scholarly journals Public nudity and the right to freedom of expression: Balancing competing interests

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Mary Lincoln
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Competing Interests ◽  
Current Test ◽  
The Right

<p>With little case law concerning nudity and the right to freedom of expression, this paper aims to uncover the appropriate frameworks to be used to determine the following questions: (a) when is public nudity “expression” for the purposes of s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and (b) in what circumstances involving “expressive” public nudity would it be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable to limit the right to freedom of expression using s 4(1)(a), as per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act? As regards the first of these questions, this paper critiques the current test in use in New Zealand for determining whether conduct is expression – the test developed by the Canadian Supreme Court in Irwin Toy Ltd v Attorney-general (Quebec) – and advocates for the adoption of a purposive approach to determining the scope of the right to freedom of expression. As for the second of these questions, this paper advocates for the adoption of “the modified Hansen sequence” proposed by Professor Claudia Geiringer. This paper then uses recent examples of public nudity involving naturists and protestors to test these frameworks and to illustrate how they would operate in practice.</p>

scholarly journals Public nudity and the right to freedom of expression: Balancing competing interests

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Mary Lincoln
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Competing Interests ◽  
Current Test ◽  
The Right

<p>With little case law concerning nudity and the right to freedom of expression, this paper aims to uncover the appropriate frameworks to be used to determine the following questions: (a) when is public nudity “expression” for the purposes of s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and (b) in what circumstances involving “expressive” public nudity would it be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable to limit the right to freedom of expression using s 4(1)(a), as per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act? As regards the first of these questions, this paper critiques the current test in use in New Zealand for determining whether conduct is expression – the test developed by the Canadian Supreme Court in Irwin Toy Ltd v Attorney-general (Quebec) – and advocates for the adoption of a purposive approach to determining the scope of the right to freedom of expression. As for the second of these questions, this paper advocates for the adoption of “the modified Hansen sequence” proposed by Professor Claudia Geiringer. This paper then uses recent examples of public nudity involving naturists and protestors to test these frameworks and to illustrate how they would operate in practice.</p>

scholarly journals Censoring cyber-bullies: Is the Harmful Digital Communications Bill a justified limitation on the right to freedom of expression?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Annie O'Connor
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Digital Communication ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Digital Communications ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Criminal Offence ◽  
Online Abuse ◽  
The Right

<p>Harmful Digital Communications have become a pervasive and serious problem in New Zealand. The Harmful Digital Communications Bill aims to address this problem in a number of ways. This paper focuses on the civil enforcement regime and the criminal offence of causing harm by posting a digital communication established by the Bill. It considers these aspects of the Bill in light of the right to freedom of expression, and analyses whether they constitute a justified limitation on that right. By applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 section 5 analysis from Hansen v R, the paper discovers that the civil enforcement regime is a justified limitation, but the new criminal offence is not. The paper concludes that the inclusion of a public interest defence in the offence would allow it to effectively ameliorate the harm caused by online abuse without impinging on freedom of expression more than is reasonably necessary.</p>

Part V Rights and Freedoms, B Rights and Freedoms under the Charter, Ch.35 The Right to Protest, Freedom of Expression, and Freedom of Association

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cameron Jamie ◽  
Rosiers Nathalie Des
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Labour Relations ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Key Aspects

Freedom of expression and freedom of association are guaranteed by section 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These freedoms are closely related, conceptually and philosophically, but evolved in different directions under the Charter. Whereas section 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom generated a rich jurisprudence across diverse issues, section 2(d)’s attention focused on associational freedom in the context of labour union activities. The authors draw on a pocket of section 2(b) case law on picketing and other labour-related expressive activities to bring these guarantees into comparison. In doing so, they comment on the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of each guarantee, including the constitutionalization of key aspects of labour relations under section 2(d). In addition, the authors critique the Court’s jurisprudence, emphasizing the central importance of protecting protest and dissent activities under both guarantees.

Cross-fertilisation of Constitutional Ideas

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Butler
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk

This chapter discusses the New Zealand courts' jurisprudence in regard to the interpretative provisions — sections 4, 5, and 6 — of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. It not only gives an overview of the relevant New Zealand case law but also compares the courts' approaches to those of their UK counterparts, in particular the UK Supreme Court (formerly, the House of Lords) in regard to section 3 of the UK Human Rights Act 1998. It is argued that the perceived difference in the approaches can be explained by different contexts rather than different methodology. The chapter thereby questions the view held in New Zealand that the UK courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are more activist than the New Zealand courts.

scholarly journals Judicial infringement of the right to internet access by the imposition of special sentencing conditions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Nina White
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Internet Access ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
The Right ◽  
Broad Approach

