scholarly journals Laboratory investigation of the first suspected human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in Bulgaria

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (30) ◽  
Author(s):  
T Hadzhiolova ◽  
S Pavlova ◽  
R Kotseva

Reports of human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) virus have received increased public attention because of the potential for the emergence of a pandemic strain. In the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006, avian influenza A(H5N1) virus caused outbreaks among domestic poultry and was isolated from wild swans in many European countries, including Bulgaria. Between January and March 2006, samples were collected from 26 patients who had been in close contact with ill or dead birds and developed a subsequent respiratory illness. The testing took place at the National Laboratory of Influenza in Sofia. Specific ?(H5N1) assays were applied for screening (Sacace RT-PCR and real-time kit). Avian flu ?(H5N1) virus was not detected in any of the patients tested. In three patients, human subtype ?(H1N1) influenza virus, identifiable by RT-PCR was isolated and further characterized by hemagglutination inhibition test (HIT). The reliability of the molecular assays used in this investigation was demonstrated in an International Quality Control for Human and Avian ?(H5N1) Influenza performed later in 2006 by INSTAND (Society for Promotion of Quality Assurance in the Medical Laboratories), Germany.

2006 ◽  
Vol 80 (12) ◽  
pp. 5976-5983 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hualan Chen ◽  
Yanbing Li ◽  
Zejun Li ◽  
Jianzhong Shi ◽  
Kyoko Shinya ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT H5N1 influenza A viruses are widely distributed among poultry in Asia, but until recently, only a limited number of wild birds were affected. During late April through June 2005, an outbreak of H5N1 virus infection occurred among wild birds at Qinghai Lake in China. Here, we describe the features of this outbreak. First identified in bar-headed geese, the disease soon spread to other avian species populating the lake. Sequence analysis of 15 viruses representing six avian species and collected at different times during the outbreak revealed four different H5N1 genotypes. Most of the isolates possessed lysine at position 627 in the PB2 protein, a residue known to be associated with virulence in mice and adaptation to humans. However, neither of the two index viruses possessed this residue. All of the viruses tested were pathogenic in mice, with the exception of one index virus. We also tested the replication of two viruses isolated during the Qinghai Lake outbreak and one unrelated duck H5N1 virus in rhesus macaques. The Qinghai Lake viruses did not replicate efficiently in these animals, producing no evidence of disease other than transient fever, while the duck virus replicated in multiple organs and caused symptoms of respiratory illness. Importantly, H5N1 viruses isolated in Mongolia, Russia, Inner Mongolia, and the Liaoning Province of China after August 2005 were genetically closely related to one of the genotypes isolated during the Qinghai outbreak, suggesting the dominant nature of this genotype and underscoring the need for worldwide intensive surveillance to minimize its devastating consequences.


2017 ◽  
Vol 216 (suppl_4) ◽  
pp. S520-S528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Apurba Chakraborty ◽  
Mahmudur Rahman ◽  
M Jahangir Hossain ◽  
Salah Uddin Khan ◽  
M Sabbir Haider ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 339
Author(s):  
C. S. KYRIAKIS (Κ. ΣΠ. ΚΥΡΙΑΚΗΣ) ◽  
K. Van REETH

