scholarly journals Using the Industry-Based Fama-French Model to Evaluate Industry Portfolios

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Keyword(s):  
2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 110-127
Author(s):  
Abdoulaye Sounaye

Unexpectedly, one of the marking features of democratization in Niger has been the rise of a variety of Islamic discourses. They focus on the separation between religion and the state and, more precisely, the way it is manifested through the French model of laïcité, which democratization has adopted in Niger. For many Muslim actors, laïcité amounts to a marginalization of Islamic values and a negation of Islam. This article present three voices: the Collaborators, the Moderates, and the Despisers. Each represents a trend that seeks to influence the state’s political and ideological makeup. Although the ulama in general remain critical vis-à-vis the state’s political and institutional transformation, not all of them reject the principle of the separation between religion and state. The Collaborators suggest cooperation between the religious authority and the political one, the Moderates insist on the necessity for governance to accommodate the people’s will and visions, and the Despisers reject the underpinning liberalism that voids religious authority and demand a total re-Islamization. I argue that what is at stake here is less the separation between state and religion than the modality of this separation and its impact on religious authority. The targets, tones, and justifications of the discourses I explore are evidence of the limitations of a democratization project grounded in laïcité. Thus in place of a secular democratization, they propose a conservative democracy based on Islam and its demands for the realization of the common good.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 346-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie Dupouy ◽  
Sandy Maumus-Robert ◽  
Yohann Mansiaux ◽  
Antoine Pariente ◽  
Maryse Lapeyre-Mestre

<b><i>Background:</i></b> In France, most patients with opioid use disorder (OUD) have been treated by buprenorphine, prescribed by general practitioners (GP) in private practice since 1996. This has contributed to building a ‘French model’ facilitating access to treatment based on the involvement of GPs in buprenorphine prescription. <b><i>Objectives:</i></b> Our study aimed to assess whether the involvement of primary care in OUD management has changed lately. <b><i>Materials and Methods:</i></b> Using data from the French National Health Insurance database, we conducted a yearly repeated cross-sectional study (2009–2015) and described proportion of opioid maintenance treatment (OMT)-prescribing GPs and OMT-dispensing community pharmacies (CP); and number of patients by GP or CP. <b><i>Results:</i></b> Whereas the number of buprenorphine-prescribing GPs in private practice remained quite stable (decrease of 3%), a substantial decrease in buprenorphine initial prescribers among private GPs was observed. In 2009, 10.3% of private GPs (6,297 from 61,301 French private GPs) prescribed buprenorphine for the initiation of a treatment, whereas they were 5.7% (<i>n</i> = 3,539 from 62,071 private GPs) in 2015 (43.8% decrease). GPs issuing initial prescriptions of buprenorphine tended to care for a higher number of patients treated by buprenorphine (14.6 ± 27.1 patients in 2009 to 16.0 ± 35.4 patients in 2015). The number of CPs dispensing buprenorphine remained quite stable (decrease of 2%), while there was a 7.5% decrease in the total number of French CPs across the study period. <b><i>Conclusions:</i></b> Our results suggest that primary care providers seem less engaged in buprenorphine initiation in OUD patients, while CPs have not modified their involvement towards these patients.


1983 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 507-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brinkley Messick

By resolution of the ruling Command Council on 19 March 1977, a new judicial organization known as the niyāba (formal name: al-niyāba al-'āmma) was introduced in the Yemen Arab Republic. Derived ultimately from a French model, the new institution has been provided with wide statutory powers, many of which are new to Yemen. Essentially, the niyāba is an agency of investigation and prosecution, with jurisdiction in criminal cases and other areas of “public” rights, It has responsibilities also in family law, especially in cases involving the dissolution of marriage and the protection of minors. In addition, the niyāba has authority over the “officials of judicial enforcement,” and it is charged with the oversight of jails. Although the niyāba's institutional ancestry is traceable to the French ministère public (or parquet), the transfer of the European institution to Yemeni soil was not direct, since Yemeni legislators modelled their niyāba on an Egyptian legal organ of the same name. The Egyptian niyāba was instituted in 1876 as a copy of the ministère public, but evolved considerably since its introduction there (Hill, 1979). The arrival of the niyāba in Yemen thus was mediated by an interval of one hundred years of development outside of France.


2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 110-127
Author(s):  
Abdoulaye Sounaye

Unexpectedly, one of the marking features of democratization in Niger has been the rise of a variety of Islamic discourses. They focus on the separation between religion and the state and, more precisely, the way it is manifested through the French model of laïcité, which democratization has adopted in Niger. For many Muslim actors, laïcité amounts to a marginalization of Islamic values and a negation of Islam. This article present three voices: the Collaborators, the Moderates, and the Despisers. Each represents a trend that seeks to influence the state’s political and ideological makeup. Although the ulama in general remain critical vis-à-vis the state’s political and institutional transformation, not all of them reject the principle of the separation between religion and state. The Collaborators suggest cooperation between the religious authority and the political one, the Moderates insist on the necessity for governance to accommodate the people’s will and visions, and the Despisers reject the underpinning liberalism that voids religious authority and demand a total re-Islamization. I argue that what is at stake here is less the separation between state and religion than the modality of this separation and its impact on religious authority. The targets, tones, and justifications of the discourses I explore are evidence of the limitations of a democratization project grounded in laïcité. Thus in place of a secular democratization, they propose a conservative democracy based on Islam and its demands for the realization of the common good.


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