scholarly journals ARROW UPDATE LOGIC

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARTELD KOOI ◽  
BRYAN RENNE

We presentArrow Update Logic, a theory of epistemic access elimination that can be used to reason about multi-agent belief change. While the belief-changing “arrow updates” of Arrow Update Logic can be transformed into equivalent belief-changing “action models” from the popular Dynamic Epistemic Logic approach, we prove that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models. Further, since many examples of belief change are naturally thought of from Arrow Update Logic’s perspective of eliminating access to epistemic possibilities, Arrow Update Logic is a valuable addition to the repertoire of logics of information change. In addition to proving basic results about Arrow Update Logic, we introduce a new notion of common knowledge that generalizes both ordinary common knowledge and the “relativized” common knowledge familiar from the Dynamic Epistemic Logic literature.

Author(s):  
Andreas Herzig ◽  
Antonio Yuste Ginel

We introduce a multi-agent, dynamic extension of abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs), strongly inspired by epistemic logic, where agents have only partial information about the conflicts between arguments. These frameworks can be used to model a variety of situations. For instance, those in which agents have bounded logical resources and therefore fail to spot some of the actual attacks, or those where some arguments are not explicitly and fully stated (enthymematic argumentation). Moreover, we include second-order knowledge and common knowledge of the attack relation in our structures (where the latter accounts for the state of the debate), so as to reason about different kinds of persuasion and about strategic features. This version of multi-agent AFs, as well as their updates with public announcements of attacks (more concretely, the effects of these updates on the acceptability of an argument) can be described using S5-PAL, a well-known dynamic-epistemic logic. We also discuss how to extend our proposal to capture arbitrary higher-order attitudes and uncertainty.


2005 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Ditmarsch ◽  
W. Van Der Hoek ◽  
B. P. Kooi

This contribution is a gentle introduction to so-called dynamic epistemic logics, that can describe how agents change their knowledge and beliefs. We start with a concise introduction to epistemic logic, through the example of one, two and finally three players holding cards; and, mainly for the purpose of motivating the dynamics, we also very summarily introduce the concepts of general and common knowledge. We then pay ample attention to the logic of public announcements, wherein agents change their knowledge as the result of public announcements. One crucial topic in that setting is that of unsuccessful updates: formulas that become false when announced. The Moore-sentences that were already extensively discussed at the conception of epistemic logic in Hintikka’s ‘Knowledge and Belief ’ (1962) give rise to such unsuccessful updates. After that, we present a few examples of more complex epistemic updates.


2013 ◽  
Vol 651 ◽  
pp. 943-948
Author(s):  
Zhi Ling Hong ◽  
Mei Hong Wu

In multi-agent systems, a number of autonomous pieces of software (the agents) interact in order to execute complex tasks. This paper proposes a logic framework portrays agent’s communication protocols in the multi-agent systems and a dynamic negotiation model based on epistemic default logic was introduced in this framework. In this paper, we use the constrained default rules to investigate the extension of dynamic epistemic logic, and constrained epistemic extension construct an efficient negotiation strategy via constrained epistemic default reasoning, which guarantees the important natures of extension existence and semi-monotonicity. We also specify characteristic of the dynamic updating when agent learn new knowledge in the logical framework. The method for the information sharing signify the usefulness of logical tools carried out in the dynamic process of information acquisition, and the distributed intelligent information processing show the effectiveness of reasoning default logic in the dynamic epistemic logic theory.


Author(s):  
Xiao Huang ◽  
Biqing Fang ◽  
Hai Wan ◽  
Yongmei Liu

In recent years, multi-agent epistemic planning has received attention from both dynamic logic and planning communities. Existing implementations of multi-agent epistemic planning are based on compilation into classical planning and suffer from various limitations, such as generating only linear plans, restriction to public actions, and incapability to handle disjunctive beliefs. In this paper, we propose a general representation language for multi-agent epistemic planning where the initial KB and the goal, the preconditions and effects of actions can be arbitrary multi-agent epistemic formulas, and the solution is an action tree branching on sensing results.To support efficient reasoning in the multi-agent KD45 logic, we make use of a normal form called alternative cover disjunctive formula (ACDF). We propose basic revision and update algorithms for ACDF formulas. We also handle static propositional common knowledge, which we call constraints. Based on our reasoning, revision and update algorithms, adapting the PrAO algorithm for contingent planning from the literature, we implemented a multi-agent epistemic planner called MAEP. Our experimental results show the viability of our approach.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 1213-1238
Author(s):  
Dominik Klein ◽  
Rasmus K Rendsvig

