Providence in Light of an Open God and an Open Future

2021 ◽  
pp. 3-18
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Cheryl D. Lew

Over the last decade, the number of neuroimaging and other neuroscience studies on the developing brain from fetal life through adolescence has increased exponentially. Children are viewed as particularly vulnerable members of our society and observations of significant neural structural changes associated with behavioral anomalies raise numerous ethical concerns around personal identity, free will, and the possibility of an open future. This chapter provides a review of recent research in the pediatric neuroscience literature, common pediatric decision-making, and social justice models, and discusses the implications of this research for the future of pediatric ethics thinking and policy. New research presents challenges to professional and pediatric bioethicist views of the moral future of children in pediatric healthcare and opportunities to examine anew notions of how to consider the developing moral agency of children.


Author(s):  
Tyler S. Gibb ◽  
Kathryn Redinger ◽  
Casey Fealko ◽  
Sonia Parikh

Guidance regarding the decision to remove an adolescent from athletic competition immediately following an acute concussive injury and the safe return of play in the short term is widely accepted and supported by clinical evidence, local institutional policies, and state and federal laws. There is considerably less guidance regarding the decision to permanently retire an adolescent athlete for medical reasons due to concussive injuries. In this article, we discuss the clinical and non-clinical considerations that should guide clinicians in discussions regarding the adolescent athlete’s permanent retirement by emphasizing the ethical obligation to protect the child’s right to an open future as possibly determinative in otherwise ambiguous cases.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg W. Bertram

AbstractThe concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.


Philosophy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Stoneham

AbstractThere are many questions we can ask about time, but perhaps the most fundamental is whether there are metaphysically interesting differences between past, present and future events. An eternalist believes in a block universe: past, present and future events are all on an equal footing. A gradualist believes in a growing block: he agrees with the eternalist about the past and the present but not about the future. A presentist believes that what is present has a special status. My first claim is that the familiar ways of articulating these views result in there being no substantive disagreement at all between the three parties. I then show that if we accept the controversial truthmaking principle, we can articulate a substantive disagreement. Finally, I apply this way of formulating the debate to related questions such as the open future and determinism, showing that these do not always line up in quite the way one would expect.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 1409-1423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel L. Mintz ◽  
John D. Loike ◽  
Ruth L. Fischbach

Computer ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-18
Author(s):  
G. Lawton
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2020-107042
Author(s):  
Elise Burn

The phenomenon of ‘sharenting’, whereby a parent shares news and images of their child on social media, is of growing popularity in contemporary society. There is emerging research into children’s attitudes regarding sharenting and their associated concerns regarding privacy; however, this research most often involves young people who are approaching adulthood and are competent to participate. As a result, children who experience illness or disability are largely absent from current research, and as such, the moral permissibility of a parent sharing their child’s illness journey on a public social media platform is largely unexplored. In this essay, I explore this issue by using the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and Joel Feinberg’s principle of the child’s right to an open future as the basis of my argument: that children with illness and disability have the same rights as healthy children to privacy, identity and an open future and that publication of their illness on a social media platform violates these rights. I conclude that parents, as surrogate decision makers for their children, have the same responsibilities in protecting their child’s privacy as they do in making medical decisions on behalf of their children. As children of the social media generation approach adulthood, it is important to consider the rights of those who cannot speak for themselves and the ethical consequences of sharenting for children with illness and disability.


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