scholarly journals The Role of AFRICOM in Solving Security Problems on the African Continent (2001-2020)

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. 619-629
Author(s):  
O. Khlopov

The article analyzes the US’s security relations with Africa, including the “war on terror”, as well as the role of the US African Military Command (AFRICOM) in resolving regional conflicts. After the end of the Cold War and a failed mission in Somalia, the United States ended major military operations in Africa. However, in the past few years, the strategic interests of the United States in the region have increased due to the threats of the activities of international terrorist groups. The article reveals the goals of Presidents George Bush, Jr., Barack Obama, and Donald Trump in relation to Africa in the context of regional security challenges and the main results of US foreign policy under three administrations.

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. JOHN IKENBERRY

Since the middle of the twentieth century, the governance of the global system has been organized around the United States and the advanced industrial democracies. In the shadow of the Cold War, these countries established a wide array of global and regional institutions to manage economic, political, and security relations. The Bretton Woods institutions, GATT (and later the WTO), the United Nations, and various functional institutions provided the bulwark for an open and managed postwar world economy and global order. An American-led alliance system provided a structure for regional security in Europe and East Asia. When the Cold War ended, these far-flung institutions were extended into a more fully global multilateral system of governance. The United States dominated the global order. But, more so than did leading states in previous eras, it established its dominance through institutions. It was an American-led liberal hegemonic order.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two world wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. This book demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy—combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries—divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of regional conflicts, to prevent existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, the book explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under Moscow's clear control. Reviewing newly available archival material, the book examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars. While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments, the book investigates how efforts to adjust burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security partners have complicated U.S. security relations with the People's Republic of China since the collapse of the Soviet Union.


2020 ◽  
pp. 97-117
Author(s):  
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres

This chapter focuses on the role of copper policies in the relations between the United States and Chile during the Frei administration, especially as they relate to the developmental efforts of the Christian Democratic project. During the Frei administration, the political debate on copper policies reached a climax. Since U.S. capitals were among the most significant actors in the story, the discussions around the issue of copper converged with the ideological visions of the United States and the Cold War held by the different Chilean political parties. As the Frei administration tried to introduce the most comprehensive and consistent reform around the structure of the property of the Gran Minería del Cobre, the forces in competition in the arena of Chilean politics stood by their ideological convictions, regarding both copper and the United States, in their opposition or grudging support for the policies proposed by the Christian Democratic government. Moreover, the U.S. government became deeply involved in the matter of copper in Chile, first by pressuring the Chilean government into rolling back a price increase in 1965 and then, mostly through the personal efforts of Ambassador Edward Korry, by mediating in the negotiation between the Frei administration and Anaconda on the nationalization of the U.S. company's largest mine, Chuquicamata, in 1969.


Author(s):  
Jared S. Buss

This chapter discusses the myriad of Ley’s activities during the late 1950s, when his status as a scientific celebrity and rocket expert peaked. It follows his pre-Sputnik and post-Sputnik tactics. Not only did Ley encourage millions of Americans to believe in American “firsts” in 1955 and 1956, but also he encouraged Americans to express resentment, anger, and shock following the launch of Sputnik I in 1957. In newspaper columns that circulated across the United States, Ley expressed fears of missile gaps and cultural lag with the Soviet Union. While historians have analyzed the role of politicians during the Cold War, they have not recognized the role of Ley as America’s rocket expert, who now shared the stage with Wernher von Braun.


2020 ◽  
pp. 109-146
Author(s):  
Pierre-Hugues Verdier

This chapter examines the rise of financial sanctions as a tool of U.S. foreign policy and the role of U.S. prosecutors in enforcing sanctions against global banks. It describes how the United States developed its financial sanctions capabilities against terrorist groups, then turned them against state actors such as North Korea, culminating with elaborate sanctions programs against Iran and Russia. It shows how U.S. federal and state prosecutors uncovered large-scale sanctions evasion efforts at numerous global banks that processed U.S. dollar payments. This enforcement campaign led to some of the largest criminal fines ever levied, and global banks such as HSBC and BNP Paribas agreed to implement U.S. sanctions and anti-money laundering controls in their worldwide operations, thus broadening the reach of U.S. policy. Although U.S. enforcement actions faced strong criticism by U.S. allies, banks facing large fines, negative publicity, and potential loss of access to essential U.S. dollar payment infrastructure complied with U.S. demands. Unlike other cases, U.S. sanctions did not lead to multilateral reforms, instead triggering efforts by sanctioned states and bystanders to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar and U.S. payment systems.


