scholarly journals The Effect of Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure on Financial Performance of Listed Companies in Nepal

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Surya Bahadur G. C. ◽  
Ravindra Prasad Baral
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Least Squares ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
And Performance

The paper attempts to analyze relationships among corporate governance, ownership structure and firm performance in Nepal. The study comprises of panel data set of 25 firms listed at Nepal Stock Exchange (NEPSE) covering a period of five years from 2012 to 2016. The econometric methodology for the study consists primarily of least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model, fixed and random effects panel data models and two-stage least squares (2SLS) model. The study finds bi-directional relationship between corporate governance and performance. Among corporate governance internal mechanisms; smaller board size, higher proportion of independent directors, reducing ownership concentration, improving standards of transparency and disclosure, and designing appropriate director compensation package are important dimensions that listed firms and regulators in Nepal should focus on. Ownership concentration is found to have positive effect on performance; however, it affects corporate governance negatively. This study raises understanding and provides empirical evidence for endogenous relationship between corporate governance and performance and offers support for principal-principal agency relationship. The results of this study lead to several practical implications for listed firms as well as policymakers of Nepal in promoting sound corporate governance practices and codes. For listed companies, the improvement in compliance with a code of corporate governance or voluntary adoption of best practices can provide a means of achieving improved performance.

scholarly journals Ownership structure, board of directors and firm performance: evidence from Taiwan

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mao-Feng Kao ◽  
Lynn Hodgkinson ◽  
Aziz Jaafar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms

PurposeUsing a data set of listed firms domiciled in Taiwan, this paper aims to empirically assess the effects of ownership structure and board of directors on firm value.Design/methodology/approachUsing a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 1997 to 2015, this study uses a panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section and time–series nature of the data. Furthermore, two stage least squares (2SLS) regression model is used as robustness test to mitigate the endogeneity issue.FindingsThe main results show that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the smaller the board size, together with a two-tier board system and no chief executive officer duality, the stronger the firm’s performance. With respect to ownership structure, block-holders’ ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and family ownership are all positively related to firm value.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough the Taiwanese corporate governance reform concerning the independent director system which is mandatory only for newly-listed companies is successful, the regulatory authority should require all listed companies to appoint independent directors to further enhance the Taiwanese corporate governance.Originality/valueFirst, unlike most of the previous literature on Western developed countries, this study examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in a newly industrialised country, Taiwan. Second, while a number of studies used a single indicator of firm performance, this study examines both accounting-based and market-based firm performance. Third, this study addresses the endogeneity issue between corporate governance factors and firm performance by using 2SLS estimation, and details the econometric tests for justifying the appropriateness of using 2SLS estimation.

scholarly journals CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM LISTED FIRMS OF PAKISTAN

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 170-187
Author(s):  
Shuaib Ali ◽  
Guo Fei ◽  
Zhaid Ali ◽  
Farhan Hussain
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
And Performance

This study aims to find the influence of corporate governance on firm performance for the listed non-financial firms on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) for the period 2005-15.  The article has measured corporate governance by the large boards with more independent directors, independence of audit committee, ownership concentration, non-existence ofCEOduality, and presence of foreign and institutional investors. To address this endogenous nature of institutional ownership and performance in this study we have used instrumental variables (IV) techniques using a two-stage least square (2SLS) by instrumentalizing institutional ownership with firm size and firm age. The study found that firms with large and independent boards outperform their counterparts. Similarly, the study found that firms having the joint position ofCEOand chairperson performs lower than counterparts. In Pakistan firms with foreign and institutional owners better than others. We found that firms with concentrated owners have a lower level of agency problem and ultimately perform well. Furthermore, we found that firms with a lower level of agency problem type II (measured via ownership concentration contestability) perform better in Pakistan. 

scholarly journals Ownership structure and corporate governance: What does the data reveal about Saudi listed firms?

