Spillover of the Chinese Civil War and Militarization of the Borderland

2019 ◽  
pp. 55-71
Author(s):  
Enze Han

Chapter 4 analyzes the legacy of the KMT in the borderland area, after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War, in terms of its impact on state building in the three countries. It analyzes how the KMT incursion in Burma played a sizable role in the fragmentation of Burma in the peripheries and also indirectly set in motion the militarized confrontation between the Burmese army and many of the estranged ethnic groups. In Thailand’s case, KMT remnant troops proved instrumental in Thai counter-insurgency campaigns within the context of its broader security relations with the United States during the Cold War. For China, the communist government carried out ruthless counterinsurgencies against the KMT remnants as well as other ethnic and local rebellions in mountainous areas that resisted the communist regime’s consolidation of power. Campaigns were also carried out to subdue the population in the name of suppressing counter-revolutionaries.

Author(s):  
Walter LaFeber

This chapter examines how the United States evolved as a world power during the period 1776–1945. It first considers how Americans set out after the War of Independence to establish a continental empire. Thomas Jefferson called this an ‘empire for liberty’, but by the early nineteenth century the United States had become part of an empire containing human slavery. Abraham Lincoln determined to stop the territorial expansion of this slavery and thus helped bring about the Civil War. The reunification of the country after the Civil War, and the industrial revolution which followed, turned the United States into the world’s leading economic power by the early twentieth century. The chapter also discusses Woodrow Wilson’s empire of ideology and concludes with an analysis of U.S. economic depression and the onset of the Cold War.


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1317-1333
Author(s):  
Norrin M Ripsman

Abstract Commercial liberalism would suggest that whereas globalization was conducive to great power cooperation—or at least moderated competition—deglobalization is likely to ignite greater competition amongst the Great Powers. In reality, however, the picture is much more complex. To begin with, the intense globalization of the 1990s and 2000s is not responsible for moderating Great Power tensions; instead, it is itself a product of the security situation resulting from the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, while globalization did serve to reinforce cooperation between the United States and rising challengers, such as China, which sought to harness the economic gains of globalization to accelerate their rise, it also created or intensified fault-lines that have led to heightening tensions between the Great Powers. Finally, while we are currently witnessing increasing tensions between the US and both China and Russia, deglobalization does not appear to be the primary cause. Thus, geoeconomic conditions do not drive security relations; instead, the geoeconomic environment, which is itself influenced by Great Power politics, is better understood as a medium of Great Power competition, which may affect the character of Great Power competition and its intensity, but does not determine it.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. 619-629
Author(s):  
O. Khlopov

The article analyzes the US’s security relations with Africa, including the “war on terror”, as well as the role of the US African Military Command (AFRICOM) in resolving regional conflicts. After the end of the Cold War and a failed mission in Somalia, the United States ended major military operations in Africa. However, in the past few years, the strategic interests of the United States in the region have increased due to the threats of the activities of international terrorist groups. The article reveals the goals of Presidents George Bush, Jr., Barack Obama, and Donald Trump in relation to Africa in the context of regional security challenges and the main results of US foreign policy under three administrations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. JOHN IKENBERRY

Since the middle of the twentieth century, the governance of the global system has been organized around the United States and the advanced industrial democracies. In the shadow of the Cold War, these countries established a wide array of global and regional institutions to manage economic, political, and security relations. The Bretton Woods institutions, GATT (and later the WTO), the United Nations, and various functional institutions provided the bulwark for an open and managed postwar world economy and global order. An American-led alliance system provided a structure for regional security in Europe and East Asia. When the Cold War ended, these far-flung institutions were extended into a more fully global multilateral system of governance. The United States dominated the global order. But, more so than did leading states in previous eras, it established its dominance through institutions. It was an American-led liberal hegemonic order.


2020 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050001
Author(s):  
KHANH VAN NGUYEN

In this article, the political–security relations between the United States and Pakistan in the Post-Cold War era are analyzed. The allied relationship between the two countries during the Cold War was abruptly disrupted following the conclusion of the Cold War in 1991 and the United States imposed a series of sanctions against Pakistan following the nuclear issue in 1990. However, the September 11 attacks of 2001 and the global anti-terrorism war launched by the G. W. Bush government resumed the relationship. Again, Pakistan became one of the principal allies of the United States and bilateral political–security relations were promoted unprecedentedly thanks to their collaboration against terrorism. The war against terrorism, however, has also produced many contradictions, which brought the relationship between the two countries into disputes and crises. This article discusses the U.S.–Pakistan relations in the Post-Cold War Era with special attention to the political–security aspects. Attempts will be made to clarify the nature, impacts and tendencies of the relationship. The U.S.–Pakistan relationship is a typical example of the international relationship between a superpower and a middle power, and it is also typical of the U.S.’s changing alliance relations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 224-229
Author(s):  
Sergey O. Buranok ◽  
Dmitriy A. Nesterov

In this paper the authors consider the materials of one of the leading American analytical magazines Foreign Affairs, devoted to the Chinese Civil War in 19291950. The novelty of this study lies in the analysis of assessments of key actors and assessments of the situation in the country as well as a possible outcome of the conflict which were made by American journalists. The authors provide the results of the analysis of Foreign Affairs articles for the formation of Mao Zedong image in connection with the events of that time. The authors reviewed the main arguments of the American press, which revealed that the problem of the civil war was one of the components of the complex problem of planning a post-war reconstruction of the world. The United States was primarily interested in changes in the balance of power in the Far East, tried to assess the possible outcomes of the conflict and how they would affect the United States itself (mainly in the economic sphere). But as the victory of the Chinese Communist Party, headed by Mao Zedong, approached the Kuomintang support from American experts weakened. The study of this information phenomenon will allow researchers to understand what impact on Sino-American relations was made by an influential American analytical magazine through the formation of ideas about China, the Chinese people and their political elites.


Author(s):  
A.O. Buranok ◽  
◽  
D.A. Nesterov ◽  

The authors of the article use prosopographic methods to analyze the materials of the journal «Foreign Affairs» devoted to the Chinese civil war of 1929-1950, in order to create «collective biographies» of the American expert community. They reveal the national, professional and age composition of the observers of the journal «Foreign Affairs» and reconstruct their ideological imperatives. The authors drew conclusions about the state of Chinese researches in the American expert community in the 1930-1940s and the functioning of the leading political science journal in the United States.


1972 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 654-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M. Leary

“The United States Government,” President Harry S. Truman announced on 5 January 1950, “will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.” Historians generally agree that President Truman meant what he said. American policy after the summer of 1949, writes Tang Tsou, was “to avoid, as far as possible, any further involvement in the Chinese civil war and to allow events in China to unfold themselves.” The Truman administration ruled out the use of force to prevent the fall of Formosa; non-recognition of the Communist government was adopted as “a temporary measure,” due to Republican pressure and the hope of gaining concessions from Peking. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, observes Lyman P. Van Slyke, “brought to a sudden end the policy that the administration had followed for two years, and committed us once again to involvement in the Chinese civil war.” The United States assumed a protective role towards the remnants of the Nationalists on Formosa and became the implacable foe of Peking. This article, a study of a commercial airline's participation in a major diplomatic and legal controversy during the last phase of the Chinese civil war, will suggest that there is reason to doubt, or at least to modify, the traditional interpretation of American policy towards China between late 1949 and June 1950.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two world wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. This book demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy—combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries—divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of regional conflicts, to prevent existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, the book explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under Moscow's clear control. Reviewing newly available archival material, the book examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars. While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments, the book investigates how efforts to adjust burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security partners have complicated U.S. security relations with the People's Republic of China since the collapse of the Soviet Union.


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