scholarly journals GLOSSARY TO THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTISE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION C-638/16 X AND X V ÉTAT BELGE

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-133
Author(s):  
Aliaksei Shulha

The subject of the glossary is to consider certain aspects concerning issuing of humanitarian visas . Its aim is to demonstrate the need for humanitarian visas in order to allow individuals to cross the external borders of the European Union in hopes of protection in one of its Member States . The prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment derives from the European Union and inter-national law . It confirms the importance of granting international protection to foreigners and accessibility to this procedure . This article is generally based on the Advocate General’s opinion and the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C-638/16 X and X v État belge . It is also noted that the Court did not comply with the recommendations of the Advocate General . The arguments used in this article are to show that people in need of international protection should be able to apply for a humanitarian visa under European Union and international law

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 24-36
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt

Abstract The present paper presents the obligation that courts in the member states of the European Union have to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with a focus on courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. The paper starts by presenting the applicable framework regarding the preliminary reference procedure, then focuses on analyzing the exceptions to national court’s duty under article 267 TFEU, with a focus on the direction in which the case law is heading based on the most recent judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2015, finally presenting the author’s conclusions and observation on the subject.


Author(s):  
Winfried Tilmann

Union law is mentioned in the first position in lit a of para 1. When is the UPC required to apply Union law? The UPC was established by the UPCA which is a piece of international law and is not part of Union law. That makes the UPC an international court. However, the Member States established it—at the level of international law—as a court common to them which, pursuant to Arts 1(2) and 21 UPCA, is part of their respective national judicial systems. As part of the judicial system (Art 21 UPCA) of the CMSs—by an order under international law—and by reason of an express provision in Art 20 UPCA, the Court fulfils the obligation of the CMSs to apply Union law. Since the Court is a ‘court common to a number of Member States’, ‘it is situated within the judicial system of the European Union’, which is why ‘its decisions’ are subject to ‘mechanisms capable of ensuring the full effectiveness of Union law’. This wording—used in Opinion C-1/09 of the Court of Justice with reference to the Benelux Court of Justice—is also appropriate with reference to the UPC. Although it is integrated into the judicial systems of the Member States in a different way compared with the Benelux Court of Justice, it is a ‘court common to the Member States’, and it is only based on that connecting factor that the Benelux Court of Justice is ‘situated within the judicial system of the European Union’. The ‘mechanisms capable’ are expressly confirmed in Arts 21–23 UPCA.


Author(s):  
Yumiko Nakanishi

Article 13 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) explicitly provides for animal welfare. Animals are sentient beings, and thus the EU and Member States have an obligation to take animal welfare into consideration. At the same time, Article 10(1) of the Charter guarantees freedom of religion. Case C-336/19 Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België dealt with the balance between animal welfare and freedom of religion. Regulation 1099/2009 stipulates that animals must be protected at the time of killing and established the principle of prior stunning in slaughter. Ritual slaughter based on religion is accepted as a derogation of this principle. In the Centraal case, which is pivotal in the context of ritual slaughter, the opinion of Advocate General Hogan and the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union were divided over the interpretation of the contested regulation. Ultimately, the Court demonstrated a definite preference for animal welfare over freedom of religion. In so doing, the Court attached a high value to national legislative competence and in paying attention to changes in society to ensure that citizens are increasingly aware of animal welfare.


