regulating foreign fighting.



Author(s):  
Rob McLaughlin

This chapter examines UN Security Council practice with respect to the use of force in no-fly zones and maritime exclusion zones. It considers whether the law governing the zone is based or not based on the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and whether the law on the use of force inside the zone is essentially the same as that outside it. It also assesses the effect of the Security Council’s act of declaring or acquiescing in the zone on the law that is normally applicable in the ocean or airspace enclosed by the zone. The chapter also analyses whether the Security Council can authorize the use of lethal force for the purpose of enforcing a mandate despite the absence of LOAC authorization. It discusses the notion of a ‘third paradigm’ for use of lethal force and the concept of ‘self-defence’ endorsed by the Security Council (and the UN more generally).



2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-16
Author(s):  
Claire Clement

On June 11, 2019, the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2474 on missing persons in armed conflict. The resolution marks the first time the Security Council has agreed on a thematic text dedicated to this issue, lending its collective voice to call for more effective implementation of existing obligations towards missing persons—both civilian and military—and their families under international law.



2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-328
Author(s):  
Catherine O’Rourke

AbstractThe gendered implications of COVID-19, in particular in terms of gender-based violence and the gendered division of care work, have secured some prominence, and ignited discussion about prospects for a ‘feminist recovery’. In international law terms, feminist calls for a response to the pandemic have privileged the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), conditioned—I argue—by two decades of the pursuit of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda through the UNSC. The deficiencies of the UNSC response, as characterised by the Resolution 2532 adopted to address the pandemic, manifest yet again the identified deficiencies of the WPS agenda at the UNSC, namely fragmentation, securitisation, efficacy and legitimacy. What Resolution 2532 does bring, however, is new clarity about the underlying reasons for the repeated and enduring nature of these deficiencies at the UNSC. Specifically, the COVID-19 ‘crisis’ is powerful in exposing the deficiencies of the crisis framework in which the UNSC operates. My reflections draw on insights from Hilary Charlesworth’s seminal contribution ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’ to argue that, instead of conceding the ‘crisis’ framework to the pandemic by prioritising the UNSC, a ‘feminist recovery’ must instead follow Charlesworth’s exhortation to refocus on an international law of the everyday.



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