The huge epizootics of highly pathogenic avian influenza (subtype H5N1) in Southeastern Asia over the last two years and especially the transmission of avian influenza viruses to humans have alerted the international scientific community. Many support that the threat of a new influenza pandemic appears greater today than ever before. During the 20th century, humanity has faced three pandemics, including the "Spanish flu" of 1918-19, which claimed over 20 to 40 million lives, and two less dramatic pandemics in 1957-58 and 1968-69. Influenza A viruses are single stranded RNA viruses belonging to the family Orthomyxoviridae. Their genome expresses only 10 proteins, most important of which are the two surface glycoproteins: haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). So far, 16 different types of haemagglutinin (HI to Η16) and 9 of neuraminidase (Nl to N9) have been recognized. Influenza A viruses are grouped into "subtypes", according to the HA and NA surface proteins they bear (for example Η I N I , H5N2). Natural reservoirs of influenza A viruses are the wild aquatic birds (migratory waterfowl), from which all types of HA and NA have been isolated. It is important to mention that migratory waterfowl do not show clinical signs of disease, but shed the virus through their excretions.The host range of flu viruses includes domestic poultry, and mammalian species from aquatic mammals to horses, humans and swine. Because of their segmented single stranded RNA genome, influenza viruses have a very high mutation rate (genetic drift) and the possibility to undergo reassortment. Reassortment may occur when more than one virus co-infect the same cell, exchange genes and as a result, provide a totally new influenza virus (genetic shift). At least two subtypes of influenza A viruses are currendy endemic within the human population (H1N1 and H3N2), causing every year outbreaks of disease with very low mortality, especially in elders. Unlike these endemic viruses, pandemic viruses have a much higher morbidity, affecting people of all ages. Η I N I , H3N2 and H1N2 influenza viruses are currently circulating in the European and American swine population. Some of the swine influenza virus subtypes, namely Η I N I and H3N2, are thus similar to those of humans, but there are still important antigenic differences between them. Only rarely swine influenza viruses may be transmitted or cause disease to humans. Unlike mammalian influenza viruses, influenza viruses of domestic birds are grouped in two "pathotypes": low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses, which cause localized infections and remain mild or subclinical, and highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, which cause severe general infection with mortality up to 100% (fowl plague). The majority of avian influenza viruses are low pathogenic and only some, but not all, viruses of H5 and H7 subtypes are highly pathogenic. Occasionally low pathogenic Η5 or H7 viruses from wild birds transmit to poultry. Such viruses can undergo mutations in poultry as a result of which they may acquire a highly pathogenic phenotype. Until the recent avian influenza epizootics in Asia, the predominant theory for the creation of a pandemic virus supported that the pig was likely to act as an intermediate host for transmission of influenza viruses from birds to humans. The fact that genetic reassortment between human and avian viruses has also been shown to occur in pigs in nature, had led to the hypothesis that the pandemic viruses of 1957 and 1968 may have been generated through the pig. More recent data, however, come to question these theories and hypotheses: (a)the direct transmission of the H5N1 and H7N7 avian influenza viruses from birds to humans in Southeastern Asia and The Netherlands, and (b) the presence of cellular receptors recognized preferentially by the haemagglutinin of avian influenza viruses in the human conjunctiva and ciliated respiratory epithelial cells, which support that avian influenza viruses can be transmitted in toto (without reassortment) to and between humans or that humans can be the mixing vessel themselves. Furthermore, there is no solid scientific evidence to prove that any influenza virus reassortants, that have originated in swine, have posed a risk for humans. There are three criteria (conditions) an influenza virus must fulfill in order to be characterized as a pandemic virus: (a) it must be a new virus against which humans are immunologically naive, (b) it must be able to replicate in humans causing severe disease, and (c) it must be efficiendy transmitted among humans, causing wide outbreaks. So far the H5N1 influenza virus only fulfills the first and second condition, and even though it has been sporadically infecting humans for over two years, it has not yet been able to fully adapt to it's new host. Compared to the human population that may have been exposed to the H5N1 influenza virus in Asia, the number of patients and fatalities due to the H5N1 virus is very small. So far, it appears that swine do not play an important role in the epidemiology of this specific virus. Experimental infections of swine with highly pathogenic H5N1 virus have shown that it does not replicate extensively in pigs. Additionally, extensive serological investigations in the swine population of Viet Nam, indicated that the H5N1 virus merely spread to a very small number (~0.25%) of contact animals within the epizootic regions. Nevertheless, it is critical to continue monitor ring pigs and studying the behavior and spread of influenza viruses in these species.


2006 ◽  
Vol 59 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 29-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Hrnjakovic-Cvjetkovic ◽  
Dejan Cvjetkovic ◽  
Vera Jerant-Patic ◽  
Vesna Milosevic ◽  
Jelena Tadic-Radovanov ◽  
...  