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 413-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Faryan ◽  
Everton Dockery
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Market Instability ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Size Variable

In this paper we examine the ownership structure of 169 firms listed on the Saudi Arabian stock market from 2008 to 2014. The analysis uses the testing methodology described by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) to examine the effects of firm and market instability on Saudi ownership structure and additionally, the effect of systematic regulation that imposes constraints on the behaviour of the selected listed firms. We find evidence, for the majority of the ownership structures considered, in favour of the view that firm size, regulation and instability affects ownership structure. The results suggest that the size variable has a positive effect on ownership concentration. Our analysis also shows that instability had some effect on ownership concentration and structure when using the non-linear specification, particularly when using firm specific instability, albeit the effect was stronger when the instability measure was accounting profit returns. Lastly, there is evidence that government-owned firms were mostly affected by regulation while diffused owned firms were affected most by instability than non-government owned firms.

scholarly journals The influence of internal corporate governance mechanisms on capital structure decisions of Chinese listed firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agyenim Boateng ◽  
Huifen Cai ◽  
Daniel Borgia ◽  
Xiao Gang Bi ◽  
Franklin Nnaemeka Ngwu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
The State ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the capital structure decisions of Chinese-listed firms. Design/methodology/approach Using a large and more recent data set consisting of 2,386 Chinese-listed firms over the period from 1998 to 2012, the authors use different statistical methods (OLS, fixed effects and system GMM) to analyse the effects of firm-specific and corporate governance influences on capital structure. Findings The authors find that the proportion of independent directors and ownership concentration exert significant influence on the level of Chinese long-term debt ratios after controlling for firm-specific determinants and split share reforms. Further analysis separating the sample of this paper into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs) suggests that ownership concentration in the hands of the state leads to decrease in debt ratios. Research limitations/implications The finding implies that concentrated ownership in the hands of the state appears more efficient compared to their private counterparts in their monitoring role. Originality/value This paper extends prior literature, which has concentrated disproportionately on firm-specific influences on capital structure, to the effects of within-firm governance mechanisms on capital structure decisions. The paper contributes to the agency theory–capital structure discourse in an emerging country context where corporate governance system appears weak.

scholarly journals OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND BOARD EFFECTIVENESS AS DETERMINANTS OF TMT COMPENSATION IN SPANISH LISTED FIRMS / NUOSAVYBĖS FORMOS IR VALDYBOS EFEKTYVUMĄ LEMIANTYS VEIKSNIAI PASIRINKTOSE ISPANIJOS KOMPANIJOSE

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregorio Sanchez-Marin ◽  
J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler ◽  
M. Encarnacion Lucas-Perez
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Board Effectiveness ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
The Board Of Directors

This study analyzes the influence of ownership structure and the board of directors on top management team (TMT) pay levels in a sample of Spanish listed firms. When panel data methodology is applied, the results show that TMT pay level is affected by the supervisory effectiveness of the board. This, in turn, is influenced by ownership concentration and the type of major shareholders. When ownership is dispersed, the board is more effective in their supervision and TMT pay level is lower. However, when ownership is concentrated, the quality of supervision and, consequently, TMT pay levels depend upon the type of shareholder that is predominant. Santrauka Analizuojama nuosavybes formos strukturos ir valdybos itaka aukšèiausio lygio Ispanijos kompaniju vadovu darbo užmokesèio dydžiui. Tyrimu duomenys parode, kad aukšèiausio lygio vadovu darbo užmokesèio dydis priklauso nuo valdybos kontroles ir jos efektyvumo itakos. Tai, žinoma, yra susijê su kompanijos savininko ir pagrindiniu akcininku pozicija. Kai savininko pozicija pasyvi, tuomet valdybos veiksmai kontroles srityje yra efektyvesni, taèiau aukšèiausio lygio vadovu darbo užmokesèio lygis yra gerokai mažesnis. Taèiau kai savininkas tiesiogiai dalyvauja kompanijos veikloje ir prisideda prie jos valdymo, tuomet kontroles kokybe ir aukšèiausio lygio vadovu darbo užmokesèio lygis priklauso nuo akcininko pozicijos.

scholarly journals Blockholders and Firm Performance: A Malaysian Evidence

2019 ◽  
pp. 18-26
Author(s):  
Imani Mokhtar ◽  
Sharifah Raihan Syed Mohd Zain ◽  
Jarita Duasa ◽  
Azhar Mohamad
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Performance Measure ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Regulatory Bodies ◽  
Investment Portfolios

This study enhances the corporate governance literature by investigating the influence of blockholders on firm performance. Employing panel data estimations, this study works on a sample of 526 non-financial listed firms in Malaysia from 2006 to 2015. Overall, our findings reveal that firm performance is negatively associated with blockholders presence but positively related to blockholders total ownership concentration. Further examinations reveal that identity of blockholders matters in influencing performance of the firm. We also found that board governance mechanisms particularly independent directors and CEO duality play a significant monitoring role in relation to firm performance. More importantly, our findings are robust to a wide variety of performance measure which includes accounting, market and value based measures. Finally, findings of our study could facilitate the regulatory bodies and firm managers in promoting better and effective corporate governance in Malaysia. Investors may also benefit from our findings in understanding corporate governance of Malaysian firms and thus diversify their investment portfolios.

