scholarly journals Private Law Remedies and Public Law Standards: An Awkward Statutory Intrusion into Tort Liability of Public Authorities

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Allars
2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Weeks

Soft law is a pervasive phenomenon which is highly effective as a means of regulation in Australia, as it is in many other jurisdictions. This article will not focus on the regulatory aspects of soft law, but will examine the capacity of individuals to obtain remedies where public authorities fail to adhere to the terms of their published soft law. The available judicial remedies apply in very limited circumstances, both in private law actions (in tort or equity) and public law (judicial review) actions. Ultimately, the most effective ways to remedy breaches of soft law appear also to be ‘soft’, such as recommendations of the Ombudsman and discretionary schemes for ex gratia payments.


Author(s):  
Simon Deakin ◽  
Zoe Adams

This chapter discusses the distinctive nature of the liability of the government, public authorities, and statutory bodies; the liability of statutory bodies in negligence; liability for breach of statutory duty; public law as a source of liability; public law as a source of immunity; Crown proceedings in tort; liability for breaches of EU law; and liabilities arising under the Human Rights Act 1998. The chapter explores in detail the question of whether public authorities, and the police in particular, are under a duty of care when undertaking and performing their operational duties, in light of the Supreme Court decision in Robinson v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire. In turn, it teases out some of the broader implications of what is a rapidly evolving, and politically sensitive, aspect of the law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (72) ◽  
pp. 31-50
Author(s):  
Gabriel Perlingeiro

This text endeavors to define the theoretical limits of the capacities of the public administrative authorities to reach consensual solutions to disputes within the framework of judicial review. It is motivated by the lack of a clear understanding in Brazilian law of the border area between the legal relations of public and private law involving the public authorities, and the expressions “inalienable right” (or “inalienable interest”) and “public interest” as shown by the inexplicable asymmetry between what the public administrative authorities can do within a judicial proceeding and outside one. Based on a comparative study of common law versus civil law legal systems and an examination of the treatment of the subject in Brazilian statutes, case law and legal studies, this article reviews the relationship between the public interest and inalienability, demonstrating, in conclusion, that the possibility of the administrative authorities to enter into settlements or follow similar practices should not be rejected a priori, even in cases of public law. According to the author, there are three possible scenarios in which public administrative authorities may resort to consensual dispute resolution in the context of the judicial review: in private-law relationships, in public-law relationships with respect to the exercise of administrative actions prescribed by law and public-law relationships with respect to the exercise of discretionary powers.


Author(s):  
Mark Lunney ◽  
Donal Nolan ◽  
Ken Oliphant

This chapter focuses on the negligence liability of public authorities. It discusses how negligence actions against public bodies may have both public and private law dimensions. The discussion of the public law dimension focuses on the mechanisms that have been employed in response to concerns about the political nature of some public authority decisions, and the fact that those decisions frequently involve the balancing of social or economic considerations, and the interests of different sections of the public. The discussion of the private law dimension of negligence actions against public bodies considers policy reasons for limiting the liability of public bodies and statutory responsibilities as a source of affirmative common law duties. The chapter concludes with a consideration of proposals for reform of the law in this area.


Author(s):  
Simon Deakin ◽  
Angus Johnston ◽  
Basil Markesinis

This chapter discusses the following: the distinctive nature of the liability of the government, public authorities, and statutory bodies; the liability of statutory bodies in negligence; liability for breach of statutory duty; public law as a source of liability; public law as a source of immunity; Crown proceedings in tort; liability for breaches of EU law; and liabilities arising under the Human Rights Act 1998.


2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 757-780 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Andenas ◽  
Duncan Fairgrieve

The protection offered to individuals by remedies in public law and tort law is developing in all jurisdictions. The past few years have witnessed an increasingly important European dimension to the tort liability of public authorities. European Union law and European Human Rights law have added to the constitutional protection of tort claims against public authorities already established as a matter of domestic law in many European countries.


2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 629
Author(s):  
Thomas Geuther

For many years the English courts have struggled to develop a principled approach for determining when a public authority can owe a duty of care in respect of the exercise of its statutory powers. Initially, public authorities received no special treatment. Then the courts conferred an almost complete immunity on them, requiring public law irrationality to be established before considering whether a duty could arise. The English approach has not been adopted elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada have developed different tests, and the New Zealand courts, while never explicitly rejecting the English position, have never followed it. This paper argues that a modified version of the Canadian Supreme Court's approach should be adopted in New Zealand. It proposes that irrationality be a precondition to the existence of a duty of care only where policy considerations are proved to have influenced the decisions of a public authority in exercising its statutory powers.


Author(s):  
Pascale Chapdelaine

This chapter proposes two principles that should inform the development of copyright law and policy and of user rights. The first calls for more cohesion between copyright law, private law, and public law, and for less exceptionalism in copyright law. The second requires that the balance in copyright law be adjusted for its future application as a mediation tool between the competing interests of copyright holders, users, intermediaries, and the public. Instituting positive obligations for copyright holders in relation to users and steering freedom of contract toward the objectives of copyright law are necessary regulatory changes to rectify ongoing imbalances. The principle of technological neutrality should guide the judiciary in its application of copyright’s objective of promoting a balance in copyright law. The proposed guiding principles lead to the creation of a taxonomy and hierarchy of copyright user rights that take into account the myriad ways users experience copyright works.


Author(s):  
Thomas W. Merrill

This chapter explores the relationship between private and public law. In civil law countries, the public-private distinction serves as an organizing principle of the entire legal system. In common law jurisdictions, the distinction is at best an implicit design principle and is used primarily as an informal device for categorizing different fields of law. Even if not explicitly recognized as an organizing principle, however, it is plausible that private and public law perform distinct functions. Private law supplies the tools that make private ordering possible—the discretionary decisions that individuals make in structuring their lives. Public law is concerned with providing public goods—broadly defined—that cannot be adequately supplied by private ordering. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, various schools of thought derived from utilitarianism have assimilated both private and public rights to the same general criterion of aggregate welfare analysis. This has left judges with no clear conception of the distinction between private and public law. Another problematic feature of modern legal thought is a curious inversion in which scholars who focus on fields of private law have turned increasingly to law and economics, one of the derivatives of utilitarianism, whereas scholars who concern themselves with public law are increasingly drawn to new versions of natural rights thinking, in the form of universal human rights.


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