Work, Human Rights, and Human Capabilities
This chapter examines the value of work and the requirements of the content of work against two normative frameworks: first, human rights, and second, human capabilities. Its main question is whether working like a robot should be prohibited. The chapter identifies certain overlaps in the requirements imposed by the two frameworks, such as a duty to create opportunities to work and the prohibition of being forced to work. When it comes to the content of work, both frameworks prohibit workers’ exploitation, and both recognize the value of self-development in the workplace, up to a certain extent. The overlap is justified given that there are connections between human dignity and human flourishing, both values that are also linked to human rights. However, the chapter also suggests that capabilities theory, as a theory of human flourishing, requires the promotion of meaningful work for everyone. This requirement is more demanding than the duties imposed by human rights, which are primarily about identifying and addressing moral wrongs. Whether boring and monotonous jobs should be prohibited as a moral wrong, though, is not specifically addressed within capabilities theory. The lack of specificity as to the duties imposed is a weakness of the capabilities approach.