scholarly journals THE CORRELATION BETWEEN LIFE IMPRISONMENT UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE OF UKRAINE AND THE RIGHT TO HOPE IN THE PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Author(s):  
N.V. Shulzhenko ◽  
V.V. Matviienko
Author(s):  
Anatoliy Chernenko ◽  
Anatoliy Shyyan

The article examines the issues of ensuring the right of convicts to life imprisonment in Ukraine to parole from serving a sentence or replacing the unserved part of the sentence with a milder one. The norms of the Criminal Code, other legislative acts of Ukraine governing this issue, as well as the Regulation on the procedure for pardon approved by decree of the President of Ukraine No. 223/2015 of April 21, 2015 are analyzed. They are compared with international legal acts, in particular, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, which governs the conditional release of life-sentenced prisoners or replaces the unserved part of the sentence with a milder one, as well as several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding such issues. The inconsistency of Ukrainian legislation, the Regulation on the procedure for pardoning international law and the decisions of the ECHR is shown. Particular attention is paid to the decision of the ECHR in the case of “Roosters v. Ukraine” of March 12, 2019, as well as future decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the Supreme Court, which are currently considering this issue. Considering the provisions expressed by the ECHR in this case, it is concluded that the current mechanism for such exemption does not comply with international standards and this entails the need to consolidate the relevant legal norms in Ukrainian legislation. The problematic aspects of the implementation of such a right are analyzed, some suggestions are made for their solution.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Mei Susanto ◽  
Ajie Ramdan

ABSTRAKPutusan Nomor 2-3/PUU-V/2007 selain menjadi dasar konstitusionalitas pidana mati, juga memberikan jalan tengah (moderasi) terhadap perdebatan antara kelompok yang ingin mempertahankan (retensionis) dan yang ingin menghapus (abolisionis) pidana mati. Permasalahan dalam penelitian ini adalah bagaimana kebijakan moderasi pidana mati dalam putusan a quo dikaitkan dengan teori pemidanaan dan hak asasi manusia dan bagaimana kebijakan moderasi pidana mati dalam RKUHP tahun 2015 dikaitkan dengan putusan a quo. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian doktrinal, dengan menggunakan bahan hukum primer dan sekunder, berupa peraturan perundang-undangan, literatur, dan hasil-hasil penelitian yang relevan dengan objek penelitian. Penelitian menyimpulkan, pertama, putusan a quo yang memuat kebijakan moderasi pidana mati telah sesuai dengan teori pemidanaan khususnya teori integratif dan teori hak asasi manusia di Indonesia di mana hak hidup tetap dibatasi oleh kewajiban asasi yang diatur dengan undang-undang. Kedua, model kebijakan moderasi pidana mati dalam RKUHP tahun 2015 beberapa di antaranya telah mengakomodasi amanat putusan a quo, seperti penentuan pidana mati di luar pidana pokok, penundaan pidana mati, kemungkinan pengubahan pidana mati menjadi pidana seumur hidup atau penjara paling lama 20 tahun. Selain itu masih menimbulkan persoalan berkaitan dengan lembaga yang memberikan pengubahan pidana mati, persoalan grasi, lamanya penundaan pelaksanaan pidana mati, dan jenis pidana apa saja yang dapat diancamkan pidana mati.Kata kunci: kebijakan, KUHP, moderasi, pidana mati. ABSTRACTConstitutional Court’s Decision Number 2-3/PUU-V/2007, in addition to being the basis of the constitutionality of capital punishment, also provides a moderate way of arguing between retentionist groups and those wishing to abolish the death penalty (abolitionist). The problem in this research is how the moderation policy of capital punishment in aquo decision is associated with the theory of punishment and human rights and how the moderation policy of capital punishment in the draft Criminal Code of 2015 (RKUHP) is related with the a quo decision. This study is doctrinal, using primary and secondary legal materials, in the form of legislation, literature and research results that are relevant to the object of analysis. This study concludes, firstly, the aquo decision containing the moderation policy of capital punishment has been in accordance with the theory of punishment, specificallyy the integrative theory and the theory of human rights in Indonesia, in which the right to life remains limited by the fundamental obligations set forth in the law. Secondly, some of the modes of moderation model of capital punishment in RKUHP of 2015 have accommodated the mandate of aquo decision, such as the determination of capital punishment outside the main punishment, postponement of capital punishment, the possibility of converting capital punishment to life imprisonment or imprisonment of 20 years. In addition, it still raises issues regarding the institutions that provide for conversion of capital punishment, pardon matters, length of delay in the execution of capital punishment, and any types of crime punishable by capital punishment. Keywords: policy, criminal code, moderation, capital punishment.


