Game strategy selection of government financial expenditure competition ??q??qAnalysis of game model based on Stacklderg game model

In recent years, evolutionary game theory has been gradually applied to analyze and predict network attack and defense for maintaining cybersecurity. The traditional deterministic game model cannot accurately describe the process of actual network attack and defense due to changing in the set of attack-defense strategies and external factors (such as the operating environment of the system). In this paper, we construct a stochastic evolutionary game model by the stochastic differential equation with Markov property. The evolutionary equilibrium solution of the model is found and the stability of the model is proved according to the knowledge of the stochastic differential equation. And we apply the explicit Euler numerical method to analyze the evolution of the strategy selection of the players for different problem situations. The simulation results show that the stochastic evolutionary game model proposed in this paper can get a steady state and obtain the optimal defense strategy under the action of the stochastic disturbance factor. In addition, compared with other kinds of literature, we can conclude that the return on security investment of this model is better, and the strategy selection of the attackers and defenders in our model is more suitable for actual network attack and defense.

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Research on the Natural Hazard Emergency Cooperation Behavior between Governments and Social Organizations Based on the Hybrid Mechanism of Incentive and Linkage in China

International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health ◽

10.3390/ijerph182413064 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 18 (24) ◽

pp. 13064

Author(s):

Jida Liu ◽

Changqi Dong ◽

Shi An ◽

Yanan Guo

Keyword(s):

Local Government ◽

Natural Hazard ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Game Model ◽

Strategy Selection ◽

Factors Affecting ◽

Social Organizations ◽

Evolutionary Trajectories ◽

Emergency Responses ◽

Selection Of

Social organizations have become an important component of the emergency management system by virtue of their heterogeneous resource advantages. It is of great significance to explore the interaction between the local government and social organizations and to clarify the key factors affecting the participation of social organizations in natural hazard emergency responses. With the aim of exploring the relationship between the local government and social organizations, based on evolutionary game theory, the emergency incentive game model and the emergency linkage game model of natural hazard emergency responses were constructed. The evolutionary trajectories of the emergency incentive game system and the emergency linkage game system were described by numerical simulation. Meanwhile, the influence mechanism of government decision parameters on the strategy selection of both game subjects was analyzed. The results show that both governmental incentive strategy and linkage strategy can significantly improve the enthusiasm of social organizations for participating in natural hazard emergency responses. Moreover, they could encourage social organizations to choose a positive participation strategy. Nevertheless, over-reliance on incentives reduces the probability of the local government choosing a positive emergency strategy. In addition, we found that, when both game subjects tend to choose a positive strategy, the strategy selection of the local government drives that of social organizations.

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