Absolute vs. relative success: Why overconfidence is an inefficient equilibrium
Overconfidence is one of the most ubiquitous biases in the social sciences, but the evidenceregarding its overall costs and benefits is mixed. To test the possibility that overconfidence mightyield important relative benefits that offset its absolute costs, we conducted an experiment (N=298university students) in which pairs of participants bargain over the unequal allocation of a prizethat was earned via a joint effort. We manipulated confidence using a binary noisy signal toinvestigate the causal effect of negotiators’ beliefs about their relative contribution on the outcomeof the negotiation. Our results provide evidence that high levels of confidence lead to relativebenefits (how much one earns compared to one’s partner) but absolute costs (how much moneyone receives overall). These results suggest that overconfidence creates an inefficient equilibriumwhereby overconfident negotiators benefit over their partners even as they bring about joint losses.