Study on longitudinal emission reduction investment of supply chain and government’s subsidy policy

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 1177-1186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youdong Li ◽  
Xinpeng Xie ◽  
Quansheng Liu
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shan Yu ◽  
Qiang Hou ◽  
Jiayi Sun

Climate change and greenhouse gas emission reduction have become common concerns. Carbon trading systems and low-carbon cost subsidies are important emission reduction measures. Impacts of a combination of the two policies on micro-supply chain emission-reduction technology investment have become a focal research area. This paper: (1) constructs an investment game model based on cost-sharing coordination under a cost subsidy between manufacturers and retailers; (2) examines the equilibrium strategy and optimal results according to the interests and game relationships of each stakeholder; and (3) explores the effectiveness of supply chain enterprise behavior based on cost-sharing coordination under the cost subsidy. This paper uses a numerical simulation method to compare the path evolution under different scenarios and to analyze the sensitivity of parameters, identifying the influence of various parameters on the general structure and pathways. The study finds that the cost subsidy policy has a regulatory effect on enterprise emission reduction investment and enterprise profit under a carbon trading system, and the difference caused by the regulation effect is enhanced over time. The study also shows that the dynamic path of each parameter strengthens over time.


Kybernetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 252-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Hou ◽  
Jiayi Sun

Purpose The authors consider a dynamic emission-reduction technology investment decision-making problem for an emission-dependent dyadic supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer under subsidy policy for carbon emission reduction. The consumers are assumed to prefer to low-carbon products and formulate a supply chain optimal control problem. Design/methodology/approach The authors adopt differential game to analyze investment strategies of cost subsidy coefficient with respect to vertical incentive of a manufacturer and a retailer. A comparison analysis under four different decision-making situations, including decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, maximizing social welfare, is obtained. Findings The results show that the economic benefit and environmental pressure have a win–win performance in centralized decision-making. In four different game models, equilibrium strategies, profits and social welfare show changing diversity and have a consistent development trend as time goes on. Research limitations/implications The authors estimate the demand function is a linear function in this paper. According to the consumers’ preference to low-carbon products, consumer’s awareness meets the law of diminishing marginal utility like advertising goodwill accumulation. The carbon-sensitive coefficient might be a quadratic expression, which will complicate the problem and be consistent with reality. Practical implications It captures that there is a necessity to strengthen cooperation and exchange of carbon emission technology among the enterprises by simulation of different decision-makings when government granted cost subsidy. Social implications The results provide significant guidelines for the supply chain to make decision-makings of emission-reduction technology investment and relevant government departments to determine emission subsidies costs. Originality/value An endogenous subsidies coefficient is produced by the social welfare function. Distinguished from previous study, it also considered the influences of carbon emission trade policy and consumer preference.


2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Huimin Li ◽  
Yongchao Cao ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Yunlong Ran

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.


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