The Legacy of 1812: How a Little War Shaped the Transatlantic World

The War of 1812 may have been a small and inconclusive war, but it had a profound and lasting impact of all the belligerents. The war may be largely forgotten, but it left a huge legacy that is still evident today. Wars can best be measured by their consequences, and the legacy of this war was both multifaceted and lasting. The conflict shaped both the United States and Canada as well as their relationship with Great Britain for nearly a century thereafter. It helps to explain how the Anglo-American alliance originated and why the British welcomed the Pax Americana in the twentieth century, as well as why Canada never joined the American Union and why American expansion after 1815 aimed south and west rather than north. It was during the War of 1812 that the great Shawnee leader Tecumseh earned his reputation, Laura Secord became famous, and Andrew Jackson began his rise to the presidency. Its impact on American culture was also far reaching and produced ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’, Uncle Sam and ‘Old Ironsides’, amongst other symbols of United States nationhood.

‘In the Midst of Three Fires, a French one, an American one, and an Indian one’: Imperial-Indigenous Negotiations during the War of 1812 in Eastern British America

This essay argues that the War of 1812 in Eastern British America, despite the near-absence of land-based conflict in this region, marked a turning point in an imperial-Indigenous relationship that differed notably from comparable relationships elsewhere in North America because of the relatively late advent of substantial settler colonization. Diplomacy, which led in 1812 to the conclusion of a series of neutrality agreements in the borderland jurisdiction of New Brunswick, contributed to the forestalling of outright military conflict in the region. But diplomacy of this nature at the same time reached the end of its effective life, as the balance tipped towards a settled environment that eroded the effectiveness of the formerly powerful diplomatic tools of Indigenous-imperial negotiation. 1

Loyalty to the Regime: Prominent Men, Militia and French-Canadian Identity through the 1812 War

In the North American British colonies, the 1812 war led to a great mobilization of militia corps to protect the Empire’s possessions. For colonial authorities, such context represented an opportunity to measure local militia officers’ loyalty to the Crown, particularly those who resided in the French traditional countryside. What can we understand of the French-Canadian involvement in the War of 1812 as officers? What is the impact of their relation to the Crown on their capacity to hold on to positions in their respective communities? By bringing to life a few case studies, this paper wishes to examine the formation of the French-Canadian identity through the involvement of local elites in the militia. This study is based on an analysis of the correspondence of the principal officers of the battalions with the central authorities and prosopographical research of those same officers in the rural regions of Lower Canada. The analysis of the strategies, values and interests of the militia officers, will serve to enlighten the parameters of the collaboration between the local elite and the colonial elite.

David Parish, Alexander Baring and the US Loan of 1813: The Role of Nationality and Patriotism in the Transatlantic Mercantile Community in Times of War

The War of 1812 was a very expensive conflict for the United States. In 1813, three foreign-born investors, among them David Parish from Hamburg, Germany, saved the US government from bankruptcy by providing a sixteen-million dollar loan. This article focuses on the reasons why Parish – who strongly opposed the war – agreed to take a major share in the loan. At the same time, it examines the ways in which the Hamburg merchant tried to sell a large share of his US government bonds in Great Britain – America’s wartime enemy. Parish’s actions make it obvious that he promoted the idea of a supranational mercantile community that was not bound by patriotic considerations even during war times. Consequently, it was the British merchant banker Alexander Baring who stood at the core of Parish’s plans to sell US bonds in London. By contrasting Baring’s room for manoeuvre during these financial transactions with that of Parish this article shows that in the British context public expectations of loyalty and patriotism could indeed limit the abilities of local merchants in financing the opponent of war. Thus, the comparison of Parish’s and Baring’s experiences highlights the importance of local factors such as a consolidated public opinion and a strong nation state in setting the limits of the sphere of activity for internationally operating merchants in times of war.

