THE MORAL WRONG OF DRUG LEGALIZATION

Author(s):  
L. Zhengbo
1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-190
Author(s):  
Bernardo J. Mora
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Virginia Mantouvalou

This chapter examines the value of work and the requirements of the content of work against two normative frameworks: first, human rights, and second, human capabilities. Its main question is whether working like a robot should be prohibited. The chapter identifies certain overlaps in the requirements imposed by the two frameworks, such as a duty to create opportunities to work and the prohibition of being forced to work. When it comes to the content of work, both frameworks prohibit workers’ exploitation, and both recognize the value of self-development in the workplace, up to a certain extent. The overlap is justified given that there are connections between human dignity and human flourishing, both values that are also linked to human rights. However, the chapter also suggests that capabilities theory, as a theory of human flourishing, requires the promotion of meaningful work for everyone. This requirement is more demanding than the duties imposed by human rights, which are primarily about identifying and addressing moral wrongs. Whether boring and monotonous jobs should be prohibited as a moral wrong, though, is not specifically addressed within capabilities theory. The lack of specificity as to the duties imposed is a weakness of the capabilities approach.


2019 ◽  
pp. 193-210
Author(s):  
Robert L. Wears ◽  
Kathleen M. Sutcliffe

Reviewing the evolution of patient safety over time, we see a discursive shift from harm to “error.” The “error” framing is used to advance the authority of scientific-bureaucratic managerial medicine and to diminish the traditional authority of clinical expertise. Psychologist Sidney Dekker noted that four different voices appear in patient safety discourses: epistemological (what happened?), preventative (how can it be prevented?), boundary-maintaining (were there violations or impermissible activities?), and existential (what is the reason for this suffering?). Discussions in one voice tend to be dissatisfying for the others, but the “error” framing addresses all four: an error occurred, errors can be prevented, violators should be punished, moral wrong leads to suffering. In summary, patient safety’s rise resulted from five factors: a general decrease in risk tolerance, the industrialization of healthcare, reframing harm as “error,” brief input from safety sciences holding out potential for improvement, and medicine’s effort to retain control of healthcare internally. Ironically, these factors also tended to make patient safety activity ineffective since they bounded out insights, skills, and theories from the safety sciences.


2021 ◽  
pp. 3-25
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

It is neither easy to define crime nor identify the aims of criminal law but some characteristics may be universal to every crime, including that it involves public wrongs and moral wrongs. ‘Public wrongs’ reflect the important role of the public in punishing crimes. A crime incorporating a moral wrong implies that a ‘wrong’ is done or harm to others is involved but experience suggests that morality and criminal law are not coextensive. The chapter introduces students to thinking about criminalization and the need to guard against overcriminalization. It also examines the principal sources of criminal law: common law, statute, EU law, international law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Problematically, important and serious offences and most defences in English law derive from common law rather than statute, and some offences—from public nuisance to gross negligence manslaughter—have been challenged recently on grounds of certainty and retrospectivity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 731-749 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adil Ahmad Haque

Helen Frowe’s Defensive Killing is in many respects an excellent book, full of arguments that are original, interesting, important, and often persuasive. In other respects, the book is deeply unsettling, as it forcefully challenges the belief that killing ordinary civilians in armed conflict is a paradigmatic moral wrong. In particular, Frowe argues that civilians who make political, material, strategic, or financial contributions to an unjust war may lose their moral protection from intentional and collateral harm. On this point, Frowe’s arguments are original, interesting, and important but, thankfully, not persuasive.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document