scholarly journals Indigenous Environmental Rights in Canada: The Right to Conservation Implicit in Treaty and Aboriginal Rights to Hunt, Fish, and Trap

2010 ◽  
pp. 959 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynda M. Collins ◽  
Meghan Murtha

This article is an exploration of Aboriginal and treaty rights strategies for protecting Indigenous environmental rights in Canada. The analysis begins with an outline of the problem, and the shortcomings of the available general law avenues. The authors then argue for the existence of a constitutionalized right to environmental preservation implicit in treaty and Aboriginal rights to hunt, fish, and trap. The article explores the theoretical, historical, and precedential support for this proposition. The central argument is that in securing the right to hunt, fish, and trap, Aboriginal peoples were in fact contracting for the continued existence of their traditional subsistence activities. These practices could not survive without the preservation of the ecosystems on which they depend, and the harvesting rights must therefore be seen to encompass a right to such preservation. Examination of the specific histories of treaty-making in Canada reveals that in many if not most cases, both the Crown and the Aboriginal signatories understood this substantive protection to be a part of the treaty guarantees. The authors then present a brief articulation of the corresponding Aboriginal right to conservation.

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Murphy

This article explores the implications of changes in Canadian Supreme Court jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights since the 1990s. While recognizing the Court's valuable contributions in the period from Calder to Sparrow, the author argues that the 1996 Van der Peet decision deals a serious blow to the legal status of Aboriginal rights, particularly the right to self-government. The standard of legal recognition established in Van der Peet constitutes a decided step back from the Court's prior jurisprudence, and is insufficient as a means of securing its stated ends: the survival and well-being of Aboriginal communities and cultures. The author concludes by arguing that the Court can repair the recent damage it has done to Aboriginal rights by revisiting the concept of the quasinational status granted to Aboriginal peoples within the context of the sui generis Crown-Aboriginal relationship.


1969 ◽  
pp. 351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Bell

Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes the aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples. Section 35(2) defines "the Aboriginal peoples of Canada" as Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples. Although s. 35 may appear straightforward, the author points out its ambiguity. This article attempts to clarify it. The ambiguity stems from the fact that the section does not define the term "Metis" nor does it say whether the "Metis" have existing aboriginal rights recognized in s. 35(1). These questions arise because self-identifying Metis are not a homogeneous group that lend themselves to easy definition. Moreover they have traditionally been excluded from federal programs benefiting Indian peoples. The author examines the difficulties involved in defining the term 'Metis ' and analyzes some of the frameworks that have been suggested by various groups, including Metis organizations. She concludes that the term must be defined according to logical and political considerations in addition to self-identification based on racial, cultural and historical criteria.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-175
Author(s):  
Ian James Urquhart

What has the addition of aboriginal rights to the Canadian constitution in 1982 meant for the place of First Nations’ interests in the Canadian constitutional order? This article considers this question in the context of natural resource exploitation – specifically, the exploitation of the oil or tar sands in Alberta. It details some of the leading jurisprudence surrounding Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982, the section of the Constitution recognizing existing aboriginal and treaty rights. Arguably, Section 35 represented an important effort to improve the status of aboriginal peoples in Canada, to enhance the extent to which Canada included and respected the values and interests of First Nations. The article specifically considers how the judicial interpretation of the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate aboriginal peoples is related to the theme of inclusivity. It argues that the general thrust of judicial interpretation has promoted a thin, or procedural, version of inclusiveness rather than a substantive, or thicker, one. Such a thicker version of inclusiveness would be one in which the pace of oil sands exploitation is moderated or halted in order to allow First Nations to engage in traditional activities connected intimately with aboriginal and treaty rights.


2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brent Olthuis

Abstract Modern negotiations between the Crown (or private parties) and Canada’s Aboriginal peoples are largely based on the legal principles articulated in major court decisions. Yet those decisions have not yet confronted a fundamental question: how, in the first instance, do we determine which groups can lay claim to the Aboriginal and treaty rights “recognized and affirmed” by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982? The author argues that this question ought to form the theoretical cornerstone of the doctrine of Aboriginal and treaty rights. It is also of critical significance to the continuing process of reconciliation between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal elements of Canadian society. The interlocutors in this process must be identifiable. The community recognition needed to give effect to section 35’s inherently group-centred approach cannot be purely subjective or purely objective in nature. Neither a process of unilateral declaration nor one of pure observation can accurately identify the communities at issue under section 35. Rather, the inquiry requires an exercise of interpretation. To this end, the author proposes guidelines to focus and assist the interpretive process. This analysis ultimately entails a reconsideration of some of the prevailing orthodoxies in Aboriginal law jurisprudence, including the “test” for determining the existence of Aboriginal rights (from R. v. Van der Peet) and the notion that an individual member of a modern, rights-holding, Aboriginal community must prove an ancestral or genealogical link to a member of the group at some earlier time (from R. v. Powley).


1997 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 149
Author(s):  
Leonard I. Rotman

In the case of R. v. Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada created a justificatory scheme for federal legislation that had the potential to derogate from the rights of the Aboriginal peoples that are protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Since that time, the Sparrow test has been applied to both Aboriginal and treaty rights. The author suggests that the straightforward application of the Sparrow test to treaty rights is inappropriate because of the significant distinctions between Aboriginal and treaty rights. Where there is a need to balance treaty rights with competing rights, any justificatory standard to be applied ought to be consistent with the consensual basis of Crown- Native treaties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 85-86
Author(s):  
Jolene Lin

Climate litigation in the Global South tends to be couched in rights-based clams including the right to life and a clean and healthy environment. Jolene Lin explained that this is in part due to the fact that many jurisdictions in the Global South have embedded environmental rights in their constitutions and, in some cases, courts have interpreted the right to life to include the right to a clean and healthy environment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-39
Author(s):  
Tinashe Madebwe ◽  
Emma Chitsove ◽  
Jimcall Pfumorodze

Environmental deterioration remains a concern in Botswana. Despite efforts being made to address this issue by the state, more needs to be done in this regard. This is particularly interesting in the light of reports that the country is looking to draft a new constitution. Against this backdrop, this article considers whether including environmental rights in Botswana’s constitution would advance environmental protection efforts. To this end, the article relies on experiences with rights drawn from different jurisdictions across the world, as well as commentary on these experiences, to build a tool for measuring the extent to which the turn to environmental rights holds value in a given jurisdiction. Using this tool, and drawing from experiences in looking to establish environmental rights in Botswana, the article measures the extent to which including the right in the constitution would hold value in advancing Botswana’s pursuit of environmental protection objectives.


1818 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 199-273 ◽  

Dear sir, In the different memoirs which you have done me the honour of submitting to the Royal Society, I have considered principally those branches of the polarisation of light which relate to the superficial action, or the superinduced properties of uncrystallized bodies. In the course of these enquiries, my attention was frequently directed to the phenomena of regular crystals; but from the difficulty of procuring proper specimens, and the extreme perplexity of the subject, it was not till lately that I succeeded in reducing under a general principle all the complex appearances which result from the combined action of more than one axis of double refraction. Before I proceed to trace the steps which have conducted me to this general law, I must entreat the indulgence of the Society, while I attempt to give a brief and rapid view of the present state of our knowledge respecting the laws of double refraction. They will thus be able to appreciate more correctly the relative value of those successive generalisations by which this subject has been raised to one of the most interesting departments of physical science.


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