World Modeling, Integrated Information, and the Physical Substrates of Consciousness; Hidden Sources of the Stream of Experience?

In this brief commentary on The Hidden Spring: A Journey to the Source of Consciousness, I describe ways in which Mark Solms’ account of the origins of subjective experience relates to Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT). IWMT is a synthetic theory that brings together different perspectives, with the ultimate goal of solving the enduring problems of consciousness, including the Hard problem. I describe points of compatibility and incompatibility between Solms’ proposal and IWMT, with particular emphasis on how a Bayesian interpretation of Integrated Information Theory and Global (Neuronal) Workspace Theory may help identify the physical and computational substrates of consciousness.

Integrated Information Theory and Isomorphic Feed-Forward Philosophical Zombies

Entropy ◽

10.3390/e21111073 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 21 (11) ◽

pp. 1073 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Jake R. Hanson ◽

Sara I. Walker

Keyword(s):

Information Theory ◽

Subjective Experience ◽

Original System ◽

Necessary Condition ◽

Mathematical Framework ◽

Hard Problem ◽

The Hard Problem ◽

Labeling Scheme ◽

Any theory amenable to scientific inquiry must have testable consequences. This minimal criterion is uniquely challenging for the study of consciousness, as we do not know if it is possible to confirm via observation from the outside whether or not a physical system knows what it feels like to have an inside—a challenge referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness. To arrive at a theory of consciousness, the hard problem has motivated development of phenomenological approaches that adopt assumptions of what properties consciousness has based on first-hand experience and, from these, derive the physical processes that give rise to these properties. A leading theory adopting this approach is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which assumes our subjective experience is a “unified whole”, subsequently yielding a requirement for physical feedback as a necessary condition for consciousness. Here, we develop a mathematical framework to assess the validity of this assumption by testing it in the context of isomorphic physical systems with and without feedback. The isomorphism allows us to isolate changes in Φ without affecting the size or functionality of the original system. Indeed, the only mathematical difference between a “conscious” system with Φ > 0 and an isomorphic “philosophical zombie” with Φ = 0 is a permutation of the binary labels used to internally represent functional states. This implies Φ is sensitive to functionally arbitrary aspects of a particular labeling scheme, with no clear justification in terms of phenomenological differences. In light of this, we argue any quantitative theory of consciousness, including IIT, should be invariant under isomorphisms if it is to avoid the existence of isomorphic philosophical zombies and the epistemological problems they pose.

Does integrated information lack subjectivity?

Theoria Beograd ◽

10.2298/theo1802131n ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 61 (2) ◽

pp. 131-145

Author(s):

Janko Nesic

Keyword(s):

Information Theory ◽

Hard Problem ◽

Subjective Character ◽

The Status ◽

The Hard Problem ◽

I investigate the status of subjectivity in Integrated Information Theory. This leads me to examine if Integrated Information Theory can answer the hard problem of consciousness. On itself, Integrated Information Theory does not seem to constitute an answer to the hard problem, but could be combined with panpsychism to yield a more satisfying theory of consciousness. I will show, that even if Integrated Information Theory employs the metaphysical machinery of panpsychism, Integrated Information would still suffer from a different problem, not being able to account for the subjective character of consciousness.

The extended dual-aspect monism framework: an attempt to solve the hard problem

Trans/Form/Ação ◽

10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.09.p153 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 41 (spe) ◽

pp. 153-182 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal

Keyword(s):

Information Theory ◽

Physical Aspect ◽

Hard Problem ◽

Prior Work ◽

Missing Information ◽

Subjective Experiences ◽

Eeg Data ◽

The Hard Problem ◽

Abstract: In prior work, we reported the followings: (i) There are about forty meanings attributed to the term consciousness. They were identified and categorized according to whether they were principally about function or about experience. (ii) The frameworks for consciousness that are based on materialism, idealism, and dualism have serious problems. Therefore, an extended dual-aspect monism (eDAM) framework was proposed for consciousness, where (a) the problematic materialism/panpsychism based integrated information theory (IIT) was interpreted and (b) the inseparability between physical and non-physical aspect holds because none of the empirical fMRI/EEG data shows separability between aspects. This has the least number of problems compared to all other frameworks. It required a novel feature that the potentiality of primary irreducible subjective experiences co-exists with its physical aspect in nature. This missing information in science is provided by the eDAM, which addresses the hard problem of consciousness successfully, which is elaborated in detail in this article.

Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) Revisited

10.31234/osf.io/kjngh ◽

2019 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Adam Safron

Keyword(s):

Hard Problem ◽

Energy Principle ◽

Brain Functioning ◽

Practical Applications ◽

Theories Of Mind ◽

Third Person ◽

Impossible Task ◽

World Modeling ◽

Modeling Theory ◽

The Hard Problem

Here, I provide clarifications and discuss further issues relating to Safron (2020), “An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of consciousness: Combining Integrated Information and Global Workspace Theories with the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference Framework; towards solving the Hard problem and characterizing agentic causation.” As a synthesis of major theories of complex systems and consciousness, with IWMT we may be able to address some of the most difficult problems in the sciences. This is a claim deserving of close scrutiny and much skepticism. What would it take to solve the Hard problem? One could answer the question of how it is possible that something like subjectivity could emerge from objective brain functioning (i.e., moving from a third person to a first person ontology), but a truly satisfying account might still require solving all the “easy” and “real” problems of consciousness. In this way, IWMT does not claim to definitively solve the Hard problem, as explaining all the particular ways that things feel across all relevant aspects of experience is likely an impossible task. Nonetheless, IWMT does claim to have made major inroads into our understanding of consciousness, and here I will attempt to justify this position by discussing challenging problems and outstanding questions with respect to philosophy, (neuro)phenomenology, computational principles, practical applications, and implications for existing theories of mind and life.

An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of consciousness: Combining Integrated Information and Global Neuronal Workspace Theories with the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference Framework; towards solving the Hard problem and characterizing agentic causation

10.31234/osf.io/j7n98 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Adam Safron

Keyword(s):

Free Energy ◽

Turbo Codes ◽

Subjective Experience ◽

Synthetic Approach ◽

Active Inference ◽

Energy Principle ◽

Free Energy Principle ◽

World Modeling ◽

Modeling Theory ◽

The Free Energy Principle and Active Inference Framework (FEP-AI) begins with the understanding that persisting systems must regulate environmental exchanges and prevent entropic accumulation. In FEP-AI, minds and brains are predictive controllers for autonomous systems, where action-driven perception is realized as probabilistic inference. Integrated Information Theory (IIT) begins with considering the preconditions for a system to intrinsically exist, as well as axioms regarding the nature of consciousness. IIT has produced controversy because of its surprising entailments: quasi-panpsychism; subjectivity without referents or dynamics; and the possibility of fully-intelligent-yet-unconscious brain simulations. Here, I describe how these controversies might be resolved by integrating IIT with FEP-AI, where integrated information only entails consciousness for systems with perspectival reference frames capable of generating models with spatial, temporal, and causal coherence for self and world. Without that connection with external reality, systems could have arbitrarily high amounts of integrated information, but nonetheless would not entail subjective experience. I further describe how an integration of these frameworks may contribute to their evolution as unified systems theories and models of emergent causation. Then, inspired by both Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) and the Harmonic Brain Modes framework, I describe how streams of consciousness may emerge as an evolving generation of sensorimotor predictions, with the precise composition of experiences depending on the integration abilities of synchronous complexes as self-organizing harmonic modes (SOHMs). These integrating dynamics may be particularly likely to occur via richly connected subnetworks affording body-centric sources of phenomenal binding and executive control. Along these connectivity backbones, SOHMs are proposed to implement loopy message passing (cf. turbo-codes) over predictive (autoencoding) networks, so generating maximum a posteriori estimates as coherent vectors governing neural evolution, with alpha frequencies generating basic awareness, and cross-frequency phase-coupling within theta frequencies for access consciousness and volitional control. These dynamic cores of integrated information also function as global workspaces, centered on posterior cortices, but capable of being entrained with frontal cortices and interoceptive hierarchies, so affording agentic causation. Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) represents a synthetic approach to understanding minds that reveals compatibility between leading theories of consciousness, so enabling inferential synergy.

An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of Consciousness: Combining Integrated Information and Global Neuronal Workspace Theories With the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference Framework; Toward Solving the Hard Problem and Characterizing Agentic Causation

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence ◽

10.3389/frai.2020.00030 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 3 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Adam Safron

Keyword(s):

