Evidence and Proof: Trends in the Imporvment Oґf the Criminal Procedural Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-140
Author(s):  
V. V. ROZHNOVA
Author(s):  
Paul Roberts

Civil procedure has been the primary focus of Adrian Zuckerman’s evidentiary scholarship in recent decades. In contributing to a celebration of his profound and lasting influence on the procedural law and scholarship of England and Wales, this essay concentrates on Zuckerman’s earlier work primarily addressing criminal evidence and procedure. It identifies and elaborates on three particularly significant conceptual innovations in Zuckerman’s evidentiary writings concerning the (1) disciplinary domain; (2) institutional context(s); and (3) normative sources of evidence law. These conceptual advances are expounded in terms of three correlative dynamic disciplinary and institutional transitions: (1) from ‘Law of Evidence’ to ‘Evidence and Proof’; (2) from transubstantivity to procedural differentiation; and (3) from evidentiary rules to principled discretion. In his ground-breaking work on the principles of criminal evidence, I argue, Zuckerman challenged us to rethink the disciplinary contours, normative foundations and jurisprudential methodologies of common law evidence. Against the prevailing common law orthodoxy of a Thayerite model of generic exclusionary rules, Zuckerman insisted that criminal evidence should be reconceptualized as the practical wisdom of principled discretion rooted in the normative values and objectives of penal justice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 237-250
Author(s):  
Bernadette M Waluyo

The Indonesian Supreme Court, in response to the information era, modernizes the civil procedural rules at the district court level.  This is done by issuing Supreme Court Regulation no. 1 of 2019 re. Administration of Justice at Civil Law Courts and Electronic-Court Proceedings. Undoubtedly, modernization of existing rules on the administration of justice is much needed.  On the other hand, these changes may violate a number of procedural civil law principles.  The author argues, from a civil procedural law perspective, that the above Supreme Court regulation violates the basic principle of transparency of court proceedings and physical attendance at court proceedings. 


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fawzia Cassim ◽  
Nomulelo Queen Mabeka

Civil procedure enforces the rules and provisions of civil law.  The law of civil procedure involves the issuing, service and filing of documents to initiate court proceedings in the superior courts and lower courts. Indeed, notice of legal proceedings is given to every person to ensure compliance with the audi alteram partem maxim (“hear the other side”). There are various rules and legislation that regulate these court proceedings such as inter alia, the Superior Courts Act, 2013, Uniform Rules of Court, Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act, 2012 and the Magistrates’ Courts Act of 1944. The rules of court are binding on a court by virtue of their nature.  The purpose of these rules is to facilitate inexpensive and efficient legislation. However, civil procedure does not only depend on statutory provisions and the rules of court.  Common law also plays a role. Superior Courts are said to exercise inherent jurisdiction in that its jurisdiction is derived from common law.  It is noteworthy that whilst our rules of court and statutes are largely based on the English law, Roman-Dutch law also has an impact on our procedural law. The question thus arises, how can our law of civil procedure transform to accommodate elements of Africanisation as we are part and parcel of the African continent/diaspora? In this regard, the article examines the origins of Western-based civil procedure, our formal court systems, the impact of the Constitution on traditional civil procedure, the use of dispute resolution mechanisms in Western legal systems and African culture, an overview of the Traditional Courts Bill of 2012 and the advent of the Traditional Courts Bill of 2017. The article also examines how the contentious Traditional Courts Bills of 2012 and 2017 will transform or complement the law of civil procedure and apply in practice once it is passed into law.


Author(s):  
Mariia Sirotkina ◽  

The article is turned out to a scientific search for the concept of "a reconciliation agreement between the victim and the suspect or accused" through the study of the essence of reconciliation and role in criminal proceedings thereof. The author notes that criminal procedural law (until 2012) had been proclaimed another approach to reconciliation between victim and suspect, not involved a dispute procedure as a conflict, the result of which can be reached by compromise and understanding through reconciliation. It is stated that one of the ways to resolve the legal conflict in committing a criminal offense was the opportunity to reach a compromise between the victim and the suspect (the accused) by concluding a reconciliation agreement between them, provided by the Code of Сriminal Procedure of Ukraine (2012). The main attention is placed on the shortcoming of the domestic criminal procedure law which is the lack of the concept of "a reconciliation agreement between the victim and the suspect or the accused", which can be eliminated only through examining the essence or legal nature of reconciliation in criminal proceedings. Taking into consideration the current legislation and modern views on the institution of reconciliation in criminal proceedings, the author's definition of the concept of "a reconciliation agreement" is proposed. Thus, “The conciliation agreement is an agreement in criminal proceedings concluded between the victim and the suspect or the accused person on their own initiative in relation to crimes of minor or medium gravity and in criminal proceedings in the form of private prosecution, the subject of which is the compensation of harm caused by wrongdoing or committing other actions not related to compensation for the damage that the suspect or the accused is obliged to commit in favor of the victim, in exchange for an agreed punishment and sentencing thereof or sentencing thereof and relief from serving a sentence with probation, as well as the statutory consequences of conclusion and approval of the agreement".


Author(s):  
Detlef Liebs

Abstract Four kinds of Romans in the Frankish kingdoms in the 6th to 8th centuries. Roman law texts from Merowingian Gaul make a difference between cives Romani, Latini and dediticii, all considered as Romans. This difference mattered only to slaves who had been freed. The status of Latin and dediticius was hereditary, whereas the descendants of one who had been freed as civis Romanus were free born Romans, who should be classified as a proper, a fourth kind of beeing Roman; it was the standard kind. The difference was important in civil law, procedural law and criminal law, especially in wergeld, the sum to be payed for expiation when somebody had been killed: Who had killed a Roman, had to pay different sums according to the status of the killed.


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