Seizing the Opportunity: Lifespan Differences in the Effects of the Opportunity Cost of Time on Cognitive Control

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Devine ◽  
Cassandra Neumann ◽  
A. Ross Otto ◽  
Florian Bolenz ◽  
Andrea M.F. Reiter ◽  
...  

Previous work suggests that lifespan developmental differences in cognitive control reflect maturational and aging-related changes in prefrontal cortex functioning. However, complementary explanations exist: It could be that children and older adults differ from younger adults in how they balance the effort of engaging in control against its potential benefits. Here we test whether the degree of cognitive effort expenditure depends on the opportunity cost of time (average reward rate per unit time): if the average reward rate is high, participants should withhold cognitive effort whereas if it is low, they should invest more. In Experiment 1, we examine this hypothesis in children, adolescents, younger, and older adults, by applying a reward rate manipulation in two cognitive control tasks: a modified Erikson Flanker and a task-switching paradigm. We found that young adults and adolescents reflexively withheld effort when the opportunity cost of time was high, whereas older adults and, to a lesser degree children, invested more resources to accumulate reward as quickly as possible. We tentatively interpret these results in terms of age- and task-specific differences in the processing of the opportunity cost of time. We qualify our findings in a second experiment in younger adults in which we address an alternative explanation of our results and show that the observed age differences in effort expenditure may not result from differences in task difficulty. To conclude, we think that our results present an interesting first step at relating opportunity costs to motivational processes across the lifespan. We frame the implications of further work in this area within a recent developmental model of resource-rationality, which points to developmental sweet spots in cognitive control.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Ross Otto ◽  
Nathaniel D. Daw

AbstractA spate of recent work demonstrates that humans seek to avoid the expenditure of cognitive effort, much like physical effort or economic resources. Less is clear, however, about the circumstances dictating how and when people decide to expend cognitive effort. Here we adopt a popular theory of opportunity costs and response vigor and to elucidate this question. This account, grounded in Reinforcement Learning, formalizes a trade-off between two costs: the harder work assumed necessary to emit faster actions and the opportunity cost inherent in acting more slowly (i.e., the delay that results to the next reward and subsequent rewards). Recent work reveals that the opportunity cost of time—operationalized as the average reward rate per unit time, theorized to be signaled by tonic dopamine levels, modulates the speed with which a person responds in a simple discrimination tasks. We extend this framework to cognitive effort in a diverse range of cognitive tasks, for which 1) the amount of cognitive effort demanded from the task varies from trial to trial and 2) the putative expenditure of cognitive effort holds measureable consequences in terms of accuracy and response time. In the domains of cognitive control, perceptual decision-making, and task-switching, we found that subjects tuned their level of effort exertion in accordance with the experienced average reward rate: when the opportunity cost of time was high, subjects made more errors and responded more quickly, which we interpret as a withdrawal of cognitive effort. That is, expenditure of cognitive effort appeared to be modulated by the opportunity cost of time. Further, and consistent with our account, the strength of this modulation was predicted by individual differences in efficacy of cognitive control. Taken together, our results elucidate the circumstances dictating how and when people expend cognitive effort.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean T Devine ◽  
A Ross Otto ◽  
Florian Bolenz ◽  
Andrea M.F. Reiter ◽  
Ben Eppinger

Previous work suggests that lifespan developmental differences in cognitive control abilitiesmight be due to maturational and aging-related changes in prefrontal cortex functioning.However, there are other explanations: For example, it could be that children and older adults differ from younger adults in how they balance the effort of engaging in control against its potential benefits. In this work, we assume that the degree of engagement in cognitive effort depends on the opportunity cost of time (average reward rate per unit time). If the average reward rate is high, participants should speed up responding whereas if it is low, they should respond more slowly. Developmental changes in opportunity cost assessments may lead to differences in the sensitivity to changes in reward rate. To examine this hypothesis in children, adolescents, younger, and older adults, we applied a reward rate manipulation in two well-established cognitive control tasks: a modified Erikson Flanker and a task-switching paradigm. We found a significant interaction between age group and average reward rate, such that older adults were more sensitive to the average reward rate than the other age groups. However, as task complexity increased (from the Flanker task to the task-switching paradigm), children also became sensitive to changes in reward rate. This may suggest that when demands on cognitive load reach capacity limitations, participants engage in strategic behaviour to optimize performance: a view we present as the “sweet sport” argument of effort allocation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akshay Nair ◽  
Ritwik K. Niyogi ◽  
Fei Shang ◽  
Sarah J. Tabrizi ◽  
Geraint Rees ◽  
...  

Background: Apathy, a disabling and poorly understood neuropsychiatric symptom, is characterised by impaired self-initiated behaviour. Although the computational mechanisms that determine self-initiation are poorly understood, it has been hypothesised that the opportunity cost of time (OCT) may be a key variable linking self-initiated behaviour with motivational status. Using a novel behavioural task and computational modelling, we investigated the relationship between OCT, self-initiation and apathy. OCT represents the amount of reward which is foregone per second if no action is taken. We predicted that higher OCT would engender shorter action latencies, and that individuals with greater sensitivity to OCT would have higher behavioural apathy.Methods: We modulated the OCT in a novel task called the ‘Fisherman Game’, Participants freely chose when to self-initiate actions to either collect rewards, or on occasion, to complete non-rewarding actions. We measured the relationship between action latencies, OCT and apathy for each participant across two independent non-clinical studies, one under laboratory conditions (n=21) and one online (n=90). ‘Average-reward’ reinforcement learning was used to model our data. We replicated our findings across both studies.Results: We show that the latency of self-initiation is driven by changes in the OCT. Furthermore, we demonstrate, for the first time, higher apathy was showed greater sensitivity to changes in OCT in younger adults. Our model shows that apathetic individuals experienced greatest change in subjective OCT during our task as a consequence of being more sensitive to rewards.Conclusions: Our results suggest that OCT is an important variable for determining free-operant action initiation and understanding apathy.


