scholarly journals HOW FIRM ARE THE BONDS THAT TIE THE EU TOGETHER? EU RULE OF LAW CONDITIONALITY MECHANISM AND THE NEXT GENERATION EU RECOVERY FUND

Author(s):  
Maja Lukić Radović ◽  
Marija Vlajković

The Covid-19 pandemic has generated a one-in-a-generation challenge upon the EU, consisting of immediate danger for life and health, savings and jobs of its citizens, as well as for the stability and proper functioning of political and legal systems of its Member States. The manner in which the EU as a whole reacted to such sudden and grave challenge is by no means indicative of its political and legal-constitutional substance, and, consequently, of its capacity to subsist in its present form or to develop further. The centrepiece of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) is the Recovery and Resilience Facility, which should help Member States address the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The establishment of the pandemic recovery fund may be regarded not only as an ad hoc measure, but also as a crucial milestone in the path to overcoming the disbalance between Union solidarity and national interests. However, the whole EU budget deal depended on the acceptance of the Rule of Law Mechanism by all Member States. In the first part, this paper will analyse the COVID-19 recovery fund compromise solution as it has been finally agreed. Firstly, we will try to determine the effectiveness of the conditionality mechanism, in the light of European Council Conclusions on the “interpretative declaration on the new Rule of Law Mechanism” and its legal effects. Secondly, we will tackle the issue of the enforcement of the Rule of Law protection mechanism, having in mind the causal link that should be detected, between the protection of the financial interests of the EU, with the non-respect of the EU values enshrined in the Article 2 TEU, by particular Member State(s). Consequently, we will try to envisage the impact of the implementation of this conditionality mechanism, taking into consideration which Member States, and EU citizens, would be “hit” hardest by it. In the second part of the paper an attempt shall be made to perceive the conditionality mechanism, tied to the recovery fund, from the perspective of the principle of solidarity. Ultimately, this paper will try to answer the following question: in view of the necessary shift of priorities and the need for urgent reaction to the COVID-19 crisis, is the common European answer, in view of the core values of the EU and the principle of solidarity, optimal, and above all, will it be effective?

Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.


Author(s):  
T. Romanova ◽  
E. Pavlova

The article examines how the normative power, which the EU puts forward as an ideological basis of its actions in the world, manifests itself in the national partnerships for modernization between Russia and EU member states. The authors demonstrate the influence of the EU’s normativity on its approach to modernization as well as the difference in the positions of its member countries. It is concluded that there is no unity in the EU’s approach to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the new classification of EU member states, which is based on their readiness to act in accordance with the Union’s concept of normative power, is offered.


Author(s):  
Artur Nowak-Far

AbstractAt present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of their identification and enforcement.


Author(s):  
Wojciech Sadowski

AbstractInvestment treaty law and EU law began to develop in the same era and share some important philosophical and axiological foundations. The pressure on the CEE countries to enter into numerous bilateral investment treaties in late 80s and early 90s, in the context of the EU accession aspirations of the former communist countries, was likely to result, eventually, in a conflict between EU law and investment treaty law. The conflict could have been managed in three different ways, yet the CJEU decided in Achmea to declare an undefined volume of intra-EU arbitrations to be incompatible with EU law. This important judgment, which delivered an outcome desired by the European Commission and a number of Member States, is based on questionable legal reasoning that creates high uncertainty in this area of law. The doubts include the scope of application of Achmea, which is now a highly debatable issue. The CJEU itself saw it necessary to limit the scope of Achmea by declaring in Opinion 1/17 (CETA) that the legal reasoning of Achmea did not apply to investment protection treaties with third countries. The Member States of the EU remain politically divided in their views as to whether Achmea applies to the Energy Charter Treaty. And while the problems with the rule of law and independence of the judiciary in certain Member States continue to grow, Achmea has left an important gap for which there is no substitute in the current architecture of the EU legal system.


Author(s):  
Andi Hoxhaj ◽  
Fabian Zhilla

Abstract This article offers a comparative analysis of the covid-19 legal measures and model of governance adopted in the Western Balkans countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo) and its impact on the state of the rule of law, and ability of parliament and civil society to scrutinise government decisions. The article assesses the governments’ approaches to introducing and enforcing covid-19 legal measures, and shows examples of how covid-19 has exposed more openly the weaknesses in the existing system of checks and balances in the Western Balkans. The article offers new insights into how covid-19 presented a new opportunity for leaders in the Western Balkans to implement further their authoritarian model of governance in undermining the rule of law. This article offers suggestions on how the EU could respond, through its accession conditionality instruments and civil society, to redirect this trend towards more state capture.


Author(s):  
Marcus Klamert

The EU is founded on ‘the Treaties’, i.e. the TEU and the TFEU (Article 1(2) TEU). It has been referred to as a ‘community of law’, and a ‘Community based on the rule of law, in as much as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty’.


