scholarly journals Privatization of Civil Justice: Is it Undermining or Promoting the Rule of Law?

Author(s):  
Tatjana Zoroska Kamilovska

The crisis of civil justice system is present in many countries in the EU and worldwide and it takes different forms. In response, many different pathways are explored in order to overcome not only the growing sense of crisis, but also its manifestations. One of the suggested routes in the ongoing efforts to improve access to civil justice at the EU and national levels is the privatization of justice through the ADR mechanisms. In many areas, with the encouragement and support of governments and other policy-making bodies, the administration of justice is being encouraged to leave the courts for alternative forums. Thereby, the ADR are presented as mechanisms which are facilitating informal, fast, cost-effective and affordable access to justice, at the same time preserving public resources. Yet, in spite of these undeniable benefits, ADR mechanisms are subject of some doubts and expressed concerns. One of the major concerns, which has already sparked a wider debate, is whether the informal and private nature of ADR is hostile to the Rule of Law and ultimately to justice itself. Namely, if the privatization of civil justice is considered in the context of the fundamental public commitment to provide substantive justice on an equal basis to all citizens, the question arises whether the ADR mechanisms are capable to secure and foster the virtues of the Rule of Law (publicity, transparency, fairness, equality, etc.). The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this debate, renewing the interest in analysing the relationship between the privatization of civil justice and the concept of the Rule of Law. In the light of evolving social, economic and political circumstances, the paper attempts to answer the question whether the growing privatized dispute resolution landscape is undermining or promoting the rule of law.

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-94
Author(s):  
Qerim Qerimi

AbstractThis article will seek to operationalize and measure rule of law primarily relying on the “Rule of Law Checklist,” developed by the Venice Commission, composed of the following five elements: (1) Legality; (2) Legal certainty; (3) Prevention of abuse or misuse of powers; (4) Equality before the law and non-discrimination; and (5) Access to Justice. Each of these elements will be operationalized in the context of Kosovo – the leading case study – with an ultimate aim of obtaining an enhanced understanding of the Rule of Law framework and its measurement in transitional contexts more generally. The underlying circumstances of the selected case are defined by an almost unparalleled involvement of the international community, in particular the UN and the EU, which forms a relatively significant part of the observable context.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 134-147

An independent judiciary is the guarantor of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, which we strive to build in Ukraine. This independence is ensured, among other things, by a stable and sufficient funding of the national courts, which has become a significant challenge. The resolution of such issues has been sought in recent decades, but the problem of court financing has become especially acute in the context of the economic crisis and the coronavirus pandemic, which occurred in 2020. This has led to somewhat hopeless feelings about the chosen way of forming the policy of Ukrainian courts financing and its implementation. Our study attempts to analyze certain aspects of the existing mechanism of financing the judiciary in Ukraine, in particular, through the prism of financial support for judges and assistant judges during the coronavirus pandemic. The functions which they perform can be attributed to the main ones during the administration of justice. The authors propose the analysis of the case on the protection of the right of assistant judges to a decent salary, which lasted for years in all courts of the state. In connection with the coronavirus pandemic in Ukraine, a law was passed reducing the salaries of judges, which is also analyzed in the article. The search for a new, more modern approach to resolving the issue of a stable financial independence of the judiciary will help to solve urgent problems and ensure a real rule of law in Ukraine. In particular, our proposed approach to the formation of financial autonomy of the judiciary in Ukraine is suggested in this study. Key words: judiciary, access to justice during pandemic, COVID Justice, financing of the judiciary, independence of the judiciary, financial autonomy of the courts.