‘True, Publick and Notorious’: The Privateering War of 1812

During the War of 1812, hundreds of private armed vessels, or privateers, carrying letters of marque and reprisal from their respective governments, served as counterweights to the navies of Great Britain and the United States. By 1812, privateering was acknowledged as an ideal way to annoy the enemy at little or no cost to the government. Local citizens provided the ships, crews and prizes while the court and customs systems took in the appropriate fees. The entire process was legal, licensed and often extremely lucrative. Unlike the navy, privateers were essentially volunteer commerce raiders, determined to weaken the enemy economically rather than militarily. So successful were they, that from July 1812 to February 1815, privateers from the United States, Britain, and the British provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia (as well as those sailing under French and Spanish flags) turned the shipping lanes from Newfoundland to the West Indies, Norway to West Africa, and even the South Pacific into their hunting grounds. In the early months of the war, privateers were often the only seaborne force patrolling their own coasts. With the Royal Navy pre-occupied with defending Britain and its Caribbean colonies from French incursions, there were relatively few warships available to protect British North American shipping from their new American foes. Meanwhile, the United States Navy had only a handful of frigates and smaller warships to protect their trade, supported by 174 generally despised gunboats. The solution was the traditional response of a lesser maritime power lacking a strong navy—private armed warfare, or privateering.

Table of Contents: London Journal of Canadian Studies 28(1)

Issue information for London Journal of Canadian Studies 28(1).

Maine’s Mode of Privateering: A Tale of Fraud and Collusion in the Northeast Borderlands, 1812–1815

The American declaration of war passed by Congress in June 1812 was followed by a prize act which authorised the issuing of Letters of marque. These commissions or licenses allowed American citizens to fit out privately armed vessels to seize British ships. Although most privateers complied with Congress’s instructions, their counterparts operating along the Maine coast used their commissions to further own economic self-interest by orchestrating pre-arranged captures with British merchants in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Since the British government encouraged its subjects to trade with the enemy to undermine the American war effort, American privateers assumed most of the risks. Merchants and mariners from as far away as New York and Connecticut traveled to Maine to trade with the British despite the hazards of detection. As these privateers engaged in fraud, other Americans turned to vigilante violence to uncover and foil these schemes. After the British occupied Eastern Maine in the summer of 1814 trading with the enemy became illegal on the British side of the border. Despite the risks, British merchants continued to engage in trade with the enemy. Ultimately, persistence of conflict and accommodation in the Northeastern Borderlands, the area comprising Maine, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, helped undermined Eastern Maine’s allegiance to the United States.

Climate Observing During Canada’s Empires, 1742–1871: People, Places and Motivations

A wealth of pre-Confederation weather and climate observations were recorded in Canada by individuals and institutions during both the French and British empires. This scientific heritage came about for a number of reasons. For instance, the Hudson’s Bay Company wanted to reduce operating costs by having their posts in Canada’s north-west become self-sufficient in agriculture. Others wished to save lives from cholera or shipwrecks, or to satisfy curiosity about the ever-present debate concerning anthropogenic climate change. Today, historical climate observations can be found in many diverse locations. Despite our rich scientific heritage, turning archival paper and ink observations into scientific data remains an enormous technical challenge. This challenge falls to our generation, both to use this heritage to investigate the historical context of current climate change and variability, and to use the digital resources in development today to safeguard our scientific heritage for future generations.

Loyalty and Lobbying: French-Canadian Delegates in London, 1763–1840

This article examines the individuals who came to London in order to lobby the imperial authorities in favour of the expansion of French-Canadian rights from the 1763 Treaty of Paris to the 1840 Act of Union and who were delegated by a significant body or institution within French Canada. Early efforts were centred on the expansion of religious rights and the perpetuation of Quebec’s legal and social institutions, including French civil law and the seigneurial system. Religious affairs remained an important facet of French-Canadian lobbying throughout the British regime, though the issue of political reform, which came to the fore in the 1780s, soon came to dominate lobbying efforts. These efforts were predicated on ideas of loyalty, as delegates sought to negotiate a place within the British Empire for French Canada. They lobbied London to allow French Canadians to fully participate in civic life within the framework of British political institutions while also allowing Quebec to retain its particular religious and social institutions. Delegates experienced some success, especially when they enjoyed the support of the colonial authorities at Quebec, but often failed to achieve their goals because they ran counter to British policy or because their English-speaking opponents had greater access to Whitehall.