scholarly journals Intersections and Roads Untravelled: Sex and Family Status in Fraser v Canada

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Jennifer Koshan
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Sex Discrimination ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Family Status ◽  
Pay Equity ◽  
Employment Benefits ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court

It has been a long road to the judicial recognition of women’s inequality under the Cana‑ dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 The Supreme Court of Canada ruling in Fraser v Can‑ ada is significant for being the first decision where a majority of the Court found adverse effects discrimination based on sex under section 15,2 and it was only two years prior that a claim of sex discrimination in favour of women was finally successful at the Court,3 almost 30 years after their first section 15 decision in Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia. 4 1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter], s 15. 2 Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 [Fraser]. 3 Quebec (Attorney General) v Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux,  2018 SCC 17 [Alliance] (majority found sex discrimination under s 15 and rejected the government’s justification argument under s 1 in the pay equity context). See also Centrale des syndicats du Québec v Quebec (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 18 [Centrale] (majority found violation of s 15 but accepted the government’s s 1 argument, also in the pay equity context). For comments on these decisions see Fay Faraday, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Substantive Equality, Systemic Discrimination and Pay Equity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2020) 94 SCLR (2d) 301; Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, “Equality Rights and Pay Equity: Déjà Vu in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2019) 15 JL & Equality 1. See also British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia Public School Employers’ Association, 2014 SCC 70 (a one-paragraph decision restoring an arbitrator’s award allowing a s 15 employment benefits claim by women); Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE, 2004 SCC 66 (finding a violation of s 15 but accepting the government’s s 1 argument, again in the pay equity context).4 [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1.

scholarly journals Comment on Fraser v Canada (AG): The More Things Change

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-96
Author(s):  
Richard Moon
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Academic Career ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court

Very early in my academic career I wrote two pieces about section 15.1 The first was written in 1987, before the Supreme Court of Canada had heard any section 15 cases,2 and the second in 1989 was a comment on Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, the first of the Court’s section 15 decisions.3 When I re-read these pieces recently it struck me that with a few minor updates they could be read as comments on the Court’s recent decision in Fraser v Canada(Attorney General). 4 The same issues and tensions that were there at the beginning of section 15 are still there. They are built into the concept of constructive/effects discrimination and are not about to disappear. Shamelessly, I have reconstituted these two earlier pieces into a comment, of sorts, on the Fraser case. Other contributors in this special issue of the Constitutional Forum have set out the facts of the Fraser case and so I have not done so here. 1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].2 Richard Moon, “Discrimination and Its Justification: Coping with Equality Rights under the Charter” (1988) 26:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 673.3 Richard Moon, “A Discrete and Insular Right to Equality: Comment on Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia”(1989) 21:3 Ottawa L Rev 563.4 2020 SCC 28 [Fraser].

De facto and de jure Crown Sovereignty: Reconciliation and Legitimation at the Supreme Court of Canada

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Ryan Beaton
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Nations ◽  
Short Story ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Shed Light

This paper offers a short story of Crown sovereignty at the Supreme Court Canada in order to shed light on questions the Court has raised about the legitimacy of Crown sovereignty over territory claimed by First Nations. In skeletal form, the story is simple. The Crown — first Imperial British and later Canadian federal and provincial — asserted sovereignty over what is now Canadian territory, and Canadian courts (and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) accepted those assertions without question. Yet the Supreme Court of Canada has lately qualified Crown sovereignty in striking ways, perhaps most notably in speaking of “de facto Crown sovereignty” in reasons released in 2004.The purpose behind this qualification, in line with the Court’s Aboriginal rights and title cases since Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), seems to be to encourage the Crown to negotiate modern treaties and settle outstandingAboriginal rights and title claims in order to perfect or legitimate Crown sovereignty. As Crown negotiations with First Nations stalled, however, the Court proceeded to develop its own framework for the procedural legitimation of Crown sovereignty, i.e. a framework of procedural safeguards designed to weed out “bad” exercises of Crown sovereignty from legitimate ones.

“THE CHOICE IS CRUEL”: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND CHARTER RIGHTS IN CANADA

2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Palmer
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
The Supreme Court

IN a groundbreaking decision, the Supreme Court of Canada in Carter v Canada (Attorney General) 2015 SCC 5 has declared the criminal law measures prohibiting the provision of assistance in dying unconstitutional. In doing so, the Supreme Court unanimously overruled its previous decision (Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney-General) [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519) upholding the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide.

The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
The Impact

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

scholarly journals The Alchemy of Equality Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-84
Author(s):  
Joshua Sealy-Harrington
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Precise Definition ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Test ◽  
Elusive Concept

A clear legal test for equality is impossible, as it should be. Indeed were the test clear, it could not be for equality. It would have to be for something other than equality — in effect, for inequality. The abstract character of equality is not a new idea. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada’s first decision under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 recognized equality as “an elusive concept” that “lacks precise definition.”2 Why, then, do judges continue to demand such definition over thirty years later? The answer, at times, is politics. 1 s 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].2 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 164, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews].

scholarly journals Settling the Fisheries: Pre-Confederation Crown Policy in Upper Canada and the Supreme Court's decisions in R. v. NIKAL and LEWIS

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-172
Author(s):  
Peggy J. Blair
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Upper Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Fishing Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject

Although a casual reading of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in R. v. Nikal and R. v. Lewis might suggest otherwise, this article will argue that Court's decisions in two recent British Columbia aboriginal fishing cases do not apply in Ontario. In doing so, it will be shown that the Supreme Court of Canada relied on evidence of historic Crown policies towards aboriginal fishing rights in Upper Canada in the absence of appropriate context as to when, how and why those policies evolved. As a result, the Court wrongly concluded that fisheries could not be the subject of exclusive aboriginal rights.

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