scholarly journals Game Description Language and Dynamic Epistemic Logic Compared

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Engesser ◽  
Robert Mattmüller ◽  
Bernhard Nebel ◽  
Michael Thielscher
Keyword(s):  
Logic Programming ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Legal Action ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Description Language ◽  
Action Sequences ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Game Description Language

Several different frameworks have been proposed to model and reason about knowledge in dynamic multi-agent settings, among them the logic-programming-based game description language GDL-III, and dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), based on possible-worlds semantics. GDL-III and DEL have complementary strengths and weaknesses in terms of ease of modeling and simplicity of semantics. In this paper, we formally study the expressiveness of GDL-III vs. DEL. We clarify the commonalities and differences between those languages, demonstrate how to bridge the differences where possible, and identify large fragments of GDL-III and DEL that are equivalent in the sense that they can be used to encode games or planning tasks that admit the same legal action sequences. We prove the latter by providing compilations between those fragments of GDL-III and DEL.

Game description language and dynamic epistemic logic compared

2021 ◽  
Vol 292 ◽  
pp. 103433
Author(s):  
Thorsten Engesser ◽  
Robert Mattmüller ◽  
Bernhard Nebel ◽  
Michael Thielscher
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Description Language ◽  
Game Description Language

scholarly journals EVERYONE KNOWS THAT SOMEONE KNOWS: QUANTIFIERS OVER EPISTEMIC AGENTS

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAVEL NAUMOV ◽  
JIA TAO
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Completeness Theorem ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Distributed Knowledge ◽  
First Order ◽  
Soundness And Completeness ◽  
First Order Modal Logic

AbstractModal logic S5 is commonly viewed as an epistemic logic that captures the most basic properties of knowledge. Kripke proved a completeness theorem for the first-order modal logic S5 with respect to a possible worlds semantics. A multiagent version of the propositional S5 as well as a version of the propositional S5 that describes properties of distributed knowledge in multiagent systems has also been previously studied. This article proposes a version of S5-like epistemic logic of distributed knowledge with quantifiers ranging over the set of agents, and proves its soundness and completeness with respect to a Kripke semantics.

Constrained Epistemic Extension on Agent Knowledge Acquisition

2013 ◽  
Vol 651 ◽  
pp. 943-948
Author(s):  
Zhi Ling Hong ◽  
Mei Hong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Default Logic ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Default Reasoning ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Negotiation Strategy ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Default Rules

In multi-agent systems, a number of autonomous pieces of software (the agents) interact in order to execute complex tasks. This paper proposes a logic framework portrays agent’s communication protocols in the multi-agent systems and a dynamic negotiation model based on epistemic default logic was introduced in this framework. In this paper, we use the constrained default rules to investigate the extension of dynamic epistemic logic, and constrained epistemic extension construct an efficient negotiation strategy via constrained epistemic default reasoning, which guarantees the important natures of extension existence and semi-monotonicity. We also specify characteristic of the dynamic updating when agent learn new knowledge in the logical framework. The method for the information sharing signify the usefulness of logical tools carried out in the dynamic process of information acquisition, and the distributed intelligent information processing show the effectiveness of reasoning default logic in the dynamic epistemic logic theory.

scholarly journals Multi-Agent Abstract Argumentation Frameworks With Incomplete Knowledge of Attacks

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Herzig ◽  
Antonio Yuste Ginel
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Second Order ◽  
The State ◽  
Incomplete Knowledge ◽  
Abstract Argumentation ◽  
Multi Agent

We introduce a multi-agent, dynamic extension of abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs), strongly inspired by epistemic logic, where agents have only partial information about the conflicts between arguments. These frameworks can be used to model a variety of situations. For instance, those in which agents have bounded logical resources and therefore fail to spot some of the actual attacks, or those where some arguments are not explicitly and fully stated (enthymematic argumentation). Moreover, we include second-order knowledge and common knowledge of the attack relation in our structures (where the latter accounts for the state of the debate), so as to reason about different kinds of persuasion and about strategic features. This version of multi-agent AFs, as well as their updates with public announcements of attacks (more concretely, the effects of these updates on the acceptability of an argument) can be described using S5-PAL, a well-known dynamic-epistemic logic. We also discuss how to extend our proposal to capture arbitrary higher-order attitudes and uncertainty.

scholarly journals ARROW UPDATE LOGIC

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARTELD KOOI ◽  
BRYAN RENNE
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Logic Approach ◽  
Action Models ◽  
Information Change ◽  
Update Logic