Introduction. Influenza A viruses can infect humans, some mammals and especially birds. Subtypes of human influenza A viruses: ACH1N1), ACH2N2) and A(H3N2) have caused pandemics. Avian influenza viruses vary owing to their 15 hemagglutinins (H) and 9 neuraminidases (N). Human cases of avian influenza A In the Netherlands in 2003, there were 83 human cases of influenza A (H7N7). In 1997, 18 cases of H5N1 influenza A, of whom 6 died, were found among residents of Hong Kong. In 2004, 34 human cases (23 deaths) were reported in Viet Nam and Thailand. H5N1 virus-infected patients presented with fever and respiratory symptoms. Complications included respiratory distress syndrome, renal failure, liver dysfunction and hematologic disorders. Since 1999, 7 cases of human influenza H9N2 infection have been identified in China and Hong Kong. The importance of human infection with avian influenza viruses. H5N1 virus can directly infect humans. Genetic reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses may occur in humans co infected with current human A(HIN1) or A(H3N2) subtypes and avian influenza viruses. The result would be a new influenza virus with pandemic potential. All genes of H5Nl viruses isolated from humans are of avian origin. Prevention and control. The reassortant virus containing H and N from avian and the remaining proteins from human influenza viruses will probably be used as a vaccine strain. The most important control measures are rapid destruction of all infected or exposed birds and rigorous disinfection of farms. Individuals exposed to suspected animals should receive prophylactic treatment with antivirals and annual vaccination. .


2000 ◽  
Vol 74 (22) ◽  
pp. 10807-10810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline M. Katz ◽  
Xiuhua Lu ◽  
Terrence M. Tumpey ◽  
Catherine B. Smith ◽  
Michael W. Shaw ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N1 viruses caused an outbreak of human respiratory illness in Hong Kong. Of 15 human H5N1 isolates characterized, nine displayed a high-, five a low-, and one an intermediate-pathogenicity phenotype in the BALB/c mouse model. Sequence analysis determined that five specific amino acids in four proteins correlated with pathogenicity in mice. Alone or in combination, these specific residues are the likely determinants of virulence of human H5N1 influenza viruses in this model.


2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (10) ◽  
pp. 1263-1267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin D. Curran ◽  
Joanna S. Ellis ◽  
Tim G. Wreghitt ◽  
Maria C. Zambon

Avian (H5N1) influenza continues to pose a significant threat to human health, although it remains a zoonotic infection. Sensitive and robust surveillance measures are required to detect any evidence that the virus has acquired the ability to transmit between humans and emerge as the next pandemic strain. An integral part of the pandemic planning response in the UK was the creation in 2005 of the UK National H5 Laboratory Network, capable of rapidly and accurately identifying potential human H5N1 infections in all regions of the UK, and the Republic of Ireland. This review details the challenges that designing molecular detection methods for a rapidly evolving virus present, and the strategic decisions and choices required to ensure successful establishment of a functional national laboratory network, providing round the clock testing for H5N1. Laboratory partnerships have delivered improved real-time one-step multiplex PCR methodologies to ensure streamlined testing capable of not only detecting H5 but also a differential diagnosis of seasonal influenza A/B. A range of fully validated real-time PCR H5 confirmatory assays have been developed to run in parallel with a universal first-screening assay. Regular proficiency panels together with weekly surveillance runs, intermittent on-call testing for suspect cases of avian flu in returning travellers, and several outbreaks of avian influenza outbreaks in poultry that have occurred since 2005 in the UK have fully tested the network and the current diagnostic strategies for avian influenza. The network has clearly demonstrated its capability of delivering a confirmed H5N1 diagnosis within 3–4 h of receipt of a sample, an essential prerequisite for administration of the appropriate antiviral therapy, effective clinical management, disease containment and implementation of infection control measures. A functional network is an important means of enhancing laboratory capability and building diagnostic capacity for a newly emerging pandemic of influenza, and is an essential part of pandemic preparedness.


