Toward a Global Consensus on Life Imprisonment Without Parole: Transnational Legal Advocates and the Zimbabwe Constitutional Court's Decision in Makoni v Commissioner of Prisons

2018 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J Novak

AbstractIn June 2016, the Zimbabwe Constitutional Court held that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional, finding that it constituted cruel and degrading punishment and a violation of the right to equal protection under the country's new constitution. The court widely cited international and foreign law to assess global trends on life imprisonment, especially the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The decision illustrates the benefits for human rights advocates of citing international and foreign law in their pleadings, and is an example of “sharing” constitutional jurisprudence across borders and the diffusion of constitutional norms.

Author(s):  
Anatoliy Chernenko ◽  
Anatoliy Shyyan

The article examines the issues of ensuring the right of convicts to life imprisonment in Ukraine to parole from serving a sentence or replacing the unserved part of the sentence with a milder one. The norms of the Criminal Code, other legislative acts of Ukraine governing this issue, as well as the Regulation on the procedure for pardon approved by decree of the President of Ukraine No. 223/2015 of April 21, 2015 are analyzed. They are compared with international legal acts, in particular, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, which governs the conditional release of life-sentenced prisoners or replaces the unserved part of the sentence with a milder one, as well as several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding such issues. The inconsistency of Ukrainian legislation, the Regulation on the procedure for pardoning international law and the decisions of the ECHR is shown. Particular attention is paid to the decision of the ECHR in the case of “Roosters v. Ukraine” of March 12, 2019, as well as future decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the Supreme Court, which are currently considering this issue. Considering the provisions expressed by the ECHR in this case, it is concluded that the current mechanism for such exemption does not comply with international standards and this entails the need to consolidate the relevant legal norms in Ukrainian legislation. The problematic aspects of the implementation of such a right are analyzed, some suggestions are made for their solution.


Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  

The article presents the conceptual foundations of bringing judges to civil and legal liability. It was found that the civil and legal liability of judges is one of the types of legal liability of judges. It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine provides for a clearly delineated list of the main cases (grounds) for which the state is liable for damages for damage caused to a legal entity and an individual by illegal actions of a judge as a result of the administration of justice. It has been proved that bringing judges to civil and legal liability, in particular on the basis of the right of recourse, provides for the payment of just compensation in accordance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. It was established that the bringing of judges to civil and legal liability in Ukraine is regulated by such legislative documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Explanatory Note to the European Charter on the Status of Judges (Model Code), the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the procedure for compensation for harm caused to a citizen by illegal actions of bodies carrying out operational-search activities, pre-trial investigation bodies, prosecutors and courts», Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of certain provisions of Article 2, paragraph two of clause II «Final and transitional provisions» of the Law of Ukraine «On measures to legislatively ensure the reform of the pension system», Article 138 of the Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges» (the case on changes in the conditions for the payment of pensions and monthly living known salaries of judges lagging behind in these), the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights».


Pravni zapisi ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 620-644
Author(s):  
Tamás Korhecz

The right to peaceful enjoyment of property is a first-generation human right, protected by the international and domestic law of the highest rank. This is not an absolute right - the European standards of protecting property rights allow possible interferences prescribed by law. The interferences can be made in the public interest but only under the assumption that the proportionality between the public interest and property rights of individuals at stake is established. Forfeiture of undeclared cash the individuals are transferring across state borders, together with imposing fines for a misdemeanor, represent an interference with individuals' property rights. The EU Member States do not share an identical system of sanctions for this petty offense, but there is a tendency of unification related to the monitoring, registering, and sanctioning of undeclared, cross-border, individual cash transfer. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights has established rather precise criteria for distinguishing permitted from unpermitted interferences in cases of undeclared cross-border cash transfers. The Serbian Constitutional Court has been faced with several constitutional complaints regarding alleged unconstitutionally of the imposed security measure amounting to the forfeiture of undeclared cash physically transferred across the state borders. The Constitutional Court has ruled inconsistently on the matter. Although it has regularly referred to the European Court of Human Rights' relevant decisions, it fails to be consistent in following the Strasbourg Court's rulings. In this article, the author has suggested that the legal certainty principle requires the Constitutional Court to consistently interpret the constitutional rights and be systematic in following Strasbourg. Only in this way, the Constitutional Court can help regular courts effectively to harmonize the interpretation and application of laws with the constitutional and international human rights standards regarding property rights.