Global Jurist ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Galliani

AbstractLife Imprisonment, unlike the death penalty, does not attract the attention of the doctrine. There are, however, significant developments in the European Court of Human Rights case law. In this paper, using a comparative methodology, we highlight the standard that, at international level, allows to consider Life Imprisonment compatible with human dignity-that is the right to a substantial judicial review. It is no longer acceptable that the ‘last word’ on the lifers’ early release is still entrusted to political power.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakob Pichon

In the July 8, 2004 case of Vo v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) dealt with the question of whether the embryo/fetus (“the fetus”) enjoys the protection of the right to life provided by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”). Below, a pregnant woman lost her fetus due to an error made by the attending doctor, and the Cour de Cassation, the French court of last instance, acquitted the doctor of involuntary homicide on the grounds that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the French Criminal Code. Claiming a violation of her child's right to life within the meaning of the Convention, the woman appealed to the ECtHR. The ECtHR left open the question whether or not a fetus falls within the scope of Article 2; declaring that, even assuming Article 2 was applicable to a fetus, there had been no failure by France to comply with its obligations under Article 2, because the ECtHR deemed the institution of criminal proceedings unnecessary. Rather, it considered the possibility for the applicant to bring an action for damages as sufficient and therefore found that there had been no violation of the fetus's right to life.


Author(s):  
Dzhuzha О. M. ◽  
◽  
Melnychenko І. P. ◽  

The article provides a legal analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in such cases like “Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom”, “Hutchinson v. The United Kingdom”. The European Court of Human Rights has established key standards for those sentenced to life imprisonment, compliance with which will ensure that this type of punishment meets the requirements of the Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such standards are: 1) sentencing of life imprisonment is not prohibited and does not conflict with the Article 3 or any other article of the Convention. The imposition of “non-reducible” life imprisonment may raise questions of compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention; 2) in decision making whether life imprisonment can be considered as “non-reducible”, it is necessary to establish whether the person convicted to life imprisonment had any prospect of release. If national law provides for the possibility of reviewing life imprisonment regarding its mitigating, reducing, terminating or releasing, this is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of th Article 3 of the Convention; 3) for the purposes of the Article 3 of the Convention it is sufficient that life imprisonment is reducible de jure and de facto; 4) European penitentiary policy is currently focusing on the correctional purpose of imprisonment, in particular until the end of long prison sentences; 5) at the very beginning of the sentence a person convicted to life imprisonment has the right to know what he must do to consider the possibility of his release and under what conditions the sentence will be reviewed or also in what order a request to this may be made; 6) if domestic law does not provide for any mechanism or possibility to review life imprisonment, then the non-compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention occurs at the time of imposition of life imprisonment and not at a later stage. The importance of such standards separating of the European Court of Human Rights for the national theory and practice of life imprisonment is that these provisions are effective guidelines for determining the prospects of releasing from sentencing in the form life imprisonment. Key words: European Court of Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, case law, convict, life imprisonment.


2018 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J Novak

AbstractIn June 2016, the Zimbabwe Constitutional Court held that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional, finding that it constituted cruel and degrading punishment and a violation of the right to equal protection under the country's new constitution. The court widely cited international and foreign law to assess global trends on life imprisonment, especially the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The decision illustrates the benefits for human rights advocates of citing international and foreign law in their pleadings, and is an example of “sharing” constitutional jurisprudence across borders and the diffusion of constitutional norms.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 385
Author(s):  
La Sina

The 1945 Constitution of Indonesia provides for rights to life and to remain free from torture that are fundamental human rights that shall not be curtailed under any circumstance. Since 1945, Indonesia does not regulate the protection of the right of life to the citizens. Until 1946, enacted Law No. 1 of 1946 concerning the Indonesian Criminal Code which in several provisions concerning the death penalty. Death sentences and executions in Indonesia is always debatable. However, it is still implemented and can not be avoided, unless the change of its legal provisions. This study was a normative research or doctrinal research. The results of the study shows that the provisions of death penalty in Indonesia is still enforced because have been regulated in the Criminal Code and several organic laws such as the law of terrorism, narcotics, corruption, and human rights justice. The death penalty is contrary to Article 28I of the 1945 Constitution. It has set the rights to life, so that no one may violate human rights, including the government and the country is not granted the right to revoke rights for every citizen. The Indonesian government should not impose the death penalty contained in the draft new Code, and abolish the death penalty in its organic law that had been imposed on the offenders. Preferably, the death penalty may be replaced by alternative punishment with life imprisonment, a prison within a specified time or according to the judge’s decision.


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