scholarly journals The Power of Place: The Effect of Forced Placement on Refugee Naturaliza-tion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederik Juhl Jørgensen
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Register Data ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Refugee Integration ◽  
Initial Placement ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Synergy Mechanism

Does initial placement matter for refugee integration? I provide new evidence for the effect of placement on refugee integration. Using Danish register data, I exploit that refugees who obtained residency after January 1 1999 were subject to forced dispersal whereas refugees who obtained res-idency before this cutoff were subject to voluntary dispersal. In a regression discontinuity design, I show that forced dispersal—that induced exogenous variation in initial placement—had a large im-pact on refugees’ likelihood of naturalization. Forced placed refugees are about 26 percent less like-ly to naturalize compared to voluntary placed refugees. Moreover, my findings suggest that this placement effect operates on a synergy mechanism between places and individuals’ characteristics: forced placement affects refugee naturalization negatively because it deteriorates their ability to select into locations that match their own characteristics. Consistent with this mechanism, the drop in naturalization rates is concentrated among the most disadvantaged refugees.

scholarly journals On the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design for Estimating Electoral Effects: New Evidence from Over 40,000 Close Races

2014 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew C. Eggers ◽  
Anthony Fowler ◽  
Jens Hainmueller ◽  
Andrew B. Hall ◽  
James M. Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
New Evidence

scholarly journals Effectiveness of a Power Factor Correction Policy in Improving the Energy Efficiency of Large-Scale Electricity Users in Ghana

Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 2582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Lotsu ◽  
Yuichiro Yoshida ◽  
Katsufumi Fukuda ◽  
Bing He
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Power Factor ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Power Factor Correction ◽  
Energy Crisis ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
The Government ◽  
Power Factor Improvement ◽  
The Impact

Confronting an energy crisis, the government of Ghana enacted a power factor correction policy in 1995. The policy imposes a penalty on large-scale electricity users, namely, special load tariff (SLT) customers of the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), whose power factor is below 90%. This paper investigates the impact of this policy on these firms’ power factor improvement by using panel data from 183 SLT customers from 1994 to 1997 and from 2012. To avoid potential endogeneity, this paper adopts a regression discontinuity design (RDD) with the power factor of the firms in the previous year as a running variable, with its cutoff set at the penalty threshold. The result shows that these large-scale electricity users who face the penalty because their power factor falls just short of the threshold are more likely to improve their power factor in the subsequent year, implying that the power factor correction policy implemented by Ghana’s government is effective.

How Much of the Incumbency Advantage is Due to Scare-Off?

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew B. Hall ◽  
James M. Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Previous Election ◽  
Us Senate ◽  
State Legislative

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the degree to which incumbents scare off challengers with previous officeholder experience. The estimates indicate a surprisingly small amount of scare-off, at least in cases where the previous election was nearly tied. As Lee and others have shown (and as we confirm for our samples) the estimated party incumbency advantage in these same cases is quite large—in fact, it is about as large as the average incumbency advantage for all races found using other approaches. Drawing from previous estimates of the electoral value of officeholder experience, we thus calculate that scare-off in these cases accounts for only about 5–7 percent of the party incumbency advantage. We show that these patterns are similar in elections for US House seats, statewide offices and US senate seats, and state legislative seats.

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