Global Jurist ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Galliani

AbstractLife Imprisonment, unlike the death penalty, does not attract the attention of the doctrine. There are, however, significant developments in the European Court of Human Rights case law. In this paper, using a comparative methodology, we highlight the standard that, at international level, allows to consider Life Imprisonment compatible with human dignity-that is the right to a substantial judicial review. It is no longer acceptable that the ‘last word’ on the lifers’ early release is still entrusted to political power.


Author(s):  
Silvia DEL SAZ

LABURPENA: Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren jurisprudentziaren ondorioz, Konstituzio Auzitegiak aurreko doktrina zuzendu behar izan du. Horretarako, errugabetasun-presuntziorako eskubidearen irismena zabaldu behar izan du, eta, administrazio-ebazpen zehatzaileetatik eta zigor-epaietatik harago, kalte-ordaina ukatzen duten erabakietara zabaldu du hori, Botere Judizialaren Lege Organikoaren 294. artikuluak eskatzen duen bezalaxe, errugabetasun-presuntzioaren printzipioa ezarri ostean akusatua absolbitu egin den baina delituzko egintzak egon ez zirela frogatu ez den kasuetarako. RESUMEN: Fruto de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, el Tribunal Constitucional se ha visto obligado a rectificar su doctrina anterior extendiendo el alcance del derecho a la presunción de inocencia, más allá de las resoluciones administrativas sancionadoras y sentencias penales, a los pronunciamientos que, tal y como exige el art. 294 LOPJ, deniegan la indemnización en atención a que el acusado fue absuelto en aplicación del principio de presunción de inocencia sin que haya quedado probado que los hechos delictivos no existieron. ABSTRACT: As a result of the case law by the European Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Court was compelled to rectify its former doctrine by broadening the scope of the right to the presumption of innocence beyond punitive administrative resolutions and criminal judgments to rulings that as art. 294 of Judiciary Act requires, deny the award of damages on the ground that the accused was acquitted due to the application of the principle of innocence without having been proved that the criminal offences did not exist.


2021 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 02020
Author(s):  
Maksim Anatolievich Tuliglovich ◽  
Aleksander Vitalievich Shvets ◽  
Nodar Shotaevich Kozaev ◽  
Boris Vasilyevich Epifanov ◽  
Suhrob Saidakhmad Narzullozoda

The existence of life imprisonment in the criminal legislation of Russia is assessed ambiguously both by representatives of Russian science and by foreign analysts. This problem is many-sided and ambiguous in its content. Its solution depends on a large number of variables, sometimes independent of the subject of analysis. These include trends in criminal policy, the state of crime in the state, and the related “punitive claims” of the population. The balance of Domestic and International Interests in ensuring Human Rights is the key idea in analyzing life imprisonment from the perspective of historical viability or reality. The purpose of the research was to clarify the place and role of life imprisonment in the current system of criminal punishment based on the analysis of doctrinal approaches, the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the European Court of Human Rights, and statistical data. The work is based on the use of such general scientific methods of research as dialectical, statistical, comparative-legal and hermeneutic. The above methods are used in interaction to obtain a synergistic effect. In the course of the study, the “deterrent” mechanism of the most severe punishment in the criminal system was found to be sufficient. It is determined that life imprisonment is a necessary measure to ensure social justice, albeit cruel, but appropriate in today’s society.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina Ragone ◽  
Valentina Volpe

This Article analyses, through the lens of comparative law, theOliari and others v. Italyjudgment, which was issued by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in July 2015. TheOliaricase is important for being the first judgment in which the ECtHR established the granting of legal “recognition and protection” to same-sex couples as a positive obligation for the Member States of the Council of Europe on the basis of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In order to understand the role of judicial bodies in the progressive protection of homosexual rights, this Article combines an analysis of European case law with the national perspective. As it concerns the supranational facet, the authors illustrateOliari's reasoning and situate the case in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Elements of both continuity and innovation emerge from the analysis, as well as a relevant dimension of judicial dialogue supporting the incremental recognition of gay rights in Europe. As it concerns the national facet, this specific case was initially dealt with at the domestic level and was the object of judgment 138/2010 by the Italian Constitutional Court. The judgment is critically put into perspective through the examination of the jurisprudence of other European Constitutional Courts (France, Portugal and Spain) that were called on to decide similar cases in the same period. Therefore, the Article offers a comparative analysis of theOliarijudgment clarifying its relevance and speculating on the potential value of this case for the future recognition of the right to a “gay” family life in Europe.