We presentArrow Update Logic, a theory of epistemic access elimination that can be used to reason about multi-agent belief change. While the belief-changing “arrow updates” of Arrow Update Logic can be transformed into equivalent belief-changing “action models” from the popular Dynamic Epistemic Logic approach, we prove that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models. Further, since many examples of belief change are naturally thought of from Arrow Update Logic’s perspective of eliminating access to epistemic possibilities, Arrow Update Logic is a valuable addition to the repertoire of logics of information change. In addition to proving basic results about Arrow Update Logic, we introduce a new notion of common knowledge that generalizes both ordinary common knowledge and the “relativized” common knowledge familiar from the Dynamic Epistemic Logic literature.

scholarly journals Dynamic epistemic logics for abstract argumentation

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Proietti ◽  
Antonio Yuste-Ginel
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Strategic Communication ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Abstract Argumentation ◽  
Information Update ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Event Models ◽  
Different Levels

AbstractThis paper introduces a multi-agent dynamic epistemic logic for abstract argumentation. Its main motivation is to build a general framework for modelling the dynamics of a debate, which entails reasoning about goals, beliefs, as well as policies of communication and information update by the participants. After locating our proposal and introducing the relevant tools from abstract argumentation, we proceed to build a three-tiered logical approach. At the first level, we use the language of propositional logic to encode states of a multi-agent debate. This language allows to specify which arguments any agent is aware of, as well as their subjective justification status. We then extend our language and semantics to that of epistemic logic, in order to model individuals’ beliefs about the state of the debate, which includes uncertainty about the information available to others. As a third step, we introduce a framework of dynamic epistemic logic and its semantics, which is essentially based on so-called event models with factual change. We provide completeness results for a number of systems and show how existing formalisms for argumentation dynamics and unquantified uncertainty can be reduced to their semantics. The resulting framework allows reasoning about subtle epistemic and argumentative updates—such as the effects of different levels of trust in a source—and more in general about the epistemic dimensions of strategic communication.

scholarly journals Decidability Results in First-Order Epistemic Planning

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrés Occhipinti Liberman ◽  
Rasmus Kræmmer Rendsvig
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Single Agent ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Existence Problem ◽  
Independent Action ◽  
First Order ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Action Representations ◽  
Multi Agent Planning

Propositional Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) provides an expressive framework for epistemic planning, but lacks desirable features that are standard in first-order planning languages (such as problem-independent action representations via action schemas). A recent epistemic planning formalism based on First-Order Dynamic Epistemic Logic (FODEL) combines the strengths of DEL (higher-order epistemics) with those of first-order languages (lifted representation), yielding benefits in terms of expressiveness and representational succinctness. This paper studies the plan existence problem for FODEL planning, showing that while the problem is generally undecidable, the cases of single-agent planning and multi-agent planning with non-modal preconditions are decidable.

scholarly journals Epistemic Argumentation Framework: Theory and Computation

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 1103-1126
Author(s):  
Chiaki Sakama ◽  
Tran Cao Son
Keyword(s):  
Logic Programming ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Argumentation Framework ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Epistemic Constraint

The paper introduces the notion of an epistemic argumentation framework (EAF) as a means to integrate the beliefs of a reasoner with argumentation. Intuitively, an EAF encodes the beliefs of an agent who reasons about arguments. Formally, an EAF is a pair of an argumentation framework and an epistemic constraint. The semantics of the EAF is defined by the notion of an ω-epistemic labelling set, where ω is complete, stable, grounded, or preferred, which is a set of ω-labellings that collectively satisfies the epistemic constraint of the EAF. The paper shows how EAF can represent different views of reasoners on the same argumentation framework. It also includes representing preferences in EAF and multi-agent argumentation. Finally, the paper discusses complexity issues and computation using epistemic logic programming.

The Failure of Conceptual Analysis

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer McKitrick
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Causal Power ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Conditional Statements ◽  
Reductive Analysis

Dispositions are often regarded with suspicion. Consequently, some philosophers try to semantically reduce disposition ascriptions to sentences containing only non-dispositional vocabulary. Typically, reductionists attempt to analyze disposition ascriptions in terms of conditional statements. These conditional statements, like other modal claims, are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds semantics. However, conditional analyses are subject to a number of problems and counterexamples, including random coincidences, void satisfaction, masks, antidotes, mimics, altering, and finks. Some analyses fail to reduce disposition ascriptions to non-modal vocabulary. If reductive analysis of disposition ascriptions fails, then perhaps there can be metaphysical reduction of dispositions without semantic reduction. However, the reductionist still owes us an account of what makes disposition ascriptions true. But to posit a causal power for every unreduced dispositional predicate is an overreaction to the failure of conceptual analysis.

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