European View ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-221
Author(s):  
Héla Slim

The COVID-19 pandemic is having a considerable impact on global economic and intercontinental geopolitical relations, and is thus significantly reshaping our world. The coronavirus crisis is also affecting democracy and the electoral process in Africa, with important implications for the rule of law, democracy and security. While 2020 started as a pivotal year for African Union–EU relations, the coronavirus has disrupted the agenda and raises questions about the repercussions of the pandemic on not only EU foreign policy but also cooperation between the two continents.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1104-1115
Author(s):  
Stanisław Biernat

AbstractA concern was voiced in commentaries after the PSPP judgment that the BVerfG’s position regarding the refusal to apply in Germany the CJEU judgment as issued on an ultra vires basis might be used in EU Member States infringing the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary in particular. This issue is presented in relation to Poland. The article sets out the constitutional provisions which proclaim openness to European integration, as well as the union-friendly case-law of the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) until 2016. The CT jurisprudence at that time provided, however, for the possibility of refusing to apply EU law in exceptional situations, even though this never happened. Next, the article discusses endeavors of the new Polish authorities since the end of 2015 which drastically breach the rule of law in the field of the judiciary, as well as the measures taken by EU institutions to counteract these adverse phenomena. The Polish authorities argue that the competence to define the legal position of the judiciary has not been conferred on the Union and remains within the exclusive competence of the Member States. Such a stance was also taken by the politically dependent CT in April 2020. The PSPP judgment was therefore welcomed with joy by Polish politicians. There are major differences, however, between the rulings of the BVerfG and those of the Polish CT in its current composition, and the hopes pinned on the PSPP judgment by the Polish authorities are unfounded.


Author(s):  
Jean-Claude Piris

Este estudio surge de los acontecimientos producidos en 2014 y 2015 en Escocia (referéndum sobre la independencia) y en Cataluña («consulta informal» y elecciones autonómicas). En ambos casos, los movimientos secesionistas deseaban que un nuevo Estado nacido de la secesión llegara a ser (según ellos, «siguiera siendo») parte de la UE. Esta convicción les fortalece, ya que la UE es vista como un «refugio seguro », que permite la independencia sin la amenaza de quedar aislado. Los Tratados de la UE ni prevén ni prohiben la división de un Estado miembro. No obstante, para llegar a ser parte de la UE, la región secesionista debería primero ser reconocida como Estado por la comunidad internacional, y específicamente por los 28 Estados miembros de la UE (incluyendo España y el Reino Unido). Esto sería legalmente posible si el nuevo Estado naciera respetando completamente el Estado de Derecho, pero en cambio excluiría un «Estado» que hubiera declarado unilateralmente su independencia violando la Constitución nacional. Así, un nuevo Estado reconocido podría ser candidato a incorporarse a la UE. El autor muestra que debería seguirse el procedimiento del artículo 49 del Tratado de la UE y no el del artículo 48 (enmiendas a los Tratados). Tomando Escocia como ejemplo, el autor describe los pasos legales necesarios que deben darse después de la secesión. Señala que la división de un Estado de la UE ya no debería verse como un asunto estrictamente nacional; dadas sus consecuencias sobre la UE en conjunto y sobre otros Estados miembros, es un asunto que no puede ser ignorado por la UE.This study starts from the 2014-2015 events in Scotland (referendum on independence) and in Catalonia («informal consultation» and regional elections). Secessionists movements in both cases wished that a new State born from the secession would become (according to them «continues to be») part of the EU. That conviction strengthens them, as the EU is seen as a «safe haven», allowing independence without the threat of being isolated. The EU Treaties neither provide for, nor prohibit the partition of a Member State. However, in order to become part of the EU, the secessionist region should first be recognized as a State by the international community, and specifically by the 28 EU Member States (including Spain and the UK). This would be legally possible if the new State was born in full respect of the Rule of Law, but would exclude a «State» having unilaterally declared its independence in violation of the national Constitution. Then, a new State recognised could be a candidate to the EU. The author shows that the procedure of article 49 of the Treaty on EU woud have to be followed (accession of a new State) and not that of article 48 (amendments to the Treaties). Taking Scotland as an example, the author describes the necessary legal steps to be accomplished after the secession. He stresses that the partition of an EU State should not anymore being regarded as a strictly national matter. Given its consequences on the EU as a whole and on other Member States, it is a matter that cannot be ignored by the EU.


Subject Polish/EU frictions. Significance The European Commission has taken the unprecedented step of warning of a "clear risk" of a serious breach of the rule of law in Poland. Many in Brussels and Poland hoped that the appointment of a young prime minister and a major cabinet reshuffle signalled a rapprochement. On early evidence, at least, they may be sorely disappointed. Impacts Poland’s position in the EU will become more constrained as the rule-of-law conflict is exploited in negotiations on unrelated issues. In openly censuring Poland, the EU sees an opportunity to prove its credentials as a bulwark against populism and extremism. If Poland is pushed too far, the EU’s actions may undesirably strengthen anti-EU sentiments in one of its largest member states.


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