2020 ◽  
pp. 34-42
Author(s):  
V.O. Koverznev ◽  
◽  
◽  

Transformation and sustainable development of modern countries is not possible without providing all participants in economic relations with equal access to justice, which should be based on respect for fundamental rights, the Rule of Law, transparent courts and the effective administration of justice, guaranteeing public access to information about activity of commercial courts. The term "access to court" is a complex legal category based on several basic criteria, the simultaneous provision of which guarantees the actual observance of a person's right to access to justice, in particular: 1) financial, which provides for the obligation of the state to establish such an algorithm for determining the amount of court costs, which takes into account the property of the party and does not create obstacles to the exercise of the right to go to court, while acting as a safeguard against abuse of the right to go to; 2) territorial, which provides that the system of courts of general jurisdiction should be built taking into account the territorial structure of the state, with local courts, which consider all cases as courts of first instance, should be territorially as close as possible to the person; 3) organizational — provides for the optimal organization of the judicial system, which should be simple and, at the same time, clear and effective, in the context of access to court and the procedure for protection of individual rights. In addition, both the system of general courts as a whole and each individual court of general jurisdiction must be established and carry out their procedural activities in strict accordance with national law; 4) informational, according to which each state must legislate to inform its citizens and business entities about the procedure for going to court, about the conditions of providing certain categories of socially vulnerable citizens engaged in business activities, professional legal assistance provided by lawyers at the expense of the state, as well as the cur rent procedural rules; 5) procedural, which guarantees the administration of justice on the basis of the Rule of Law, as well as impartiality and impartiality of the court and judges, reasonable timeliness of court proceedings, publicity of proceedings and promulgation of court decisions, proper motivation and justification of court decisions, ensuring effective execution of court decisions and respect for final court decision; 6) quality of legislation, which imposes on the state the obligation to adopt legislation that meets the requirements of accessibility and predictability, so that each person has the opportunity to obtain adequate information about the circumstances of the application of legal norms in a particular case.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Andraž Teršek

Abstract The central objective of the post-socialist European countries which are also Member States of the EU and Council of Europe, as proclaimed and enshrined in their constitutions before their official independence, is the establishment of a democracy based on the rule of law and effective legal protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In this article the author explains what, in his opinion, is the main problem and why these goals are still not sufficiently achieved: the ruthless simplification of the understanding of the social function and functioning of constitutional courts, which is narrow, rigid and holistically focused primarily or exclusively on the question of whether the judges of these courts are “left or right” in purely daily-political sense, and consequently, whether constitutional court decisions are taken (described, understood) as either “left or right” in purely and shallow daily-party-political sense/manner. With nothing else between and no other foundation. The author describes such rhetoric, this kind of superficial labeling/marking, such an approach towards constitutional law-making as a matter of unbearable and unthinking simplicity, and introduces the term A Populist Monster. The reasons that have led to the problem of this kind of populism and its devastating effects on the quality and development of constitutional democracy and the rule of law are analyzed clearly and critically.


Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.


Author(s):  
T. Romanova ◽  
E. Pavlova

The article examines how the normative power, which the EU puts forward as an ideological basis of its actions in the world, manifests itself in the national partnerships for modernization between Russia and EU member states. The authors demonstrate the influence of the EU’s normativity on its approach to modernization as well as the difference in the positions of its member countries. It is concluded that there is no unity in the EU’s approach to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the new classification of EU member states, which is based on their readiness to act in accordance with the Union’s concept of normative power, is offered.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Bárd ◽  
Wouter van Ballegooij

This article discusses the relationship between judicial independence and intra-European Union (EU) cooperation in criminal matters based on the principle of mutual recognition. It focuses on the recent judgment by the Court of Justice of the EU in Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM. In our view, a lack of judicial independence needs to be addressed primarily as a rule of law problem. This implies that executing judicial authorities should freeze judicial cooperation in the event should doubts arise as to respect for the rule of law in the issuing Member State. Such a measure should stay in place until the matter is resolved in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU or a permanent mechanism for monitoring and addressing Member State compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Court, however, constructed the case as a possible violation of the right to a fair trial, the essence of which includes the requirement that tribunals are independent and impartial. This latter aspect could be seen as a positive step forward in the sense that the judicial test developed in the Aranyosi case now includes rule of law considerations with regard to judicial independence. However, the practical hurdles imposed by the Court on the defence in terms of proving such violations and on judicial authorities to accept them in individual cases might amount to two steps back in upholding the rule of law within the EU.


1969 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-261
Author(s):  
William Lucy

After elucidating and defending an account of access to justice that is consistent with most uses of that notion in academic and policy discourse, this essay examines some arguments that attempt to show the value of access to justice. It shows that one such argument (from non-domination) does a better job of illustrating access to justice’s normative significance than two frequently invoked competitors (the arguments from the rule of law and equality). In an era in which access to justice seems genuinely in peril, it is vital to appreciate the normative cost of its restriction or denial.          


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