Abstract The paper analyses dynamic epistemic logic from a topological perspective. The main contribution consists of a framework in which dynamic epistemic logic satisfies the requirements for being a topological dynamical system thus interfacing discrete dynamic logics with continuous mappings of dynamical systems. The setting is based on a notion of logical convergence, demonstratively equivalent with convergence in Stone topology. Presented is a flexible, parametrized family of metrics inducing the Stone topology, used as an analytical aid. We show maps induced by action model transformations continuous with respect to the Stone topology and present results on the recurrent behaviour of said maps. Among the recurrence results, we show maps induced by finite action models may have uncountably many recurrent points, even when initiated on a finite input model. Several recurrence results draws on the class of action models being Turing complete, for which the paper provides proof in the postcondition-free case. As upper bounds, it is shown that either 1 atom, 3 agents and preconditions of modal depth 18 or 1 atom, 7 agents and preconditions of modal depth 3 suffice for Turing completeness.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 208-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
LOUWE B. KUIJER

AbstractA commonly used dynamic epistemic logic is one obtained by adding commonknowledge and public announcements to a basic epistemic logic. It is known from Kooi (2007) that adding public substitutions to such a logic adds expressivity over the class K of models. Here I show that substitutions also add expressivity over the classes KD45, S4 and S5 of models. Since the combination of common knowledge, public announcements and substitutions, was shown in Kooi (2007) to be equally expressive to relativized common knowledge these results also show that relativized common knowledge is more expressive than common knowledge and public announcements over KD45, S4 and S5. These results therefore extend the result from van Benthem et al. (2006) that shows that relativized common knowledge is more expressive than common knowledge and public announcements over K.


Studia Logica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sena Bozdag

AbstractI propose a novel hyperintensional semantics for belief revision and a corresponding system of dynamic doxastic logic. The main goal of the framework is to reduce some of the idealisations that are common in the belief revision literature and in dynamic epistemic logic. The models of the new framework are primarily based on potentially incomplete or inconsistent collections of information, represented by situations in a situation space. I propose that by shifting the representational focus of doxastic models from belief sets to collections of information, and by defining changes of beliefs as artifacts of changes of information, we can achieve a more realistic account of belief representation and belief change. The proposed dynamic operation suggests a non-classical way of changing beliefs: belief revision occurs in non-explosive environments which allow for a non-monotonic and hyperintensional belief dynamics. A logic that is sound with respect to the semantics is also provided.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (7) ◽  
pp. 1071-1097
Author(s):  
Davide Grossi ◽  
Wiebe van der Hoek ◽  
Christos Moyzes ◽  
Michael Wooldridge

Abstract We develop a logic for reasoning about semi-public environments , i.e. environments in which a process is executing, and where agents in the environment have partial and potentially different views of the process. Previous work on this problem illustrated that it was problematic to obtain both an adequate semantic model and a language for reasoning about semi-public environments. We here use program models for representing the changes that occur during the execution of a program. These models serve both as syntactic objects and as semantic models, and are a modification of action models in Dynamic Epistemic Logic, in the sense that they allow for ontic change (i.e. change in the world or state). We show how program models can elegantly capture a notion of observation of the environment. The use of these models resolves several difficulties identified in earlier work, and admit a much simpler treatment than was possible in previous work on semi-public environments.


Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Proietti ◽  
Antonio Yuste-Ginel

AbstractThis paper introduces a multi-agent dynamic epistemic logic for abstract argumentation. Its main motivation is to build a general framework for modelling the dynamics of a debate, which entails reasoning about goals, beliefs, as well as policies of communication and information update by the participants. After locating our proposal and introducing the relevant tools from abstract argumentation, we proceed to build a three-tiered logical approach. At the first level, we use the language of propositional logic to encode states of a multi-agent debate. This language allows to specify which arguments any agent is aware of, as well as their subjective justification status. We then extend our language and semantics to that of epistemic logic, in order to model individuals’ beliefs about the state of the debate, which includes uncertainty about the information available to others. As a third step, we introduce a framework of dynamic epistemic logic and its semantics, which is essentially based on so-called event models with factual change. We provide completeness results for a number of systems and show how existing formalisms for argumentation dynamics and unquantified uncertainty can be reduced to their semantics. The resulting framework allows reasoning about subtle epistemic and argumentative updates—such as the effects of different levels of trust in a source—and more in general about the epistemic dimensions of strategic communication.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 370-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yì N. Wáng ◽  
Thomas Ågotnes

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document