Free Energy ◽

Subjective Experience ◽

Reference Frames ◽

Synthetic Approach ◽

Active Inference ◽

Energy Principle ◽

Free Energy Principle ◽

World Modeling ◽

Modeling Theory ◽

The Free Energy Principle and Active Inference Framework (FEP-AI) begins with the understanding that persisting systems must regulate environmental exchanges and prevent entropic accumulation. In FEP-AI, minds and brains are predictive controllers for autonomous systems, where action-driven perception is realized as probabilistic inference. Integrated Information Theory (IIT) begins with considering the preconditions for a system to intrinsically exist, as well as axioms regarding the nature of consciousness. IIT has produced controversy because of its surprising entailments: quasi-panpsychism; subjectivity without referents or dynamics; and the possibility of fully-intelligent-yet-unconscious brain simulations. Here, I describe how these controversies might be resolved by integrating IIT with FEP-AI, where integrated information only entails consciousness for systems with perspectival reference frames capable of generating models with spatial, temporal, and causal coherence for self and world. Without that connection with external reality, systems could have arbitrarily high amounts of integrated information, but nonetheless would not entail subjective experience. I further describe how an integration of these frameworks may contribute to their evolution as unified systems theories and models of emergent causation. Then, inspired by both Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) and the Harmonic Brain Modes framework, I describe how streams of consciousness may emerge as an evolving generation of sensorimotor predictions, with the precise composition of experiences depending on the integration abilities of synchronous complexes as self-organizing harmonic modes (SOHMs). These integrating dynamics may be particularly likely to occur via richly connected subnetworks affording body-centric sources of phenomenal binding and executive control. Along these connectivity backbones, SOHMs are proposed to implement turbo coding via loopy message-passing over predictive (autoencoding) networks, thus generating maximum a posteriori estimates as coherent vectors governing neural evolution, with alpha frequencies generating basic awareness, and cross-frequency phase-coupling within theta frequencies for access consciousness and volitional control. These dynamic cores of integrated information also function as global workspaces, centered on posterior cortices, but capable of being entrained with frontal cortices and interoceptive hierarchies, thus affording agentic causation. Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) represents a synthetic approach to understanding minds that reveals compatibility between leading theories of consciousness, thus enabling inferential synergy.

Ambiguous Body Ownership Experience Caused by Feeling–judgement Conflict: Evidence from Subjective Measurement in Rubber Hand Illusion using Integrated Information Theory

10.1101/2021.11.29.470324 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Takayuki Niizato ◽

Yuta Nishiyama ◽

Kotaro Sakamoto ◽

Takumi Kazawa ◽

Tatsuya Okabayashi ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Information Theory ◽

Subjective Experience ◽

Small Body ◽

Rubber Hand Illusion ◽

General Tendency ◽

Body Ownership ◽

Entire System ◽

Rubber Hand ◽

Human body awareness is malleable and adaptive to changing contexts. The illusory sense of body-ownership has been studied since the publication of the rubber hand illusion, where ambiguous body ownership feeling, expressed as "the dummy hand is my hand even though that is not true", was first defined. Phenomenologically, the ambiguous body ownership is attributed to a conflict between feeling and judgement; in other words, it characterises a discrepancy between first-person (i.e. bottom-up) and third-person (i.e. top-down) processes. Although Bayesian inference can explain this malleability of body image sufficiently, the theory does not provide a good illustration of why we have different experiences to the same stimuli -- the difficulty lies in the uncertainty regarding the concept of judgement in their theory. This study attempts to explain subjective experience during rubber hand illusions using integrated information theory (IIT). The integrated information Φ in IIT measures the difference between the entire system and its subsystems. This concept agrees with the phenomenological interpretation -- that is, there is conflict between judgement and feeling. By analysing the seven nodes of a small body--brain system, we demonstrate that the integrity of the entire system during the illusion decreases with increasing integrity of its subsystems. These general tendencies agree well with many brain-image analyses and subjective reports; furthermore, we found that subjective ratings were associated with the Φs. Our result suggests that IIT can explain the general tendency of the sense of ownership illusions and individual differences in subjective experience during the illusions.

Awareness and integrated information theory identify plant meristems as sites of conscious activity

PROTOPLASMA ◽

10.1007/s00709-021-01633-1 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Anthony Trewavas

Keyword(s):

Information Theory ◽

Nervous System ◽

Complex Networks ◽

Environmental Changes ◽

Biological Function ◽

Human Consciousness ◽

Extrinsic Information ◽

Conscious Activity ◽

AbstractLacking an anatomical brain/nervous system, it is assumed plants are not conscious. The biological function of consciousness is an input to behaviour; it is adaptive (subject to selection) and based on information. Complex language makes human consciousness unique. Consciousness is equated to awareness. All organisms are aware of their surroundings, modifying their behaviour to improve survival. Awareness requires assessment too. The mechanisms of animal assessment are neural while molecular and electrical in plants. Awareness of plants being also consciousness may resolve controversy. The integrated information theory (IIT), a leading theory of consciousness, is also blind to brains, nerves and synapses. The integrated information theory indicates plant awareness involves information of two kinds: (1) communicative, extrinsic information as a result of the perception of environmental changes and (2) integrated intrinsic information located in the shoot and root meristems and possibly cambium. The combination of information constructs an information nexus in the meristems leading to assessment and behaviour. The interpretation of integrated information in meristems probably involves the complex networks built around [Ca2+]i that also enable plant learning, memory and intelligent activities. A mature plant contains a large number of conjoined, conscious or aware, meristems possibly unique in the living kingdom.