Law and World ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-59

The paper addresses the basic rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of Georgia, in particular, issues related to personal data. The development of information technology has had a significant impact on the dangers of illegal processing of personal data. The European Court of Human Rights considers the inviolability of private life as a precondition for human autonomy, independent development and protection of human dignity. According to the norms of international law, the right to respect for private life is recognized as one of the most important and fundamental rights, the protection of which is indicated by the legislation of Georgia. The aim of the paper is to analyze the legislation and practice of police law in the field of protection of the right to privacy and to offer relevant recommendations, taking into account the standards set by European and national courts. Human rights legislation must ensure the protection of all human beings against the abuse of state power. Interference with rights must be based on the principle of proportionality. The use of policing should not pose an excessive threat of fundamental human rights violations. Interference with a particular right must be done under principle of proportionality to achieve a certain public good. In clarifying the issue of alleged violation of the right, special attention should be paid to the severity and probability of the expected threat to legal good. The Constitution of Georgia, EU and Council of Europe data protection standards, national legislation, as well as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the National Constitutional Court are analyzed around the topic. In addition, the reports of the State Inspector, the Public Defender and the relevant scientific literature are used to study the above issues.


2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Casini

Il contributo prende in esame la sentenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo emanata dalla Grande Camera il 3 novembre 2011 (caso S.H. et Al.v. Austria n. 57813/00). Essa va ad arricchire positivamente il panorama biogiuridico europeo. La sentenza in oggetto riguarda il giudizio instaurato nei confronti dell’Austria, a proposito della disciplina che pone il divieto di fecondazione artificiale eterologa. Nella sentenza, resa in via definitiva, la Grande Camera ha superato, ribaltandolo, il giudizio espresso dalla Camera semplice il 1° aprile 2011, affermando che il divieto di fecondazione artificiale eterologa, contenuto nella legge austriaca, non contrasta con gli artt. 8 (diritto alla vita privata e familiare) e 14 (principio di non discriminazione) della Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti e delle libertà fondamentali. La Corte non affronta le questioni bioetiche e biogiuridiche sollevate dalla fecondazione artificiale eterologa (si pensi al diritto del figlio all’unitarietà delle figure genitoriali), ma salva la legge austriaca facendo riferimento alla dottrina del c.d. “margine di apprezzamento” degli Stati membri. È auspicabile comunque che la sentenza influisca sul giudizio di costituzionalità in ordine al divieto di eterologa contenuto nella legge italiana. Nella prospettiva di valorizzare la voce degli Stati, merita sostegno iniziativa cittadina europea promossa ai sensi dell’art. 11 del Trattato di Lisbona per riconoscere il diritto alla vita di ogni essere umano fin dal concepimento. ---------- The article considers the decision of the European Court of Human Rights given by the Grand Chamber on November 3rd 2011 (case S.H. et Al. vs. Austria, application n. 57181/00). This ruling, which adds an important contribution to European Biolaw, concerns the Austrian law that prohibits heterologous artificial human reproduction and reversed the previous ruling (April, 1st, 2011) by the lower chamber of the European Court. So, the Grand Chamber affirmed that the ban on heterologous artificial reproduction does not violate article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) and article 14 (Prohibition of discrimination) of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Grand Chamber did not address the bioethical questions raised by heterologous artificial reproduction, but confirmed the law by referring to the theory of a “wide margin of appreciation” of member States. It is to be hoped that this decision will carry weight with the Italian Constitutional Court when it considers the Italian law prohibiting heterologous artificial reproduction. With regard to valorizing the beliefs of the member States, it would be good to support the European citizen’s initiative, promoted following article 11 of the Lisbon Treaty, to recognize the right to life of every human being from conception.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document