Getting the relationships right in water property rights

Author(s):  
Edella Schlager
2001 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 111-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin E. Kemper

Water resources management requires an interdisciplinary approach to meet the challenges posed by ever increasing water demand and pollution. This paper discusses in which way appropriate institutional arrangements are complementary to technical interventions that aim to increase more efficient water use and allocation. Specific emphasis is given to water property rights as one of the determining factors in regard to the institutional framework. Issues such as the range of flexibility in designing property rights to water, the implications for pricing, enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms as well as for water trading and information needs are highlighted.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dionisio Ortiz Miranda ◽  
Felisa Ceña Delgado

The Spanish water economy is within a process of institutional change. The development of this change will be strongly conditioned by the water property rights structure, and this structure –in the context of irrigated agriculture- is defined by a complex net of informal institutions and farmers’ perceptions. The objective of the article is to characterise these property rights –through previous desegregation of its content- in the context of Irrigation Districts of the Guadalquivir basin, in order to analyse how the new institutions could be performed in this environment. Results, based in both the analysis of formal institutions and farmers’ opinion, show (i) the lack of adaptation of new institutions to farmers’ demands, and (ii) some characteristics of the property rights structure which could hinder the institutional change.


2017 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 692-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez

In 1966, after more than 700 years, the irrigation community in Mula (Spain) switched from auctions to quotas to allocate water from its river. This change happened in the absence of either political or technological change. Quotas were more efficient, but required that farmers own water property rights. I develop a model in which poor farmers cannot credibly commit to purchase water rights. I show that empirical evidence on savings and prices is consistent with this interpretation. A temporary increase in output prices in the 1950s and better financial institutions allowed farmers to accumulate savings and solve the commitment problem.“There is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through, than to initiate a new order of things.”Niccolò Machiavelli,The Prince


2018 ◽  
Vol III (I) ◽  
pp. 10-20
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ali ◽  
Suneel Kumar ◽  
Pasand Ali Khoso

Pakistan is said to be at the brink of being a water-scarce country current per capita water availability is 1090 m3 per year. This point to the water governance issues in Pakistan. Given these problems, a debate among scholars and policymakers is what governance model should Pakistan adopt to manage its water resources effectively. A few of them are a proponent of privatization of water, while others argue that traditional warabandi can still be an effective way to manage the water if certain loopholes in the system can be addressed. In this paper, we discuss both models and analysis with institutional theories of (water) property rights and relations, state authority, and neoliberalism to analyze the pros and cons of both models. In conclusion, we enlist the problems that persist in both models and provide recommendations for better governance of water in Pakistan.


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