scholarly journals Angel in “the Cartesian theatre” – Aquinas and the mind-body problem

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 66-79
Author(s):  
Tomasz Stępień
Keyword(s):  
Human Body ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Human Action ◽  
The Body ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

One of the solutions of the mind-body problem, which returns to the philosophical discussion on consciousness is the “soul hyphotesis”. Existence of the soul can clear the “explanatory gap”, but it brings yet another problems in explanation of how consciousness works. The magiority of those issues exist because of very specific understanding of the mind-body relations in Cartesian way as two separated substances. Some of the schoars propose to overlap the Cartesian approach by returning to the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas. This article shows that in the writings of Aquinas we can find exact analogy of the Cartesian view of the body-soul relations in the description of how immaterial angel assums the body. For Aquinas angel exist and acts in assumed human body in the very same way as Descartes describes the soul acting in human body, and angel’s mode of perception is similar to what is usually called as “the Cartesian theatre”. For Aquinas angel in assumed body cannot perfom any human action, it only pretends to perform it, because it operates bodily organs as the form, which is not united with this specific body. St Thomas explanation of the relation of body and soul in human being relies on the claim of unity of body and soul, which together are one substance. Such approach was even called biological, because of the stress on the role which body plays in human actions. Therefore Aquinas proposition could be perceived the way of overcoming the dualism and removing some of the dilemas which are linked with “soul hypothesis” understood in traditional way.

scholarly journals Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-63
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Multiple Realizability ◽  
Ongoing Research ◽  
Reductive Physicalism ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Conceivability Arguments ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Methodological Reflection

This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or "qualia," which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety.

scholarly journals Fear is Stress that causes Weakening of the Immune System

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (S4) ◽  
pp. 19-21
Author(s):  
L Ross-Williams Rhoda ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Immune System ◽  
Health Risk ◽  
Human Body ◽  
Modern Medicine ◽  
The Body ◽  
Death Rates ◽  
News Reports ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
The Mind

The immune system protects the human body from pathogens like viruses and bacteria. People need to maintain a strong immune system during the COVID-19 pandemic. Unfortunately, the fearmongering news reports on death rates increase fear. This could become a health risk because fear could weaken the immune system by in creasing the release of corticosteroid in the body. Modern medicine includes the mind, body, and soul strengthening the immune system.

Finite Subjects in the Ethics

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Body ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Finite Minds

This chapter suggests a new interpretation of Spinoza’s concept of mind claiming that the goal of the equation of the human mind with the idea of the body is not to solve the mind-body problem, but rather to show how we can, within the framework of Spinoza’s rationalism, conceive of finite minds as irreducibly distinguishable individuals. To support this view, the chapter discusses the passage from E2p11 to E2p13 against the background of three preliminaries, i.e. the notion of a union between mind and body as it appears in Thomas Aquinas’ refutation of Averroism, Spinoza’s views on knowledge of actually existing things in E2p8c, and the phenomenological character of E2a2-4. It argues that while this view on the human mind does not undermine radical rationalism, it does require its amendment by some irreducibly empirical concessions.

scholarly journals A pulsação sob a letra: pela quebra de um silêncio histórico no estudo do som de fala

2011 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Eleonora Cavalcante Albano
Keyword(s):  
Human Body ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Academic Practice ◽  
Psychological Theories ◽  
Inherent Dignity ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

This paper analyses the ideologies underlying western thinking on speech in terms of the metaphorical use of two notions: the alphabet and the machine. It is argued that a subtle cooperation between these two metaphors underlies not only scientific but also technological work on speech – and, indirectly, language. Such ideologies are so deeply rooted in academic practice that attempts at solving the mind-body problem that do not incorporate them tend to be relegated to silence. This silence is shown to serve the same interests as other, more violent, ways of denying the inherent dignity of the human body. The historical status of current phonetic theories related to psychological theories that reject such metaphors is discussed in this light.

Russellian Monism and Epistemic Pessimism

SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ståle Gundersen
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Other Minds Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Russellian Monism

AbstractRussellian monism is any view that proposes that we cannot solve the mind-body problem because natural science cannot tell us about the aspects of physical reality that are necessary to know to explain consciousness. I argue that Russellian monism should be combined with the Heil-Martin theory about dispositions. However, this combination becomes a theory with some profound epistemic pessimistic consequences, namely that we cannot bridge the explanatory gap between physical and conscious states and that we cannot solve the other minds problem. However, this epistemic pessimism does not constitute an unacceptable kind of “mystery-mongering” because we can also find analogous results in the well-established sciences. This may make it easier to accept Russellian monism’s epistemic pessimism.

Almog's Descartes

Philosophy ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-431
Author(s):  
Fred Ablondi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
The Body ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Antoine Arnauld

The answer which Joseph Almog gives to the question which serves as the title of his recent book What Am I? (subtitled: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem) is based upon his interpretation of (1) and objection to Descartes' argument for the distinction of the mind and the body raised by Antoine Arnauld, as well as Descartes' response to it, and (2) Descartes' letters of 9 February 1645 to Denis Mesland. I will argue that both of these interpretations are incorrect, and as such do not support the conclusions which Almog claims to draw from them. The answer, then to the question of what I am which Almog provides is, I believe, not one Descartes would have held, nor one which his writings support.

The Mind-Body Problem Revisited

1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 660-660
Author(s):  
MADGE SCHEIBEL ◽  
ARNOLD SCHEIBEL
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Zombies and Dolls

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

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