Author(s):  
Miroslav Slašťan

Within the context of the subject of the Private International Law Section, the contribution identifies selected recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which indicate further developments in this area of law. The contribution will focus on the provisions for determining international jurisdiction as well as the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions.


elni Review ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 2-6
Author(s):  
Ludwig Krämer

The question, whether or not plants that were obtained by genome editing are covered by Directive 2001/181 is at present the subject of proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In this case, Advocate General (AG) Bobek has just issued his Opinion. He concluded that such plants are exempted from the provisions of the Directive, as genome editing is a form of mutagenesis, so that the exemption of Art. 3(1) of the Directive, read in conjunction with its Annex I B, applied. The application of the precautionary principle does not lead, in his opinion, to a different result. The Opinion of the AG is not binding for the CJEU. However, it has a considerable weight, as it is the first factual and legal analysis of the case made by someone else than one of the Parties, and as the AG is an eminent lawyer with a rich professional experience and who is in rank equal to a judge at the CJEU. This contribution argues that the Opinion of the AG comes to conclusions which are contrary to the wording and the purpose of Directive 2001/18, and that genome editing must be understood as being covered by the provisions of that Directive.


Author(s):  
M. Montanarini

Imports of goods at less than an average market price can be very harmful to fair competition and to the economies of the importing Country. The European Union has established since 2016 a standard set of regulations for its member states in order to identify dumped imported goods and apply duties to redress the situation. People Republic of China, due to its importance as exporter of goods in the European Union, at a price liable to be defined as “dumped” has been the subject of the overwhelming majority of duties leveled at dumped imports. Such a conflicting situations can be solved either applying standard international law negotiations and agreements, either making recourse to the tools offered by European Union’s regulation from the affected companies exporting goods to European Union’s member states.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (2) ◽  
pp. 410-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph W. Herrmann

In the judgment Pringle v. Ireland, the full Court of Justice of the European Union (Court or ECJ) upheld the validity of the decision of the European Council enabling the simplified amendment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union(TFEU). In its Decision 2011/199/EU, the Council had provided for the establishment of a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) by those member states of the European Union (Union or EU) that had adopted the euroas their common currency and legal tender. The Court also found in this judgment that those member states had not violated EU law by negotiating and concluding the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty). The Court based the latter finding on the long-awaited clarification of the scope and content of the TFEU’s “no-bailout clause” (Art. 125(1)), which had been the subject of intense controversies among legal scholars, in particular in Germany.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 697-721
Author(s):  
Iyiola Solanke

AbstractThe Advocate General (AG) has been a permanent feature of the European Union judicial order since 1957. From two Advocates General (AGs) in a Community of six Member States and Court of seven judges, their number has risen to eight in a Union of 27 Member States, three courts and 61 judges. Their task under the Treaty has remained the same, as has their mode of recruitment. The Lisbon Treaty has, however, assigned a new task to the collective judiciary of the Union—under Article 13 TEU, it is to ‘serve’ the citizens of the EU. What does this mean, and in particular what does it mean for the AG—has the task of these non-decision making officers also changed? This chapter suggests that the objective of this new duty is to manufacture trust in the Court of Justice and argues that this requires more transparency at the CJEU and thus a new role for the Advocate General.


Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

The European Union was born as an international organization. The 1957 Treaty of Rome formed part of international law, although the European Court of Justice was eager to emphasize that the Union constitutes “a new legal order” of international law. With time, this new legal order has indeed evolved into a true “federation of States.” Yet how would the foreign affairs powers of this new supranational entity be divided? Would the European Union gradually replace the member states, or would it preserve their distinct and diverse foreign affairs voices? In the past sixty years, the Union has indeed significantly sharpened its foreign affairs powers. While still based on the idea that it has no plenary power, the Union’s external competences have expanded dramatically, and today it is hard to identify a nucleus of exclusive foreign affairs powers reserved for the member states. And in contrast to a classic international law perspective, the Union’s member states only enjoy limited treaty-making powers under European law. Their foreign affairs powers are limited by the exclusive powers of the Union, and they may be preempted through European legislation. There are, however, moments when both the Union and its states enjoy overlapping foreign affairs powers. For these situations, the Union legal order has devised a number of cooperative mechanisms to safeguard a degree of “unity” in the external actions of the Union. Mixed agreements constitute an international mechanism that brings the Union and the member states to the same negotiating table. The second constitutional device is internal to the Union legal order: the duty of cooperation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


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