scholarly journals Pandemics in New South Wales prisons: the more things change…

2021 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Hampton ◽  
Kathryn M Weston ◽  
Louella R McCarthy ◽  
Tobias Mackinnon

Background: The current COVID-19 pandemic is not the first time New South Wales prisons have faced contagion. This paper examines the current responses in New South Wales prisons to the threat of COVID-19 to prisoner health, by contrasting contemporary activities with actions and policy developed during two historical epidemics: the influenza epidemic of 1860 and pandemic of 1919. Method: Epidemiological information relating to cases of disease in NSW prisons during the 1860 and 1919 influenza epidemics was obtained from the Comptroller-General’s reports for the specific outbreak years and for the preceding and succeeding five-year periods. Additional archival sources such as digitised newspaper reports and articles available through the National Library of Australia were analysed for closer detail. The management of these outbreaks was compared to current strategies to mitigate against risk from the COVID-19 pandemic in the NSW prison system. Results: Interesting similarities were discovered in relation to the management of the historic influenza outbreaks in NSW prisons and in the management of the current COVID-19 pandemic. An outbreak of influenza in mid-1860 impacted seven penal institutions in Sydney and Parramatta. Infection rates at these institutions were between 3.1% and 100%; the mean rate was 41.8%. The public health measures employed at the time included allowing ‘air circulation freely night and day’, and treatments that were ‘tonical and stimulatory’. In 1919, the attack rate of influenza infection for Sydney was 358 per 1,000 population, whereas for the two large penitentiaries in Sydney, it was only 26 per 1,000 population. Similarly, the reported death rates were much reduced for prisoners compared to the general community. The recorded measures in 1919 included: disinfecting of the gaol buildings; inoculation (experimental but of no value); the compulsory wearing of masks; the closure of the border between NSW and Victoria; fumigation and inhalation disinfection; daily examination with isolation for symptomatic staff; and quarantine of new arrivals. These are remarkably similar to current strategies. Discussion: While the past 100 or more years have brought huge progress in scientific knowledge, public health approaches remain the mainstay of outbreak management in prisons; and, as in 1919, the opportunity for Australia to observe the rest of the world and plan for action has not been wasted. Prisons pose a potential risk for pandemic spread but they also present a unique opportunity for reducing disease risk by ironic virtue of the ‘separate system’ that was recognised even 100 years ago as characteristic of these institutions.

Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 610
Author(s):  
Dirk H. R. Spennemann

Given its intensity, rapid spread, geographic reach and multiple waves of infections, the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020/21 became a major global disruptor with a truly cross-sectoral impact, surpassing even the 1918/19 influenza epidemic. Public health measures designed to contain the spread of the disease saw the cessation of international travel as well as the establishment of border closures between and within countries. The social and economic impact was considerable. This paper examines the effects of the public health measures of “ring-fencing” and of prolonged closures of the state border between New South Wales and Victoria (Australia), placing the events of 2020/21 into the context of the historic and contemporary trajectories of the border between the two states. It shows that while border closures as public-health measures had occurred in the past, their social and economic impact had been comparatively negligible due to low cross-border community integration. Concerted efforts since the mid-1970s have led to effective and close integration of employment and services, with over a quarter of the resident population of the two border towns commuting daily across the state lines. As a result, border closures and state-based lockdown directives caused significant social disruption and considerable economic cost to families and the community as a whole. One of the lessons of the 2020/21 pandemic will be to either re-evaluate the wisdom of a close social and economic integration of border communities, which would be a backwards step, or to future-proof these communities by developing strategies, effectively public health management plans, to avoid a repeat when the next pandemic strikes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meena Chandra ◽  
Anthea Duri ◽  
Mitchell Smith

The aim of this study is to compare the prevalence of chronic disease risk factors in humanitarian arrivals to Sydney, New South Wales (NSW) with the Australian Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations aged 35–44 years. Data on risk factors collected from 237 refugees presenting to the NSW Refugee Health Service (RHS) from January 2015 to August 2016 were retrospectively analysed and compared with data from the Australian Health Surveys, 2011–13 for the Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australian populations. This study found significantly higher levels of triglycerides (z=3; 95% CI, 0.16–0.26); hypertension (z=3.2; 95% CI, 0.17–0.29); and smoking (z=3.5; 95% CI, 0.27–0.33) in refugees compared with the general Australian population. The Indigenous population had significantly higher levels of triglycerides (z=4; 95% CI, 0.16–0.26); body mass indexes (BMIs) (z=3.3; 95% CI 0.58–0.72); and smoking (z=5.4; 95 CI 0.27–0.33) compared with refugees. Based on the study findings, screening for chronic disease risk factors from age 35 years may be warranted in all humanitarian arrivals to Australia, along with dietary and lifestyle advice.


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