scholarly journals Defining Parameters: Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, and the Sparrow Justificatory Test

1997 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 149
Author(s):  
Leonard I. Rotman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Aboriginal Peoples ◽  
Federal Legislation ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Straightforward Application ◽  
The Supreme Court

In the case of R. v. Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada created a justificatory scheme for federal legislation that had the potential to derogate from the rights of the Aboriginal peoples that are protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Since that time, the Sparrow test has been applied to both Aboriginal and treaty rights. The author suggests that the straightforward application of the Sparrow test to treaty rights is inappropriate because of the significant distinctions between Aboriginal and treaty rights. Where there is a need to balance treaty rights with competing rights, any justificatory standard to be applied ought to be consistent with the consensual basis of Crown- Native treaties.

Recent Developments in Canadian Aboriginal Law: Overview of Case Law and of Certain Principles of Aboriginal Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-350
Author(s):  
Patricia Ochman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Aboriginal Law

AbstractThe author reviews the most recent judgments rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada and certain provincial courts, in order to provide an update in the sphere of Aboriginal law practice in Canada, destined mainly for foreign lawyers and academics. Throughout the review of those recent judgments, the author provides an overview of certain key principles and concepts of Canadian Aboriginal law. Besides providing an overview of recent judgments in the sphere of Aboriginal law, the author seeks to illustrate how meaningful the protection and recognition of Aboriginal rights and treaty rights are in practice, through the overview of key concepts and principles of Canadian Aboriginal law and how they were recently interpreted by Canadian courts. The author briefly addresses Canada's vote against the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

scholarly journals Dizzying Dialogue: Canadian Courts and the Continuing Justification of the Dispossession Of Aboriginal People

2011 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 55 ◽  
Author(s):  
D’Arcy Vermette
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Aboriginal People ◽  
Aboriginal Peoples ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Peuples Autochtones

Since Aboriginal rights have found protection within Canada’s Constitution, a new relationship has emerged between Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples and the Crown. This relationship is characterized by the need for “reconciliation.” In its growing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Canada applies reconciliation doctrine to several important Aboriginal claims. Each application, however, brings with it a restriction on Aboriginal rights. This paper argues that the Court’s conception of reconciliation is designed to facilitate the integration of Aboriginal peoples into larger society rather than to protect their collective interests. To demonstrate this argument, this paper examines the Supreme Court’s discussion of the doctrine of reconciliation from Sparrow (1990) to Little Salmon (2010).Depuis que les droits des autochtones sont protégés par la constitution canadienne, une nouvelle relation, ayant comme caractéristique le besoin de « réconciliation », a vu le jour entre les peuples autochtones du Canada et la Couronne. La Cour suprême du Canada a appliqué la doctrine de la réconciliation dans la série d’arrêts où elle s’est penchée sur plusieurs importantes revendications autochtones. Dans chaque cas, l’application de la doctrine de la réconciliation a cependant abouti à une restriction des droits des autochtones. Dans cet article, l’auteur soutient que, dans l’esprit de la Cour, la réconciliation vise à faciliter l’intégration des peuples autochtones dans la société en général plutôt qu’à protéger leurs intérêts collectifs. Pour étayer cette opinion, il examine l’analyse qu’a faite la Cour suprême de la doctrine de réconciliation de l’arrêt Sparrow (1990) à l’arrêt Little Salmon (2010).

On the breach: Identifying infringements of section 35 rights

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerry Wilkins
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Substitution Effects ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Inclusive Approach ◽  
Critical Scrutiny

Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada has said, protects existing Aboriginal and treaty rights from unjustified infringement at the hands of federal and provincial legislatures and governments. To give meaningful effect to section 35’s protection, we need, therefore, to understand what counts as infringement of such rights and why. The Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence to date on this question, alas, disappoints; it does not withstand close critical scrutiny. This article calls attention to several shortcomings and inconsistencies in that jurisprudence and proposes for initial consideration a more inclusive approach to infringement identification, one that draws a sharper distinction between the infringement and justification inquiries. Adoption of such an approach, however, could have unwelcome substitution effects, prompting cautious courts to be more selective when asked to authenticate future claims of Aboriginal right, more penurious when construing the constitutionally protected scope of particular treaty or Aboriginal rights and/or more generous to governments during the justification inquiry. If the goal is to optimize the protection that Canadian constitutional law affords to treaty and Aboriginal rights, we shall need to be mindful of the interdependence among the authentication, infringement, and justification inquiries, and we shall need to understand much more clearly than we currently do just where the outer limits are beyond which mainstream Canadian law cannot, or will not, countenance Indigenous ways and why.

scholarly journals Commentary on “Adhesion to Canadian Indian Treaties and the Lubicon Lake Dispute”

1992 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-212
Author(s):  
Kent McNeil
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Canadian Journal ◽  
Law And Society ◽  
Aboriginal Peoples ◽  
Western Canada ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Unexplored Area ◽  
Aboriginal Title

Thomas Flanagan's article on adhesion to Indian treaties in this issue of the Canadian Journal of Law and Society is a bold foray into a virtually unexplored area of aboriginal rights. Although adhesions to most of the eleven Numbered Treaties in northern and western Canada were common, as Flanagan points out, not much attention has been paid to them. The matter is nonetheless of major importance for many aboriginal peoples, as was demonstrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada last year that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai had surrendered their aboriginal title by adhesion to the 1850 Robinson-Huron Treaty. There can be little doubt that the issue is going to arise more frequently as other aboriginal peoples challenge the application of treaties to their ancestral lands.

