scholarly journals The Pacific War and Changes in the Strategic Values of the Government of the Republic of China

2018 ◽  
Vol null (108) ◽  
pp. 169-198
Author(s):  
정형아
2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 252-271
Author(s):  
Madoka Fukuda

AbstractThis article examines the substance and modification of the “One-China” principle, which the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued in the mid 1960s. Under this principle, a country wishing to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was required first to break off such relations with the Republic of China (ROC). In 1964 the PRC established diplomatic relations with France. This was its first ambassadorial exchange with a Western government. The PRC, in the negotiations over the establishment of diplomatic relations, attempted to achieve some consensus with France on the matter of “One-China”. The PRC, nevertheless, had to abandon these attempts, even though it demanded fewer conditions of France than of the United States (USA), Japan and other Western countries in the 1970s. The PRC had demanded adherence to the “One-China” principle since 1949. France, however, refused to accept this condition. Nevertheless, the PRC established diplomatic relations with France before the latter broke off relations with the ROC. Subsequently, the PRC abandoned the same condition in negotiations with the African governments of the Republic of Congo, Central Africa, Dahomey and Mauritania. After the negotiations with France, the PRC began to insist that the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations should clearly state that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China”. However, France refused to insert these words into the communiqué. Afterwards, the PRC nevertheless insisted on putting such a statement into the joint communiqués or exchanges of notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the African countries mentioned above. This was done in order to set precedents for making countries accede to the “One-China” principle. The “One-China” principle was, thus, gradually formed in the process of the negotiation and bargaining between the PRC and other governments.


1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-188 ◽  

The fourteenth session of the General Assembly met at UN Headquarters from September 15 through December 12, 1959, when it was adjourned. At the opening plenary meeting Mr. Victor Belaunde (Peru) was elected President of the session, having obtained 81 votes out of a possible 82. At its 803d plenary meeting, the Assembly adopted by a vote of 44 to 29, with 9 abstentions, the recommendation contained in the report of the General Committee that the Assembly reject the request of India for the inclusion in its agenda of the question of the representation of China in the UN and decided not to consider at its fourteenth session any proposal to exclude the representatives of the government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-138 ◽  

The tenth session of the General Assembly met at UN Headquarters from September 20 to December 20, 1955. At the opening plenary meeting, Mr. José Maza (Chile) was unanimously elected President of the session. On the motion of the United States, the Assembly by a vote of 42 to 12 with 6 abstentions decided not to consider any proposals to exclude the representatives of the government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China during the tenth session.


1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-133 ◽  

The thirteenth session of the General Assembly met at UN Headquarters from September 16 through December 13, 1958, when it was adjourned. It was decided at the Assembly's 782d plenary meeting to reconvene on February 20, 1959, to consider exclusively the question of the future of the trust territories of the Cameroons under French administration and the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration. At the opening plenary meeting, Mr. Charles Malik (Lebanon) was elected President of the session, having obtained 45 votes to 31, which were cast for Mr. Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub (Sudan). At its 755th plenary meeting, the Assembly adopted the recommendation contained in the report of the General Committee that the Assembly reject the request of India for the inclusion in its agenda of the question of the representation of China in the UN and decide not to consider at its thirteenth session any proposals to exclude the representatives of the government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.


Author(s):  
Yiting Yang

The subject of this research is response of the government, political parties, and society of the Republic of China to signing the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan on April 13, 1941 – one of the crucial bilateral agreements of the World War II, which entailed fundamental changes to the Far Eastern international system. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact negatively affected the relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China. The goal of this work is to objectively assess the impact of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941 upon the domestic and foreign policy of the Chinese government, as well as further development of the Sino-Soviet relations. The novelty of this work consists in the fact that based on the poorly studied Russian and foreign documentary materials, the author examines the questions that have been rarely touched upon within the Russian historiography, such as: China’s response to conclusion of the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan; its effect upon Sino-Soviet relations. The conclusion is made that the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941, which marked the most difficult moment of the Sino-Japanese War, was a psychological blow to China. The position of the Kuomintang government was ambivalent: on the one hand, it refrained from the public anti-Soviet propaganda; while on the other hand, used dissatisfaction of China’s population to enhance pressure on its major political opponent – China’s Communist Party. Therefore, the Sino-Soviet relations in general did not experience severe problems; however, the internal split in the Chinese society has worsened, which substantially undermined the formation of Second United Front.


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-116

The first part of the eighth regular session of the General Assembly met in the General Assembly building at United Nations headquarters from September 15 to December 9, 1953, and considered an agenda of 76 items. After adopting by 44 votes to 10 with 2 abstentions a United States draft resolution to postpone for the duration of the eighth session in the current year consideration of all proposals to exclude representatives of the government of the Republic of China and to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, the Assembly elected Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (India) president of the eighth session over Prince Wan Waithayakon (Thailand) by a vote of 37 to 22. Dr. Miguel R. Urquia was elected chairman of the Ad Hoc Political Committee; the following were elected chairmen of the main committees: Political and Security Committee, Fernand van Langenhove (Belgium); Economic and Financial Committee, Leo Mates (Yugoslavia); Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee, G. F. Davidson (Canada); Trusteeship Committee, Dr. Santiago Pérez Pérez (Venezuela); Administrative and Budgetary Committee, Awni Khalidy (Iraq); and Legal Committee, Juliusz Katz-Suchy (Poland).


1967 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 59-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melvin Gurtov

Ever since the conquest of the mainland by Communist forces, the foreign policy of the Republic of China has revolved about a single goal: recovery of the mainland. Recovery of the mainland is, in fact, the reason d'être of the Chiang Kai-shek régime; should the government ever admit doubts about its ability or desire to return, the entire basis for KMT rule would be irrevocably undercut. It is therefore not surprising that, in the last two years no less than in the more distant past, the theme of an imminent return has dominated the pages of Formosa's newspapers, with new evidence being brought forward regularly to demonstrate that the mainland régime is on the verge of collapse. The cultural revolution has brought about important changes in the “return” theme. It has not reduced its relevance, but seems to have induced recalculations in ROC official circles over the timing and nature of the mainland recovery operation.


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