scholarly journals The relationship between physiological arousal and multiple levels of temporal context in risky choice

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hayley R. Brooks ◽  
Peter Sokol-Hessner

Context-dependence is fundamental to risky monetary decision-making. A growing body of evidence suggests that temporal context, or recent events, alters risk-taking at a minimum of three timescales: immediate (e.g. trial-by-trial), neighborhood (e.g. a group of consecutive trials), and global (e.g. task-level). To examine context effects, we created a novel monetary choice set with intentional temporal structure in which option values shifted between multiple levels of value magnitude (“contexts”) several times over the course of the task. This structure allowed us to examine whether effects of each timescale were simultaneously present in risky choice behavior and the potential mechanistic role of arousal, an established correlate of risk-taking, in context-dependency. We found that risk-taking was sensitive to immediate, neighborhood, and global timescales, increasing following small (vs. large) outcome amounts, large positive (but not negative) shifts in context, and when cumulative earnings exceeded expectations. We quantified arousal with skin conductance responses, which were specifically related to the global timescale, increasing with cumulative earnings, suggesting that physiological arousal captures a task-level assessment of performance. We complimented this correlational analysis with a secondary reanalysis of risky monetary choices following the double-blind administration of propranolol and a placebo during a temporally unstructured choice task. We replicated our behavioral finding that risk-taking is context-sensitive at three timescales but found no change in temporal context-effects following propranolol administration. Our results demonstrate that risky decision-making is consistently dynamic at multiple timescales and that arousal is likely the consequence, rather than the cause, of temporal context in risky monetary decision-making.

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angelo Panno ◽  
Marco Lauriola ◽  
Bernd Figner

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Éltető Noémi ◽  
Janacsek Karolina ◽  
Kóbor Andrea ◽  
Takács Ádám ◽  
Tóth-Fáber Eszter ◽  
...  

AbstractIn real-life decision-making, sub-optimal risk-taking seems characteristic of adolescents. Such behavior increases the chance of serious negative, and at times, irreversible outcomes for this population (e.g., road traffic accidents, addictions). We are still lacking conclusive evidence, however, for an inverted U-shaped developmental trajectory for risk-taking. This raises the question whether adolescents are really more risk-prone or when facing a novel risky situation, they behave just as children and adults do. To answer this question, we used the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) to assess the risky decision making of 188 individuals ranging in age from 7 to 30. The BART provided useful data for characterizing multiple aspects of risk-taking. Surprisingly, we found that adolescents were not more inclined to take risks than children or young adults. Participants in all age groups were able to adapt their learning processes to the probabilistic environment and improve their performance during the sequential risky choice. There were no age-related differences in risk-taking at any stage of the task. Likewise, neither negative feedback reactivity nor overall task performance distinguished adolescents from the younger and older age groups. Our findings prompt 1) methodological considerations about the validity of the BART and 2) theoretical debate whether the amount of experience on its own may account for age-related changes in real-life risk-taking, since risk-taking in a novel and uncertain situation was invariant across developmental stages.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Russek ◽  
Rani Moran ◽  
Yunzhe Liu ◽  
Raymond J Dolan ◽  
Quentin JM Huys

A ubiquitous feature of human decision making under risk is that individuals differ from each other, as well as from normativity, in how they incorporate reward and probability information. One possible explanation for these deviations is a desire to reduce the number of potential outcomes considered during choice evaluation. Although multiple behavioral models can be invoked involving selective consideration of choice outcomes, whether differences in these tendencies underlie behavioral differences in sensitivity to reward and probability information is unknown. Here we consider neural evidence where we exploit magnetoencephalography (MEG) to decode the actual choice outcomes participants consider when they decide between a gamble and a safe outcome. We show that variability in tendencies of individual participants to reinstate neural outcome representations, based on either their probability or reward, explains variability in the extent to which their choices reflect consideration of probability and reward information. In keeping with this we also show that participants who are higher in behavioral impulsivity fail to preferentially reinstate outcomes with higher probability. Our results suggest that neural differences in the degree to which outcomes are considered shape risk taking strategy, both in decision making tasks, as well as in real life.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. e0245969
Author(s):  
Inkyung Park ◽  
Paul D. Windschitl ◽  
Andrew R. Smith ◽  
Shanon Rule ◽  
Aaron M. Scherer ◽  
...  

When making decisions involving risk, people may learn about the risk from descriptions or from experience. The description-experience gap refers to the difference in decision patterns driven by this discrepancy in learning format. Across two experiments, we investigated whether learning from description versus experience differentially affects the direction and the magnitude of a context effect in risky decision making. In Study 1 and 2, a computerized game called the Decisions about Risk Task (DART) was used to measure people’s risk-taking tendencies toward hazard stimuli that exploded probabilistically. The rate at which a context hazard caused harm was manipulated, while the rate at which a focal hazard caused harm was held constant. The format by which this information was learned was also manipulated; it was learned primarily by experience or by description. The results revealed that participants’ behavior toward the focal hazard varied depending on what they had learned about the context hazard. Specifically, there were contrast effects in which participants were more likely to choose a risky behavior toward the focal hazard when the harm rate posed by the context hazard was high rather than low. Critically, these contrast effects were of similar strength irrespective of whether the risk information was learned from experience or description. Participants’ verbal assessments of risk likelihood also showed contrast effects, irrespective of learning format. Although risk information about a context hazard in DART does nothing to affect the objective expected value of risky versus safe behaviors toward focal hazards, it did affect participants’ perceptions and behaviors—regardless of whether the information was learned from description or experience. Our findings suggest that context has a broad-based role in how people assess and make decisions about hazards.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Valsecchi ◽  
Jutta Billino ◽  
Karl R. Gegenfurtner

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