Main Points of Talk Given by Person in Charge of Bureaus of Letters and Petitions of the General Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and of the General Secretariat of the State Council When Receiving a Number of Falun Gong Appellants

1999 ◽  
Vol 32 (5) ◽  
pp. 19-21
1977 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
pp. 473-497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Domes

Early in March this year visitors to China reported seeing in Canton a wall-poster with the headline “ [I]t's not a ‘gang of four’ but a gang of five!” (pu shih ‘ssu-jen-pang,’ erh shih wu-jen-pang!). The poster alleged that the new chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and premier of the State Council, Hua Kuofeng, had been a loyal follower of the Cultural Revolutionary Left led by Chiang Ch'ing, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yüan from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. It went on to claim that although he had turned against the personnel of the Left, he nevertheless remained a supporter of Leftist policies even today. We do not know whether the wall-posters “vilifying Chairman Hua,” for which seven men and two women were reportedly executed in Hangchow on 11 March 1977, and 26 people in Shanghai in early April, had carried the same accusation. But there is some evidence that certain, as yet unidentified, forces in China take a different view of the policies and attitudes of Hua Kuo-feng during the intra-elite conflict of the last few years, from that of most foreign observers of Chinese politics. Such observers have generally argued, since the spring of 1976, that Hua is a “middle-of-the-roader,” a politician having more in common with the ideas and values of the now dominant complex of veteran cadres and generals than with those of their “radical” Cultural Revolutionary adversaries.


Asian Survey ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Cheng ◽  
Lynn White

This essay offers data about China's Central Committee, Politburo, and Standing Committee, e.g., turnover rates, generations, birthplaces, educations, occupations, ethnicities, genders, experiences, and factions. Past statistics demonstrate trends over time. Norms of elite selection can be induced from such data, which allow a broad-based analysis of changes in China's technocracy. New findings include evidence of cooperation among factions and swift promotions of province administrators.


Author(s):  
Ning Wang

This chapter contends that, although some intellectuals were labelled rightists because of their sharp criticism of Party policies and cadre officials (for their abuse of power) or because of their advocacy of greater intellectual freedom, many others were so labelled due to factional conflicts, personal animosity, grudges, and/or the mishandling of interpersonal relations. The chapter suggests that, although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign to punish opponents of the state, intellectuals and officials took advantage of it to attack their peers and competitors. As Party bosses and heads of work units had the power to interpret state policies and to determine a person's fortune, those individuals who did not truly display dissent but simply failed to adequately manage their relations with these power holders inevitably suffered in politically motivated campaigns.


1969 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 92-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Baum

At the time the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued its now-famous Circular Notice of 16 May 1966, which roundly criticized Peking's Mayor P'eng Chen and thereby ushered in a dramatic new stage of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a large-scale and intensive Socialist Education Movement was still being implemented systematically in the Chinese countryside.


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