Author(s):  
Jason C. Parker

The decolonization of the European overseas empires had its intellectual roots early in the modern era, but its culmination occurred during the Cold War that loomed large in post-1945 international history. This culmination thus coincided with the American rise to superpower status and presented the United States with a dilemma. While philosophically sympathetic to the aspirations of anticolonial nationalist movements abroad, the United States’ vastly greater postwar global security burdens made it averse to the instability that decolonization might bring and that communists might exploit. This fear, and the need to share those burdens with European allies who were themselves still colonial landlords, led Washington to proceed cautiously. The three “waves” of the decolonization process—medium-sized in the late 1940s, large in the half-decade around 1960, and small in the mid-1970s—prompted the American use of a variety of tools and techniques to influence how it unfolded. Prior to independence, this influence was usually channeled through the metropolitan authority then winding down. After independence, Washington continued and often expanded the use of these tools, in most cases on a bilateral basis. In some theaters, such as Korea, Vietnam, and the Congo, through the use of certain of these tools, notably covert espionage or overt military operations, Cold War dynamics enveloped, intensified, and repossessed local decolonization struggles. In most theaters, other tools, such as traditional or public diplomacy or economic or technical development aid, affixed the Cold War into the background as a local transition unfolded. In all cases, the overriding American imperative was to minimize instability and neutralize actors on the ground who could invite communist gains.


2019 ◽  
pp. 82-117
Author(s):  
Geoffrey B. Robinson

This chapter examines the role of foreign powers in the October 1, 1965 incident. It argues that the wider international context, in particular the rhetoric and logic of the Cold War and anticolonial nationalism, affected the contours of Indonesian politics, making it more militant and polarized. In addition, that general atmosphere, together with the actions of major powers elsewhere in the region and beyond, contributed to political conditions inside Indonesia in which a seizure of power by the army was much more likely to occur. In creating this atmosphere of polarization and crisis, several major powers played some part, including China. Yet it was overwhelmingly the United States, the United Kingdom, and their closest allies that played the central roles.


Author(s):  
Aryeh Neier

This chapter highlights the significant role of the human rights movement after September 11, 2001. It points out how Al-Qaeda made no claim to respect rights after 9/11, making them insusceptible to the human rights movement's main weapon: embarrassment. It also details how the United States played a crucial role in the promotion of human rights worldwide during and after the Cold War. The chapter analyzes the consequence of the decision to make prevention the defining concern of U.S. government policy in responding to the threat of terrorism for human rights. It looks at the consequences of the primacy given to prevention that removed one of the restraints on the use of torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.


2019 ◽  
pp. 55-71
Author(s):  
Enze Han

Chapter 4 analyzes the legacy of the KMT in the borderland area, after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War, in terms of its impact on state building in the three countries. It analyzes how the KMT incursion in Burma played a sizable role in the fragmentation of Burma in the peripheries and also indirectly set in motion the militarized confrontation between the Burmese army and many of the estranged ethnic groups. In Thailand’s case, KMT remnant troops proved instrumental in Thai counter-insurgency campaigns within the context of its broader security relations with the United States during the Cold War. For China, the communist government carried out ruthless counterinsurgencies against the KMT remnants as well as other ethnic and local rebellions in mountainous areas that resisted the communist regime’s consolidation of power. Campaigns were also carried out to subdue the population in the name of suppressing counter-revolutionaries.


2019 ◽  
pp. 27-49
Author(s):  
Michael Nacht ◽  
Patricia Schuster ◽  
Eva C. Uribe

This chapter assesses the role of cross-domain deterrence in recent American foreign policy. Cross-domain deterrence is not a new phenomenon, even if our consciousness of it may be. Prominent cases from the Cold War, such as the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, can be interpreted through the lens of cross-domain deterrence and fruitfully compared with more contemporary cases, such as the Stuxnet attack on Iran. These cases illustrate the variation across domains by the adversary and U.S. responses. Considered together, the United States generally responded to these crises by initially limiting itself to the domain where a crisis started and only later expanding into other domains. The United States has typically been cautious when shifting domains and has tried to escalate in ways that would not produce adversarial retaliation.


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