<p>Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act extends to protect internet access within New Zealand as a means of expression. Judicial restriction of internet access via the imposition of special conditions during sentencing is therefore an infringement of s 14. This interpretation of s 14 is consistent with its purpose, legislative history, and the broad approach afforded to human rights generally, as well as international case law and statutes. Any imposition of special conditions restricting internet access must be a demonstrably justifiable limit per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act to be legitimate. The practical considerations of such a technological limit also warrant judicial consideration before it is imposed. As yet, New Zealand has no explicit protection of internet access but growing acceptance of its importance indicates that reform or judicial acknowledgement are, or soon will be, required.</p>

Judicial Culture and the Politicolegal Opportunity Structure: Explaining Bill of Rights Legal Impact in New Zealand

2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (01) ◽  
pp. 95-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Erdos
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Liberty ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
Legal Outcomes ◽  
Cultural Self ◽  
The Common

This article argues that the cultural self‐understandings of the judiciary can exert a profound effect on legal outcomes under a bill of rights. Utilizing the case of New Zealand, it demonstrates that confinement of expansive case law under the New Zealand Bill of Rights (NZBOR) to the criminal law and freedom of expression arenas is most significantly explained by a British‐descended judicial culture that prioritizes, first, those civil liberty values already cognizable by the common law and, second, rights connected with the policing of parliamentary and legal processes. Nevertheless, judicial culture does not operate in a vacuum. Rather, the opportunity structure facing potential public interest litigants under NZBOR depends also on their politicolegal resource set including the attitude of the political branches (legislature and executive) to the claim being forwarded.

scholarly journals Responsible publication of criminal accusations in New Zealand – the case for change

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
William Steel
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Current Approach ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Criminal Conduct ◽  
Court Of Appeal

<p>In 2000, a full Court of Appeal in Vickery v McLean excluded all generally published allegations of criminal conduct from the protection of Lange qualified privilege. Highlighting difficulties with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, this paper argues that New Zealand’s current approach represents an unjustifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression and is out of line with comparable jurisdictions. It suggests that adopting the principle from the recent UK Supreme Court decision in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, within the existing Lange framework, strikes a more appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the right to reputation. Doing so would allow Lange privilege to protect unproven, but verified, allegations of criminal impropriety whilst adequately safeguarding reputations and guarding against fears of trial by media.</p>

scholarly journals Responsible publication of criminal accusations in New Zealand – the case for change

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
William Steel
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Current Approach ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Criminal Conduct ◽  
Court Of Appeal

<p>In 2000, a full Court of Appeal in Vickery v McLean excluded all generally published allegations of criminal conduct from the protection of Lange qualified privilege. Highlighting difficulties with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, this paper argues that New Zealand’s current approach represents an unjustifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression and is out of line with comparable jurisdictions. It suggests that adopting the principle from the recent UK Supreme Court decision in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, within the existing Lange framework, strikes a more appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the right to reputation. Doing so would allow Lange privilege to protect unproven, but verified, allegations of criminal impropriety whilst adequately safeguarding reputations and guarding against fears of trial by media.</p>

scholarly journals Judicial infringement of the right to internet access by the imposition of special sentencing conditions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Nina White
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Internet Access ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
The Right ◽  
Broad Approach

<p>Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act extends to protect internet access within New Zealand as a means of expression. Judicial restriction of internet access via the imposition of special conditions during sentencing is therefore an infringement of s 14. This interpretation of s 14 is consistent with its purpose, legislative history, and the broad approach afforded to human rights generally, as well as international case law and statutes. Any imposition of special conditions restricting internet access must be a demonstrably justifiable limit per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act to be legitimate. The practical considerations of such a technological limit also warrant judicial consideration before it is imposed. As yet, New Zealand has no explicit protection of internet access but growing acceptance of its importance indicates that reform or judicial acknowledgement are, or soon will be, required.</p>

scholarly journals Censoring cyber-bullies: Is the Harmful Digital Communications Bill a justified limitation on the right to freedom of expression?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Annie O'Connor
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Digital Communication ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Digital Communications ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Criminal Offence ◽  
Online Abuse ◽  
The Right

<p>Harmful Digital Communications have become a pervasive and serious problem in New Zealand. The Harmful Digital Communications Bill aims to address this problem in a number of ways. This paper focuses on the civil enforcement regime and the criminal offence of causing harm by posting a digital communication established by the Bill. It considers these aspects of the Bill in light of the right to freedom of expression, and analyses whether they constitute a justified limitation on that right. By applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 section 5 analysis from Hansen v R, the paper discovers that the civil enforcement regime is a justified limitation, but the new criminal offence is not. The paper concludes that the inclusion of a public interest defence in the offence would allow it to effectively ameliorate the harm caused by online abuse without impinging on freedom of expression more than is reasonably necessary.</p>

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