Cognition ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 216 ◽  
pp. 104863
Author(s):  
Sean Devine ◽  
Cassandra Neumann ◽  
A. Ross Otto ◽  
Florian Bolenz ◽  
Andrea Reiter ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Akshay Nair ◽  
Ritwik K. Niyogi ◽  
Fei Shang ◽  
Sarah J. Tabrizi ◽  
Geraint Rees ◽  
...  

Abstract Background Apathy, a disabling and poorly understood neuropsychiatric symptom, is characterised by impaired self-initiated behaviour. It has been hypothesised that the opportunity cost of time (OCT) may be a key computational variable linking self-initiated behaviour with motivational status. OCT represents the amount of reward which is foregone per second if no action is taken. Using a novel behavioural task and computational modelling, we investigated the relationship between OCT, self-initiation and apathy. We predicted that higher OCT would engender shorter action latencies, and that individuals with greater sensitivity to OCT would have higher behavioural apathy. Methods We modulated the OCT in a novel task called the ‘Fisherman Game’, Participants freely chose when to self-initiate actions to either collect rewards, or on occasion, to complete non-rewarding actions. We measured the relationship between action latencies, OCT and apathy for each participant across two independent non-clinical studies, one under laboratory conditions (n = 21) and one online (n = 90). ‘Average-reward’ reinforcement learning was used to model our data. We replicated our findings across both studies. Results We show that the latency of self-initiation is driven by changes in the OCT. Furthermore, we demonstrate, for the first time, that participants with higher apathy showed greater sensitivity to changes in OCT in younger adults. Our model shows that apathetic individuals experienced greatest change in subjective OCT during our task as a consequence of being more sensitive to rewards. Conclusions Our results suggest that OCT is an important variable for determining free-operant action initiation and understanding apathy.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debbie Marianne Yee ◽  
Sarah L Adams ◽  
Asad Beck ◽  
Todd Samuel Braver

Motivational incentives play an influential role in value-based decision-making and cognitive control. A compelling hypothesis in the literature suggests that the brain integrates the motivational value of diverse incentives (e.g., motivational integration) into a common currency value signal that influences decision-making and behavior. To investigate whether motivational integration processes change during healthy aging, we tested older (N=44) and younger (N=54) adults in an innovative incentive integration task paradigm that establishes dissociable and additive effects of liquid (e.g., juice, neutral, saltwater) and monetary incentives on cognitive task performance. The results reveal that motivational incentives improve cognitive task performance in both older and younger adults, providing novel evidence demonstrating that age-related cognitive control deficits can be ameliorated with sufficient incentive motivation. Additional analyses revealed clear age-related differences in motivational integration. Younger adult task performance was modulated by both monetary and liquid incentives, whereas monetary reward effects were more gradual in older adults and more strongly impacted by trial-by-trial performance feedback. A surprising discovery was that older adults shifted attention from liquid valence toward monetary reward throughout task performance, but younger adults shifted attention from monetary reward toward integrating both monetary reward and liquid valence by the end of the task, suggesting differential strategic utilization of incentives. Together these data suggest that older adults may have impairments in incentive integration, and employ different motivational strategies to improve cognitive task performance. The findings suggest potential candidate neural mechanisms that may serve as the locus of age-related change, providing targets for future cognitive neuroscience investigations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michiko Sakaki ◽  
Jasmine A. L. Raw ◽  
Jamie Findlay ◽  
Mariel Thottam

Older adults typically remember more positive than negative information compared to their younger counterparts; a phenomenon referred to as the ‘positivity effect.’ According to the socioemotional selectivity theory (SST), the positivity effect derives from the age-related motivational shift towards attaining emotionally meaningful goals which become more important as the perception of future time becomes more limited. Cognitive control mechanisms are critical in achieving such goals and therefore SST predicts that the positivity effect is associated with preserved cognitive control mechanisms in older adults. In contrast, the aging-brain model suggests that the positivity effect is driven by an age-related decline in the amygdala which is responsible for emotional processing and emotional learning. The aim of the current research was to address whether the age-related positivity effect is associated with cognitive control or impaired emotional processing associated with aging. We included older old adults, younger old adults and younger adults and tested their memory for emotional stimuli, cognitive control and amygdala-dependent fear conditioned responses. Consistent with prior research, older adults, relative to younger adults, demonstrate better memory for positive over negative images. We further found that within a group of older adults, the positivity effect increases as a function of age, such that older old adults demonstrated a greater positivity effect compared to younger older adults. Furthermore, the positivity effect in older old adults was associated with preserved cognitive control, supporting the prediction of SST. Contrary to the prediction of the aging-brain model, participants across all groups demonstrated similar enhanced skin conductance responses to fear conditioned stimuli – responses known to rely on the amygdala. Our results support SST and suggest that the positivity effect in older adults is achieved by the preserved cognitive control mechanisms and is not a reflection of the impaired emotional function associated with age.


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