scholarly journals No Middle Ground: Ad Medium Filum Aquae, Aboriginal Fishing Rights, and the Supreme Court of Canada's Decisions in Nikal and Lewis

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 515-597
Author(s):  
Peggy J. Blair
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Aboriginal Peoples ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Fishing Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court

This article will argue that in two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada which considered the ad medium filum aquae presumptions, the Court wrongly concluded that exclusive aboriginal fishing rights were not "granted" by the Crown and therefore did not exist in waters adjacent to reserves. It will show that in both Nikal and Lewis, the Court relied on highly technical European laws which are inappropriate where aboriginal laws and perspectives are required to be taken into account. By accepting historically discriminatory policies of the Crown to prove the existence of aboriginal rights, it will be argued that the Court ignored the pre-existing rights and title of aboriginal peoples.

scholarly journals Fiduciary Relationship as Contemporary Colonialism

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-115
Author(s):  
Christina Yui Iwase
Keyword(s):  
North America ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Aboriginal Peoples ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Constitutional Protection ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Recent Tendency

Aboriginal rights as inherent rights deriving from Aboriginal peoples’ historical occupation of North America (i.e. sovereignty) are recognized and affirmed in Section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982. Despite the fact that this constitutional protection recognizes the sui generis nature of the Crown-Aboriginal relationship, there is a recent tendency in the Supreme Court of Canada to comprehend Aboriginal rights by characterizing the Crown-Aboriginal relationship as fiduciary. This paper discusses the danger of recognizing Aboriginal rights through the lens of a Crown-Aboriginal fiduciary relationship. This type of recognition entails: (1) authorizing excessive fiduciary discretion by the Crown, as opposed to focusing on its obligations; (2) failing to reflect the Aboriginal perspective on Aboriginal rights, which are derived from Aboriginal sovereignty; (3) fundamentally distorting the nature of Aboriginal rights by creating a myth that Aboriginal rights were created by the Canadian constitution; and (4) as a result, creating vulnerability on the Aboriginal side by making Aboriginal peoples tacitly consent to the Crown’s de facto sovereignty. If the Court’s characterization of the Crown-Aboriginal fiduciary relationship remains as it is now, the gap between the Crown’s understanding of Aboriginal rights and that of Aboriginal peoples may constitute a form of contemporary colonialism.

scholarly journals The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa Nation and the Foundation of the Duty to Consult

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Hamilton ◽  
Joshua Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Aboriginal Peoples ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Similar Relationship ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Useful Components ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Relationship

The recent Ktunaxa Nation decision of the Supreme Court of Canada provides an opportunity to discuss the fundamental legal presumptions that underlie the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples. The jurisprudence in this area has been based on a “thick” conception of Crown sovereignty as including legislative power and underlying title in relation to Aboriginal lands. This, in the Supreme Court’s view, justifies the possibility of the unilateral infringement of Aboriginal rights. This framework assumes that the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is a sovereign-to-subjects one. This assumption, however, lacks a legal and factual basis. Conversely, Aboriginal peoples articulate their claims in the language of inherent jurisdiction within a nation-to nation relationship. If the Supreme Court acknowledged that the relationship between the parties is indeed nation-to-nation, the appropriate doctrine would no longer be a duty to consult and accommodate. Following the approach to a similar relationship outlined by the Supreme Court in the Secession Reference, the appropriate model would be a generative duty to negotiate. This article sets a path to a model that preserves the useful components of the duty to consult while providing a remedy to the distributional inequity in bargaining power created under the current framework, thereby opening avenues for effective conflict resolution.

scholarly journals Settling the Fisheries: Pre-Confederation Crown Policy in Upper Canada and the Supreme Court's decisions in R. v. NIKAL and LEWIS

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-172
Author(s):  
Peggy J. Blair
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Upper Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Fishing Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject

Although a casual reading of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in R. v. Nikal and R. v. Lewis might suggest otherwise, this article will argue that Court's decisions in two recent British Columbia aboriginal fishing cases do not apply in Ontario. In doing so, it will be shown that the Supreme Court of Canada relied on evidence of historic Crown policies towards aboriginal fishing rights in Upper Canada in the absence of appropriate context as to when, how and why those policies evolved. As a result, the Court wrongly concluded that fisheries could not be the subject of exclusive aboriginal rights.

scholarly journals Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties

1997 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 46 ◽  
Author(s):  
James (Sakej) Youngblood Henderson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Contextual Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Cognitive Diversity ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court

This article explores the interpretive principle of sui generis treaties introduced by the Supreme Court of Canada since the repatriation of the Constitution in 1982. The article proceeds through an analysis of treaty rights as constitutional rights, contextual analysis of Indian Treaties, the intent of the treaty parties and the principles which govern the interpretation of treaty text. The author concludes that the principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada are an attempt to affirm and enhance Aboriginal worldviews and cognitive diversity within the Constitution of Canada.

Aboriginal rights and litigation: history and future of court decisions in Canada

Polar Record ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (152) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Douglas Elias
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Native Title ◽  
Successful Case ◽  
The Supreme Court

AbstractRecent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Constitution Act 1982, and the establishment of the Office of Native Claims, would seem to have assured the rapid settlement of outstanding issues regarding aboriginal rights and native title to lands. More recently, the seeming abandonment by government of political and negotiated resolution of these issues has left litigation as the remaining recourse for native groups to protect their interests. The courts, however, have become increasingly demanding in terms of what must be proven in order to make a successful case at law. It is predicted that the costs and technical difficulties of providing such proofs will limit the number of rights cases before the courts, and the chances of success for those that are mounted.

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