North Korea’s ‘Correlation of Forces (COF)’ and ‘New Defense Strategy’

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 41-76
Author(s):  
Tae-Hyun Kim
Keyword(s):  
Defense Strategy

A DATA DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR MODERN BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-26
Author(s):  
FLORIN OGIGAU NEAMTIU ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Business Environment ◽  
Defense Strategy ◽  
Modern Business

Network attack-defense strategy based on rough Bayesian game

2011 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 784-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun-zi WANG ◽  
Guang-qiu HUANG
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Game ◽  
Network Attack ◽  
Defense Strategy

Risk and the National Defense Strategy

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wally Wininger
Keyword(s):  
National Defense ◽  
Defense Strategy

National Defense Strategy

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARMY AVIATION CENTER AND FORT RUCKER AL
Keyword(s):  
National Defense ◽  
Defense Strategy

Does a Persistent Defense Strategy Pay Off? An Analysis of Insurance Company Defense Expenditures

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Born ◽  
Karen Epermanis ◽  
Kathleen A. McCullough
Keyword(s):  
Insurance Company ◽  
Defense Strategy

Defensive Deterrence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yishai Beer
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Practical Problem ◽  
Strategic Thinking ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Global Security ◽  
Defense Strategy ◽  
Essential Component ◽  
The Law ◽  
Compliance With The Law ◽  
The Military

This chapter deals with the lack of coherency between strategic reality—which uses deterrence as an essential strategic tool—and the prevailing law. Deterrence is a tool for enforcing compliance with the law; it promotes the containment of potential conflicts. It is pivotal in strategic thinking and, in many cases, an essential component of the national-defense strategy of law-abiding states. But although deterrence is central to the management of global security, in current international law deterrence considerations are perceived with suspicion and mistrust. It is perceived as an unlawful punitive measure. The lack of consensus on lawful deterrence, however, might create a vacuum that invites aggressors and transgressors. This chapter offers normative suggestions for introducing defensive deterrence and overcoming the practical problem of putting it into practice within the current contours of the law, by using the military professionalism criterion.

scholarly journals MAIAD: A Multistage Asymmetric Information Attack and Defense Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Symmetry ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Yang ◽  
Bichen Che ◽  
Yang Zeng ◽  
Yang Cheng ◽  
Chenyang Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Defense Strategy ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Defense Model ◽  
Attack And Defense ◽  
Systems Simulation

With the rapid development and widespread applications of Internet of Things (IoT) systems, the corresponding security issues are getting more and more serious. This paper proposes a multistage asymmetric information attack and defense model (MAIAD) for IoT systems. Under the premise of asymmetric information, MAIAD extends the single-stage game model with dynamic and evolutionary game theory. By quantifying the benefits for both the attack and defense, MAIAD can determine the optimal defense strategy for IoT systems. Simulation results show that the model can select the optimal security defense strategy for various IoT systems.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document