Unjust History and Its New Reproduction—A Reply to My Critics

Demands calling for reparations for historical injustices—injustices whose original victims and perpetrators are now dead—constitute an important component of contemporary struggles for social and transnational justice. Reparations are only one way in which the unjust past is salient in contemporary politics. In my book, Injustice and the Reproduction of History: Structural Inequalities, Gender and Redress, I put forward a framework to conceptualise the normative significance of the unjust past. In this article, I will engage with the insightful comments and try to address the concerns of the contributors to the symposium on my book. I will discuss (i) whether and in what sense my framework incorporates past-regarding duties, (ii) how it is different from causal interpretations of the relationship between past and present injustice, (iii) whether it can carve out a greater place for blame in our thinking about responsibility for (historical) structural injustice, (iv) whether such a responsibility needs to hinge upon an account of solidarity, and (v) how de-temporalising injustice can cast new light on immigration politics. In particular, I will stress and further clarify the importance that the notion of ‘structural debt’, which my book develops to reflect on historical responsibility, can play in thinking about what is owed to an unjust history.

What Is the New Testament?

This chapter reviews the origin of the term “New Testament” and then surveys the contexts, various literary forms, and contents of its twenty-seven “books.” It also sketches the historical context in which the New Testament writings developed, beginning with the historical, political, and social context of the life and mission of Jesus of Nazareth, and the extension of early Christianity from its original Jewish milieu out into the Gentile world. While the New Testament exhibits great diversity in its literary components and in the variety of the theological perspectives found in its individual writings, the New Testament also finds a unifying factor in its focus on the identity and mission of Jesus and his normative significance for Christian life. This unifying factor is a major reason for considering the New Testament writings “sacred.”

An explanation of the relationship between artificial intelligence and human beings from the perspective of consciousness

What will be the relationship between human beings and artificial intelligence (AI) in the future? Does an AI have moral status? What is that status? Through the analysis of consciousness, we can explain and answer such questions. The moral status of AIs can depend on the development level of AI consciousness. Drawing on the evolution of consciousness in nature, this paper examines several consciousness abilities of AIs, on the basis of which several relationships between AIs and human beings are proposed. The advantages and disadvantages of those relationships can be analysed by referring to classical ethics theories, such as contract theory, utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics. This explanation helps to construct a common hypothesis about the relationship between humans and AIs. Thus, this research has important practical and normative significance for distinguishing the different relationships between humans and AIs.

Structural injustice and the significance of the past

Alasia Nuti's Injustice and the Reproduction of History lays out a brilliant structural injustice approach that incorporates the normative significance of the past. This article will introduce Nuti's framework and critically reflect on its original contributions. First, I will explain how Nuti's structural injustice approach successfully incorporates backward-looking dimensions. Second, I will provide a detailed analysis of Nuti's conception of sexism as a specific type of structural injustice. Finally, I will critically engage with Nuti's idea of structural remedy and explore how her analysis could be extended.

Lower and upper bound estimates of inequality of opportunity for emerging economies

Equality of opportunity is an important normative ideal of distributive justice. In spite of its wide acceptance and economic relevance, standard estimation approaches suffer from data limitations that can lead to both downward and upward biased estimates of inequality of opportunity. These shortcomings may be particularly pronounced for emerging economies in which comprehensive household survey data of sufficient sample size is often unavailable. In this paper, we assess the extent of upward and downward bias in inequality of opportunity estimates for a set of twelve emerging economies. Our findings suggest strongly downward biased estimates of inequality of opportunity in these countries. To the contrary, there is little scope for upward bias. By bounding inequality of opportunity from above, we address recent critiques that worry about the prevalence of downward biased estimates and the ensuing possibility to downplay the normative significance of inequality.

Rational Agency and the Struggle to Believe What Your Reasons Dictate

According to an influential view known as agentialism, our capacity to believe and intend directly on the basis of reasons—our rational agency—has a normative significance that distinguishes it from other kinds of agency. Agentialists maintain that insofar as we exercise rational agency, we bear a special kind of responsibility for our beliefs and intentions, and those attitudes are truly our own. This chapter will challenge these agentialist claims. The argument centers on a case in which a thinker struggles to align her belief to her reasons and succeeds only by resorting to non-rational methods. The chapter argues that she is responsible for the attitude generated by this struggle, that this process expresses her capacities for rationality and agency, and that the belief she eventually arrives at is truly her own. So rational agency is not distinctive in the ways that agentialists contend.

Special Claims from Improvement: A Comment on Armstrong

Chris Armstrong argues that attempts at justifying special claims over natural resources generally take one of two forms: arguments from improvement and arguments from attachment. We argue that Armstrong fails to establish that the distinction between natural resources and improved resources has no normative significance. He succeeds only in showing that ‘improvers’ (whoever they may be) are not necessarily entitled to the full exchange value of the improvement. It can still be argued that the value of natural and improved resources should be distributed on different grounds, but that the value of improvements should be conceived differently.

The Normative Significance of Pragmatic Genealogies

This chapter examines how pragmatic genealogy can affect the space of reasons by addressing four objections to this idea: normatively ambitious genealogies commit the genetic fallacy; if not, they founder on failures of continuity in the conditions securing their normative import; if not, this must be because they deal with universal needs, which severely restricts their explanatory scope; and what counts as a need is anyway eagerly contested. In answering these objections, the chapter shows two ways around the genetic fallacy and addresses the problem of Rortyan irony; it offers a need-satisfaction account of functions or pointfulness and discusses the strategies by which genealogies can secure continuity; it shows that the method is not restricted to explaining anthropological universals and that the state of nature can also be used to model local problems; finally, it explores how genealogies help us navigate contestations of certain needs and conceptions of human agents.

A transnational judicial public sphere as an idea and ideology: Critical reflections on judicial dialogue and its legitimizing potential

This article sheds a critical light on judicial dialogue when its purpose and meaning are taken beyond cross-fertilization and comparative reasoning. It cautions against a conceptualization of judicial dialogue as a means to foster commonalities between courts and to legitimize judicial governance. The argument develops from an idealized notion of a ‘transnational judicial public sphere’. In this sphere, domestic, regional and international courts ideally form common opinions through dialogue and pursue common purposes. The danger of this understanding is to construct a new paradigm that not only overlooks important differences in the interest, influence and opinion of courts, but also overstates the socio-normative significance of exchanges between courts and of judicial governance in general. The critical potential of judicial dialogues lies less in the formation of commonalities or in the legitimization of judicial authority than in bringing alternatives and a plurality of opinions to the fore.