scholarly journals Ownership structure and performance: A comparison of different corporate governance systems

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 76-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto de Miguel Hidalgo ◽  
Julio Pindado ◽  
Chabela de la Torre
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
Insider Ownership ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
The World ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Relationship

This paper analyses how the main institutional factors characterizing corporate governance systems around the world affect the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Our analysis gives rise to the following remarks. First, ownership concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as investor protection, development of capital markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and effectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and performance is not directly affected by these institutional factors. Third, there is, however, a direct influence of corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and performance.

scholarly journals Earnings management, corporate governance, and ownership structure of Philippine initial public offerings

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Angelo O. Burdeos
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Public Offerings

Prior studies examined the effect of corporate governance variables on discretionary current accrual, the most widely used measurement of earnings management. The principal-agent conflict implies that the size of the board, the percent of independent directors, CEO duality, and auditor prestige limit discretionary current accruals (DCA). This paper extends past studies by examining the effect of ownership structure on discretionary current accruals. The study determines the level of income-increasing earnings management of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Philippines and the factors that explain it. Particularly, the paper examines the effect of ownership concentration and largest shareholder ownership on discretionary current accruals. The study uses a final sample of 105 IPO firms in Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) from 2008 to 2018. Employing the modified Jones’s (1991) model to measure discretionary current accrual and multiple regression analysis, the study finds -4.19% discretionary current accrual on the average. It also reveals that the 2002 Philippine Code of Corporate Governance (PCCG) is ineffective in curbing earnings management. In addition, there is an insignificant relationship between the size of the board, CEO duality, ownership concentration, largest shareholder ownership and auditor prestige, and earnings management. Furthermore, the paper finds a significant relationship between the percent of independent directors, industry sector, return on assets (ROA) and cash flow from operations and earnings management.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance: Analysis of Nigeria Stock Exchange Listed Companies

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Olajide Solomon Fadun
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Performance Variables ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
And Performance

<p><em>Corporate governance is relevant in both developed and emerging economies. The study investigated the impact of corporate governance on organisational performance, using thirty (30) randomly selected listed companies in the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) in the year 2016. The study focused on three corporate governance variables (i.e., Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Duality/Tenure); and two performance variables - i.e., Returns on Asset (ROA) and Returns on Equity (ROE). The study does not cover the market measure performance variable of Tobin’s Q. The study is an empirical research, with analytical research design. Secondary data, extracted from published annual reports of selected quoted companies and NSE website, is used for the study. The findings revealed a positive correlation between board size, independence directors, and performance variables; but, showed a negative correlation between CEO tenure and performance variables. The result showed that number of directors was not positively related to performance in selected quoted companies in terms of ROA; but, it revealed a positive correlation between board size and performance in terms of ROE. It also showed that the correlation between CEO tenure and performance variables was negative on the two performance variables (ROA and ROE). Regarding relationship between CEO Duality and performance variables (ROA and ROE), the result showed that CEO Duality has a positive correlation with ROA; but had a negative relationship with ROE. Generally, the study revealed that adoption of sound corporate governance practices by listed companies can improve their performance. Companies can benefit from this improved corporate governance practices by way of increased investment from investors and reduced capital cost. Shareholders confidence would be enhanced with attendant improvement in shareholders wealth. The nation’s economy would also benefit from sound corporate governance practices by way of improved GDP. </em></p>

scholarly journals The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy: An Application in Vietnam Stock Exchange

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-146
Author(s):  
Thi Xuan Anh Tran ◽  
Quoc Tuan Le
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
H Index ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Ownership Composition ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract This research examines the possible association between ownership structure and Vietnam listed companies’ dividend payout policy over the period of 2009 – 2015. We have investigated 642 listed firms in Hochiminh stock exchange and Hanoi stock exchange, using pannel data analysis. Ownership structure is described with two main sub-variables: ownership concentration and ownership composition. Specifically, the Herfindahl index (or H-index) was applied to measure the level of ownership concentration /dispersion for all major shareholders in the company, including the five biggest investors, corporate institutional investors, the ownership concentration level, and foreign investors. It has been observed that the H-index of all major shareholders has an average of less than 0.5 but the value of the H-index of institutional investors at 0.594 indicates that institutional investors are more likely to be concentrated in the hands of large institutional investors. The result showed linear relationship between institutional ownership and the dividend rate, but not statistically significant for the relationship between managerial ownership and dividend payout ratio.

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