1999 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 937-943 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Rowe ◽  
Robert A. Abernathy ◽  
Jean Hu-Primmer ◽  
William W. Thompson ◽  
Xiuhua Lu ◽  
...  

From May to December 1997, 18 cases of mild to severe respiratory illness caused by avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses were identified in Hong Kong. The emergence of an avian virus in the human population prompted an epidemiological investigation to determine the extent of human-to-human transmission of the virus and risk factors associated with infection. The hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay, the standard method for serologic detection of influenza virus infection in humans, has been shown to be less sensitive for the detection of antibodies induced by avian influenza viruses. Therefore, we developed a more sensitive microneutralization assay to detect antibodies to avian influenza in humans. Direct comparison of an HI assay and the microneutralization assay demonstrated that the latter was substantially more sensitive in detecting human antibodies to H5N1 virus in infected individuals. An H5-specific indirect enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) was also established to test children’s sera. The sensitivity and specificity of the microneutralization assay were compared with those of an H5-specific indirect ELISA. When combined with a confirmatory H5-specific Western blot test, the specificities of both assays were improved. Maximum sensitivity (80%) and specificity (96%) for the detection of anti-H5 antibody in adults aged 18 to 59 years were achieved by using the microneutralization assay combined with Western blotting. Maximum sensitivity (100%) and specificity (100%) in detecting anti-H5 antibody in sera obtained from children less than 15 years of age were achieved by using ELISA combined with Western blotting. This new test algorithm is being used for the seroepidemiologic investigations of the avian H5N1 influenza outbreak.


2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 845-851 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Sidwell ◽  
Dale L. Barnard ◽  
Craig W. Day ◽  
Donald F. Smee ◽  
Kevin W. Bailey ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT T-705 (6-fluoro-3-hydroxy-2-pyrazinecarboxamide) was inhibitory to four strains of avian H5N1 influenza virus in MDCK cells, with the 90% effective concentrations ranging from 1.3 to 7.7 μM, as determined by a virus yield reduction assay. The efficacy was less than that exerted by oseltamivir carboxylate or zanamivir but was greater than that exerted by ribavirin. Experiments with mice lethally infected with influenza A/Duck/MN/1525/81 (H5N1) virus showed that T-705 administered per os once, twice, or four times daily for 5 days beginning 1 h after virus exposure was highly inhibitory to the infection. Dosages from 30 to 300 mg/kg of body weight/day were well tolerated; each prevented death, lessened the decline of arterial oxygen saturation (SaO2), and inhibited lung consolidation and lung virus titers. Dosages from 30 to 300 mg/kg/day administered once or twice daily also significantly prevented the death of the mice. Oseltamivir (20 mg/kg/day), administered per os twice daily for 5 days, was tested in parallel in two experiments; it was only weakly effective against the infection. The four-times-daily T-705 treatments at 300 mg/kg/day could be delayed until 96 h after virus exposure and still significantly inhibit the infection. Single T-705 treatments administered up to 60 h after virus exposure also prevented death and the decline of SaO2. Characterization of the pathogenesis of the duck influenza H5N1 virus used in these studies was undertaken; although the virus was highly pathogenic to mice, it was less neurotropic than has been described for clinical isolates of the H5N1 virus. These data indicate that T-705 may be useful for the treatment of avian influenza virus infections.


2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
J Crofts ◽  
W J Paget ◽  
F Karcher

Two cases of confirmed influenza due to the avian influenza A H5N1 virus were reported last week in Hong Kong (1). The cases occurred in a Hong Kong family who had recently visited Fujian province in southern China. The daughter, aged 8 years, died following a respiratory illness. The cause of her death is unknown. The father and son also had respiratory illnesses; the father died and the son recovered. Both were infected with the H5N1 virus. The mother also had a respiratory illness, which is reported to have been unrelated to influenza infection. Investigations are continuing to determine where and how transmission of infection to the cases may have occurred.


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