Case C-336/19 Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België: Animal welfare and freedom of religion

Author(s):  
Yumiko Nakanishi

Article 13 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) explicitly provides for animal welfare. Animals are sentient beings, and thus the EU and Member States have an obligation to take animal welfare into consideration. At the same time, Article 10(1) of the Charter guarantees freedom of religion. Case C-336/19 Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België dealt with the balance between animal welfare and freedom of religion. Regulation 1099/2009 stipulates that animals must be protected at the time of killing and established the principle of prior stunning in slaughter. Ritual slaughter based on religion is accepted as a derogation of this principle. In the Centraal case, which is pivotal in the context of ritual slaughter, the opinion of Advocate General Hogan and the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union were divided over the interpretation of the contested regulation. Ultimately, the Court demonstrated a definite preference for animal welfare over freedom of religion. In so doing, the Court attached a high value to national legislative competence and in paying attention to changes in society to ensure that citizens are increasingly aware of animal welfare.

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 697-721
Author(s):  
Iyiola Solanke

AbstractThe Advocate General (AG) has been a permanent feature of the European Union judicial order since 1957. From two Advocates General (AGs) in a Community of six Member States and Court of seven judges, their number has risen to eight in a Union of 27 Member States, three courts and 61 judges. Their task under the Treaty has remained the same, as has their mode of recruitment. The Lisbon Treaty has, however, assigned a new task to the collective judiciary of the Union—under Article 13 TEU, it is to ‘serve’ the citizens of the EU. What does this mean, and in particular what does it mean for the AG—has the task of these non-decision making officers also changed? This chapter suggests that the objective of this new duty is to manufacture trust in the Court of Justice and argues that this requires more transparency at the CJEU and thus a new role for the Advocate General.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-32
Author(s):  
Rumiana Yotova

ON 16 May 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its Opinion 2/15 concerning the competence of the EU to conclude the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore (EUSFTA) (ECLI:EU:C:2017:376). The Opinion was requested by the Commission which argued, with the support of the European Parliament (EP), that the EU had exclusive competence to conclude the EUSFTA. The Council and 25 of the Member States countered that the EUSFTA should be concluded as a mixed agreement – that is, by the EU and each of its members – because some of its provisions fell under the shared competence of the organisation or the competence of the Member States alone.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 472-486
Author(s):  
Elizaveta Samoilova

Abstract With all eyes on the recent global COVID-19 pandemic, another pandemic has been growing in the shadows: violence against women. The Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention creates a legal framework in order to protect women against all forms of violence. Its ratification process, however, has faced considerable challenges, particularly in the Central and Eastern European Member States. This article discusses the basic elements of the Istanbul Convention, reflects on the ratification process in the EU and its Member States, and sets out the main legal issues raised in the European Parliament’s request for an opinion (A-1/19 of 22 November 2019) to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Special focus is put on the choice of the correct EU legal basis and the practices of ‘splitting’ and ‘common accord’. This article argues that the European Parliament’s request for an opinion provides the perfect opportunity for the Court of Justice of the European Union to further clarify the law and the practice of concluding mixed agreements by the EU and its Member States.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 694-707
Author(s):  
Justine N. Stefanelli

In its preliminary ruling in Haqbin, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) ruled for the first time on whether the EU Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33 (RCD) prohibits Member States from withdrawing material reception conditions in the event of a breach of the rules of accommodation centers, or in the context of violent behavior within those centers. In holding in the negative, the CJEU affirmed the important role played by fundamental rights in the EU's asylum system.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. Article 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) governs compensation against the EU. It leaves the Court of Justice of the European Union with considerable room for interpretation, and directs it to consider the general principles common to the laws of the Member States. The key issue is the test for liability where losses are caused by EU acts that are illegal. The Court has fashioned different tests for cases where the challenged act is of a discretionary nature and for those where it is not. This chapter discusses the application of Article 340 in relation to discretionary and non-discretionary EU acts, official acts of Union servants, valid legislative acts, causation and damage, joint liability for the EU and Member States, contractual liability, and restitution.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


Lex Russica ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 112-129
Author(s):  
A. O. Chetverikov

In recent years, Russia has invested significant assets in unique scientific facility of the “Megascience” class that are being built or are already operating on the territory of foreign countries, mainly member states of the European Union: the International Thermonuclear Research Reactor-ITER (France), the European X-ray Free Electron Laser-European XFEL, the Large Hadron Collider (Switzerland and France), etc.How reliable and safe are such investments in the context of the sanctions policy of the West, including the EU, against our country? To what extent are they protected by the principle of immunity of states and international organizations, which is generally recognized, but is not interpreted and applied in different legal systems? The paper considers these issues in the context of the development of the judicial practice of the supranational institution of the judicial power of the EU, namely the Court of Justice of the European Union and the concept of relative immunity (immunité relative) formulated herein.Having conducted a comparative legal review of the current state of the sources of law and doctrine on the issues of immunity of states and international organizations, the author analyses and evaluates the decisions of the EU Court of Justice and the legal positions of its attorneys General: — Mahamdia v. Algeria, 2012: for the first time ECJ formulates the concept of relative immunity in relation to states;— "Rina" and "Suprim" cases, 2020: EU Court clarifies the interpretation of the concept of acta iure imperii (acts of public authority), in respect of which states retain immunity in the EU, and extends its concept of relative immunity to international intergovernmental organizations.The final section deals with legal issues that yet to get a clear answer in the practice of the EU Court of Justice. In this regard, the author highlights possible directions of its evolution, and studies other recent decisions of the EU Court of Justice that may affect Russia’s national interests in the context of cooperation with EU member states in the scientific and technical sphere, including megascience, and in other areas.


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